Inside Gagauzia’s Political Transformation

Anton ŠVEC

Having temporarily overcome its domestic political crisis and under the cover of tensions along its external borders, the PAS regime continues to rapidly impose new electoral legislation on Comrat

Geopolitical factors time and again contribute to the ruling party’s arbitrary actions. While no real threats to the country’s security have emerged recently, the broader context regularly diverts the attention of the opposition and the public toward events unfolding at the global and regional levels. This allows PAS to play its own game, suppressing protest sentiment and curtailing any expressions of autonomy in Gagauzia. Moreover, the regime doesn’t even have to go out of its way to stoke fear among the public by artificially provoking incidents. The recent incident involving a Russian drone discovered in Copanca is more of an exception to the rule. Usually, the geopolitical landscape helps Maia Sandu advance her own interests with minimal resistance. For example, the sharp increase in residential gas rates can easily be explained by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, which has restricted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. If the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is also blocked due to the actions of the Yemeni Houthis, then any greed on the part of the authorities, who profit from shady intermediary schemes in the procurement of resources, will be attributed to unfavorable external conditions. Incidentally, the price hikes for fuel and petroleum products, especially the explosive one, through excise taxes also helps fill the deficit-ridden budget, which supports numerous party officials and members of Maia Sandu’s team. On top of that, there has been a sharp deterioration in the situation regarding shipping in the Black Sea due to mutual attacks by Russia and Ukraine, which have even affected the interests of Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Iran. If the situation continues to deteriorate, Igor Grosu or some other member of the ruling elite will remind the ungrateful people just how profitable, in the end, the government’s recent sale of the port in Giurgiulesti to a “Romanian investor” turned out to be. Especially given the shallowing of the Danube, which, combined with the temporary suspension of oil supplies from Kazakhstan to Romania (which have since resumed), led Prime Minister Vasile Tofan to declare a state of heightened readiness at the national level in the energy and hydrological sectors. Such a decision, already supported by some opposition figures, once again shifts the government’s operations to a “manual control” mode, which will enable the implementation of various questionable schemes involving resource procurement, pricing, and the exertion of pressure on political opponents, the media, and citizens. Maia Sandu, in turn, readily joined the promotion of a new narrative emerging in Romania, where amid a domestic political crisis and numerous labor union protests sparked by drastic austerity measures local pilots of American F-16s have unexpectedly learned to shoot down Russian drones. Moreover, the combat operations are being conducted at a rapid pace: three days – three UAVs shot down. In response, Bucharest also expelled a diplomat from the Russian Embassy. The inexperienced President Nicushor Dan, who had largely blocked the formation of a government through absurd behind-the-scenes maneuvers, was visibly delighted by this turn of events and has already sent his emissaries (including his chief of staff) to Washington – following in the footsteps of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The calculation is to draw the U.S. into the acute phase of the conflict with Russia in a show of solidarity, since an escalation could lead to the write-off of debts stemming from corruption schemes, as well as the consequences of past political and economic miscalculations. Amid “distracted public attention” and limited security risks, Chisinau is persistently pushing to redraw the electoral map in Gagauzia. Moreover, the regime’s plan is being implemented without proper consultation with representatives of the autonomous region. Maia Sandu held a meeting with deputies of the Gagauz People’s Assembly, which was purely a formality. Valentin Gaidarji and Gheorghe Leiciu weren’t exactly expected in parliament either but they still managed to make it to the session – only to confirm once again that all decisions at the government level had long since been made, and no one there intended to listen to them. On Monday, the PAS submitted a bill to the legislature to amend the Electoral Code, introducing the concept of “regional elections” for the autonomous region. The bill calls for the Central Election Commission, which is directly controlled by the president’s office, to take over oversight of the Gagauzia Central Electoral Council (the People’s Assembly will appoint only two of its representatives to the council out of a total of 7 or 11; the rest will be appointed by the Central Election Commission). At the same time, a proportional representation system is being introduced in the region, involving voting along party-list lines. Although the upcoming campaign will take place within single-member districts, in the long term, the PAS will seek to secure its representation in the People’s Assembly and to draw other parties into various temporary coalitions, as in other regions of the country where the authorities have failed to secure a majority. The PAS project also calls for elections to be held as early as November, which is a key element that benefits the Gagauz elites, as it will allow them to form the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia with relatively limited pressure from the central government and to enter a new phase of confrontation while maintaining the legitimacy of the autonomy’s official representatives. Valentin Gaidarji may even succeed in pushing through his initiative to hold the election for the Bashkan concurrently. Socialist Fiodor Gagauz has already declared his candidacy for this position. A partnership with a weakened PSRM would be a favorable trade-off for the PAS, allowing it to definitively “write off” Evghenia Gutul and the voters who trusted her. The bottom line is that the regime is once again exploiting the global and regional situation to achieve its own utilitarian goals of retaining power, putting pressure on the opposition, dismantling Gagauz autonomy, and preserving opaque systems of economic management and business operations. Stabilization of the external situation would inevitably expose the failure of PAS’ methods. However, there are no signs of such normalization yet, especially given the ability of Maia Sandu and her court media to exaggerate any threat, even an imaginary one.