Vasile Tofan’s Government Is Losing Ground

The energy crisis has once again raised pressing questions about securing external loans to get through the winter, but Moldova’s international partners are themselves in a state of political chaos

The government has once again rejected the proposal to allocate 1,000 lei to help schoolchildren prepare for the school year. As it turns out, there isn’t even enough money available to repair the Triumphal Arch in Chisinau, which many see as a symbol of the regime’s administrative failure. When announcing a 60-day state of emergency in the energy sector, the government and the president’s office not only cited alarming figures highlighting the country’s dependence on imports and shortages of gas, electricity, and fuel, but also explicitly pointed to the need for donor funding to compensate for rising rates, as no funds have been allocated in the budget for these purposes. According to Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu, gas prices will soon rise (tariff discrepancies, according to ANRE, have already reached 180 million lei), and the cost of fuel will jump to 40 lei per liter by the end of the month. In previous years, despite excessive bureaucracy and limited external resources, international partners helped Moldova get through the winter without any major disruptions. However, at this stage, the prospects for foreign aid remain uncertain. And the issue is not only that PAS faces no risk of losing power at this time and does not need a financial boost to raise its approval ratings in the run-up to elections. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the main foreign donors themselves are caught in a cycle of protracted political instability. The notorious Moldova Support Platform, which over the course of five meetings had raised hundreds of millions of euros to meet PAS’s needs, has not convened for two years – since its meeting in Chisinau in mid-September 2024. Berlin, Paris, and Bucharest, the key participants in the platform, now have priorities of their own. In Romania, the political crisis has been dragging on for around five months. President Nicusor Dan has announced a new candidate for prime minister: MEP Siegfried Muresan. Chisinau has reacted quite favorably to the choice. In the European Parliament, the politician devotes considerable attention to supporting our country, actively lobbying for assistance and pushing for Moldova’s accelerated accession to the European Union. Muresan has also supported Maia Sandu’s team for many years, allowing PAS to count on a cooperative relationship should he be approved for the top post. One problem is that the nominated candidate has not yet been able to secure enough votes in support of him among the parliamentary parties. He is fundamentally ignoring the “Alliance for the Union of Romanians”, and Social Democratic Party leader Sorin Grindeanu, following the party convention, effectively refused to support any government that does not include ministerial portfolios for the PSD. Nevertheless, Siegfried Muresan still intends to officially run for office and hold consultations; should these fail, Nicusor Dan will be forced to dissolve Parliament and call for early elections. Amid a budget deficit and drastic austerity measures, as well as the latest arrest of opposition leader Calin Georgescu, Romania finds itself on the brink of political transformation. And Igor Grosu will simply have no one in Bucharest with whom to discuss the notorious “Plan B”, which is so “natural” for “educated people who know their history on both banks of the Prut.” The situation is hardly any better for German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who risks losing his post in the coming weeks. For the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) he leads, September has become a month of the “perfect storm”. The party lost elections in the capital and in two federal states. In one of them, the CDU failed to win any representation in the state parliament for the first time in its history; in the other, a coalition government is expected to be formed largely by representatives of the winning party, Alternative for Germany (AfD). Even in Berlin, power went to the “left” and the Greens, pointing to an electoral catastrophe for the CDU’s right-wing conservatives, directly linked to the federal chancellor’s negative approval ratings. Notably, even Friedrich Merz, an active proponent of escalating tensions with Russia, has expressed skepticism about the prospects of Moldova and Ukraine joining the European Union as full members. Undoubtedly, his successor’s policy will be even more cautious, and Berlin will spend less and less of German taxpayers’ money in Eastern Europe. In France, the presidential race is gaining momentum, with the seat being vacated by Emmanuel Macron at the height of his unpopularity. The election is scheduled for April of next year, and according to all polls, former National Front (FN) leader Marine Le Pen is in the lead. Her rise to power would mean a massive transformation of France, with a shift toward reduced involvement in NATO, the European Union, and Ukraine. In the United Kingdom, the situation has stabilized somewhat following Keir Starmer’s dismissal in July, but the country’s migration and economic crises are limiting London’s room for maneuver. Moreover, the new prime minister, Andy Burnham, is facing the threat of a fundamental restructuring of the state’s historic political order, amid a joint statement by the leaders of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland on the possibility of leaving the union in order to seek independent membership in the EU, with reunification with Ireland being an option in Belfast’s case. All of the countries listed were key stakeholders in the platform supporting Moldova; their representatives, serving as ministers, high-level advisors, and other leaders, play a key role in overseeing our country’s foreign affairs. However, as it turns out, they are unable to cope even with their own internal challenges and crises, which objectively reduces their ability to serve as sponsors of the PAS regime. Neighboring Ukraine is also going through extremely difficult times: the country is facing a record budget deficit, funding for most government programs has been suspended, and Russian attacks have caused enormous damage. Volodymyr Zelensky is trying to secure a halt to strikes on energy facilities and export and storage infrastructure, but Moscow has responded indifferently to these appeals. As a result, Vasile Tofan’s government is left to face its problems alone, grappling with a shortage of donor resources. Yesterday, it was decided to cut funding for government services and agencies, reducing staff by 10-30%. No immediate or predictable effect from these measures is to be expected. Nor is there any sign of a normalization of the external economic situation. If Chisinau does not urgently find a new, effective foothold (Igor Dodon is already openly campaigning in favor of a deal with Moscow), this winter could turn out to be the hardest yet for the population, derailing plans for European Union membership and deepening the socio-demographic crisis.