How Maia Sandu and PAS’ inadequate reintegration policy has put Moldova’s prospects of joining the European Union at risk – in an author’s commentary by Dorin Mocanu
Dorin MOCANU, RTA:
Putin’s decree simplifying the acquisition of Russian citizenship for all residents of Transnistria is a potential game changer not only for the Transnistrian settlement, but also for Moldova’s broader geopolitical prospects. Too much suggests that this is far from a “purely symbolic and inconsequential step”, as the authorities claim. Notably, even expert circles that are generally loyal to the ruling regime, on the contrary, clearly understand what has happened and are already sounding the alarm. But let us take things step by step.
Thus, the entire population of the left bank of the Dniester will, by virtue of birth and residence there, effectively have the opportunity to obtain Russian citizenship, seemingly without even needing to travel anywhere. Everything is being arranged in such a way as to allow as many interested individuals as possible to acquire Russian documents as quickly as possible. One only needs to look at the pace of implementation of Putin’s decree: May 15 - the date of signing, and already by May 25 the acceptance of applications is expected to begin. For the not particularly agile Russian bureaucratic system, such a pace is extremely high and, in itself, indicative: it suggests that the process is being overseen from very high levels within the Kremlin, where results are expected as quickly as possible.
The Russian president’s decision is directly linked to another important act – the law on the use of Russian armed forces abroad to protect citizens from criminal and other forms of prosecution by foreign states. It has already been approved by parliament and will enter into force in the near future. Many previously interpreted it narrowly, as a tool for protecting merchant fleet sailors. However, the law now takes on a completely different meaning. One could easily have put two and two together, but the Russian side has left no room for alternative interpretations. Both in the commentary of the Russian Embassy in Chisinau and in statements by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova regarding simplified citizenship for Transnistrians, there are explicit references to the expansion of mechanisms for protecting their rights, as well as unambiguous allusions to the new law.
In fact, the Russian side is not concealing the reasons for its actions. The embassy’s statement attributes them to Chisinau’s “uncompromising and confrontational line”. In other words, the Kremlin’s recent assertive steps are presented as a direct consequence of the highly particular reintegration policy pursued by Maia Sandu and PAS.
One is left to ask the country’s (dis)respected leaders: is this really what you have been striving for all along? While the authorities were boasting about the extension of national legislation to the left bank of the Dniester and the erosion of Tiraspol’s economic base following the disruption of energy ties, in reality the country’s reintegration is now being pushed light-years further away. After all, no matter how much money may be extracted from Tiraspol, the local regime, now likely to receive full-scale support from Moscow, can sustain itself indefinitely. The result is a long-term freezing of the conflict, with no real prospects for its resolution. Well done, PAS!
Yes, full responsibility for bringing the situation to such an impasse lies with the ruling party. In my view, the past few years represented a unique window of opportunity for the Transnistrian settlement. As early as 2022, it would have been necessary to begin addressing socio-economic disagreements in parallel with the launch of intensive negotiations on the political status of Transnistria. Moreover, at that time, the Russian officials responsible for Moldova-related policy were still adhering a line aimed at returning the region to Moldova’s constitutional framework on acceptable terms. There is little doubt that an attractive model of coexistence could have appealed both to the population and businesses in the “PMR”, as well as to Moscow, which in 2022-2023 was clearly preoccupied with other priorities and might have accepted a resolution within a more or less workable framework.
Instead, a different course was chosen, one based on forcing Tiraspol into a form of capitulation and on the assumption of Russia’s military defeat in Ukraine. As a result, the authorities not only stopped discussing but at times even ceased informing the left bank about measures taken in relation to it. They abandoned virtually all previous agreements and the conclusion of new ones, and no longer spoke of a special status for Transnistria, instead viewing its reintegration as the return of an ordinary administrative unit. Moreover, over these years PAS has demonstrated its attitude toward the region’s population by severely restricting their participation in national elections, adopting legislation on separatism, and beginning to strip some Transnistrian residents of citizenship, among other measures.
The country’s leadership, like casino players, placed everything on black and lost. Russia has not been defeated, Tiraspol is not prepared to surrender, and now it is even less willing to do so, receiving a significant boost of external support. The only outcome of the ruling regime’s reintegration policy is that Russia has seriously shifted its focus to the Transnistrian issue. And judging by the steps being taken, these are not tactical measures but elements of a long-term strategy. One can only speculate about what other actions may be planned within it.
For those who still do not understand what is happening, let me put it this way: we are witnessing a complete shift in the status quo. For the first time, Moldova has received such explicit and targeted threats from Russia, reinforced by legislation (!), in the event that PAS continues its current policy toward the left bank. Secondly, the authorities have achieved a situation in which Transnistria is increasingly perceived as something separate from the rest of Moldova – one only needs to look at the wording of the decree, or at the fact that in Russian federal media the left bank is more and more often referred to as the “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”. And although the official position on Moldova’s territorial integrity has not yet changed, what guarantees are there that it will not do so at a later stage, especially if no adjustments are made to the current approach to the Transnistrian issue.
But most importantly, by forcing Russia into more decisive actions, PAS has put at risk the country’s central national project – accession to the European Union. Regardless of what some officials in Brussels may say, the virtually consensus view among EU member states is that Moldova’s accession is only possible as a single, unified state entity. In the context of multiple internal and external challenges, no one is willing to bring in another problematic member, especially given the experience of Cyprus.
Those who believe I am exaggerating should ask themselves a simple question: why do our officials regularly travel to Brussels and report on developed concepts and plans for reintegration? They are clearly not doing this out of great enthusiasm, but rather because the EU demands progress in the settlement process and has no intention of taking this problem upon itself, regardless of what our leaders may wish. It has been stated more than once that this is our “homework”. And the repeated mantra that “the Transnistrian issue must not become an obstacle to European integration” does little to change that reality.
It is time for the entire ruling elite to understand that only a Moldova free from the burden of a frozen conflict will be able to join the European Union. However, instead of taking thoughtful and coherent steps toward resolving it, everything has been done in the opposite direction, deepening the divide between the two banks. At this point, that gap is already virtually unbridgeable.
It is striking that Maia Sandu, seemingly aware of where things have led, has recently begun to speak more frequently about unirea as a fallback path toward EU accession. One is tempted to ask the head of state whether the people voted in a referendum or national elections for the loss of statehood and a transfer under Bucharest’s jurisdiction. If memory serves, the question was never framed in such terms. In fact, unionist rhetoric had largely been toned down until recently – only to resurface now in force, at a moment when the “front-door” path to the European Union is beginning to experience serious disruptions.
Personally, I am not prepared to wait another twenty or thirty years for Moldova to finally become a full-fledged member of the EU. I strongly urge the authorities to stop undermining Moldova’s European path and to begin changing their current policy, which, as has now become crystal clear, can hardly end well. Moscow’s current decisions are not even a final warning – they represent the formation of a framework for further actions that we are clearly unlikely to find favorable.
After all, who knows what steps the Kremlin might take once Transnistria shifts from a region of nominal compatriots to a territory where nearly the entire population consists of Russian citizens. In Moscow’s eyes, violations of Transnistrians’ rights could soon be reframed as mass violations of the rights of Russian citizens. And in that case, could Russia greenlight a new referendum on the left bank? Could it recognize its results and later even Transnistria itself? Such a scenario would open a true Pandora’s box, where any outcome becomes potentially catastrophic. A forceful reintegration of the region would risk the physical destruction of the state, while without such a step the prospects for reintegration would effectively vanish. In both scenarios, Moldova’s European ambitions would be irreversibly compromised, since in such a configuration EU membership would be off the table indefinitely. So perhaps it is worth avoiding these extremes and beginning to change something now?