The Kremlin Ups the Ante Ahead of Moldova’s Talks with the EU

Sergiu CEBAN

The first half of the year did not bring any significant progress in the Transnistrian issue; however, a series of steps taken by Chisinau and Moscow’s response to them point to a gradual shift in the previous foundations of the conflict settlement process  

In the summer, the Transnistrian settlement entered its usual seasonal state of stagnation. Official negotiations are not being held, and even verbal exchanges have lost their former energy and sharpness. However, this perception may prove misleading: the pause exists primarily at the local level, meaning between Chisinau and Tiraspol, while on the external track the Transnistrian issue remains an important regional factor. Moreover, under current circumstances, it is increasingly becoming part of a broader question concerning the future of European security. The end of the war in Ukraine, possible formats for its termination, and the future architecture of relations between Russia and the West inevitably also involve the frozen conflicts across the post-Soviet space. In this sense, the left bank of the Dniester is one of the elements in a macro-regional picture where the interests of Moscow, Kyiv, Chisinau, and European capitals intersect. At present, it is difficult to assess with certainty how actively Europeans are promoting the Transnistrian issue in their contacts with Russia. In principle, the very fact of recent attempts to establish a separate negotiation track between Russia and Europe suggests that regional security issues may once again become the subject of major diplomatic engagement. In such a scenario, the left bank of the Dniester would inevitably transform from an internal Moldovan problem into part of the future balance of power in Eastern Europe. A particular interest in the developments around Transnistria is held by neighboring Ukraine, and not only due to geography. For it, the question of the region’s status is of fundamental importance, linked to its own security, post-war future, and negotiating positions. It is no coincidence that Volodymyr Zelensky, in a recent open letter to Vladimir Putin, separately noted that Kyiv is observing how “the Kremlin is playing some kind of game with Transnistria”. But let us return to what Chisinau itself was doing in the first half of the year. During this period, the authorities took decisive steps that effectively amounted to a bid to change the entire existing configuration of the Transnistrian issue and the current status quo. Formally, no one has withdrawn from the negotiation process, but key decisions are being made not there, but within government offices and parliamentary chambers, for example, regarding the introduction of a full fiscal burden on Transnistria. The main objective of these measures is to create conditions capable of fundamentally influencing the formula of a future settlement. For decades, the Transnistrian issue was viewed within a model in which the end goal was the definition of a special status for the region within a reintegrated state – with guarantees and a division of powers between the central authorities and regional administrations. However, recently signals from Chisinau have increasingly suggested that granting such a status is not automatic and depends on the fulfilment of a set of conditions. Deputy Prime Minister Valeriu Chiveri even suggested that no special arrangement would be granted to the eastern districts if there were no political and legal grounds for it. In this way, Chisinau is gradually shifting the negotiating framework, which, under certain developments, could radically alter the very logic of the negotiations between the parties. It is evident that the primary addressee of these new ideas in the Transnistrian settlement was not so much Tiraspol as Moscow. The authorities, together with their partners, were clearly expecting a reaction to the changes around a territory that the Kremlin considers part of its sphere of interest. In this sense, the first significant signal is particularly telling – the adoption of a presidential decree on Russian citizenship for residents of the left bank of the Dniester, as well as a law permitting the use of Russian armed forces abroad to protect Russian citizens. This “double move” in theory creates a new legal and political reality around the left bank. This was followed by a series of statements from Russian diplomats which, despite differences in wording, essentially converged on a return to the previous foundations of the settlement: the restoration of the “5+2” format, the continuation of dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and the maintenance of Russia’s military presence until a final settlement is reached. Of course, there is nothing fundamentally new in these statements. However, a different question is worth considering: how far is the Kremlin prepared to go in advancing its position regarding the status prospects of the left bank of the Dniester? For now, the Kremlin’s actions appear to be more a demonstration of capabilities than a move toward an active phase of escalation. Nevertheless, a number of recent events indicate that Russia views the Transnistrian factor as a potential element of a broader strategic game. Thus, last week Tiraspol, together with representatives of the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, organized an online event that had not happened for quite some time. Following this, a statement was published calling for international recognition of all three quasi-state entities. It is evident that the event was conducted on Moscow’s instructions and was intended as a demonstration with a very specific subtext. In other words, it was not an explicit threat, but rather a kind of implicit message to our elites that the Transnistrian region could be included in an external policy package together with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both of these entities, as is known, are recognized by Russia and, following its lead, by some other states as well. No less important – and this is hardly a coincidence – is the fact that this signal was sent right on the eve of the official opening of negotiations between Moldova and the European Union. The chronological precision is so evident that explaining it as a mere coincidence would be, to put it mildly, naive. The Kremlin outlined its position precisely at the moment when Chisinau made one of its most significant steps toward European integration. The logic is straightforward: it is being hinted that any further movement to the West will be interpreted as grounds for a corresponding tightening of Russian policy and increased pressure on the Transnistrian “sore spot”. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin will stop at these warning messages. However, one way or another, history offers a reference point that should not be ignored. Exactly twenty years ago, after Russian-Moldovan relations entered a sharp downturn and Chisinau made a fundamental decision regarding the status of the Transnistrian region by enshrining it in legislation, Moscow organized a so-called “referendum” on independence on the left bank. Among the current indicators, there are none that would clearly point to Moscow’s readiness to once again move toward such an open escalation. After all, the geopolitical landscape in the post-Soviet space is now fundamentally different, and abrupt unilateral steps entail unpredictable risks. However, ruling out such a scenario would be just as imprudent as considering it inevitable. The Transnistrian issue has too often produced surprises precisely at moments when stability and equilibrium along the banks of the Dniester seemed beyond doubt. The question of where exactly lies the threshold beyond which Moscow would consider action acceptable or necessary remains open. And this is what makes the current relative calm so troubling.