Opinion: “PAS Will Not Survive the End of the Ukraine War”

Nicolae TCAÇ

The ruling regime continues to face the risk of losing its grip on the country. Corruption scandals that led to the change of government, growing resistance to Moldova’s EU membership in European capitals, and the growing presence of American diplomats are all further narrowing the room for man oeuvre available to Maia Sandu and PAS

The current generation of politicians came to power on the wave of opposition to Vlad Plahotniuc’s “captured state”. At that time, American, Russian, and European diplomats joined forces to facilitate a change of regime and establish what was presented as a new, fair, and democratic political order. Unfortunately, Maia Sandu and PAS have failed to demonstrate the ability to fundamentally reinvent the way the country is governed. The changes that have taken place have been largely superficial, resembling little more than a cosmetic renovation of the façade. Meanwhile, the judiciary has effectively been placed under manual political control. The cost of living has risen dramatically, further accelerating the outflow of people abroad. The media are left with two choices: openly praise the country’s leadership or accept the necessity of operating in the shadows. The “captured state” has merely acquired a new manager, while the usurped system of governance has been given even greater scope to reproduce itself in increasingly distorted forms. The establishment of a new form of authoritarianism, with increasingly totalitarian overtones, was greatly facilitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which for the first time allowed the authorities to test restrictions on civil rights and freedoms, as well as opaque decision-making mechanisms that proved politically convenient. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine then became, in effect, a political windfall for the “yellow leadership”. It provided the government with a ready-made justification for repeatedly invoking states of emergency, dismantling freedom of speech, manipulating electoral processes, concentrating power in its own hands without regard for the opposition, and avoiding any accountability for its endless governance failures. And, most importantly for the foreign actors supporting the country’s authorities, they managed to consolidate a course toward a unipolar Moldovan foreign policy that acquired a distinctly anti-Russian nature. This approach was met with enthusiastic applause from Brussels bureaucrats and the administration of Joseph Biden. Moldova once again became a “success story”, receiving as a reward the long-awaited status of an EU candidate country and reaching the stage of opening negotiation clusters. Meanwhile, the Brussels-Washington-Moscow triangle that brought the current leadership of the country to power has undergone significant changes. Russia is engaged in a prolonged military conflict in Ukraine, which has evolved from the initially planned rapid “special military operation” into a full-scale war involving not only the battlefield but also the information sphere, competition in military technologies, and economic confrontation. After a period of relative calm, the United States under Donald Trump has become the world’s leading newsmaker, moving from statements about the possible annexation of Canada or Greenland to coup in Venezuela and a war with Iran. The only relatively unchanged element remains Brussels’ policy, focused on liberal-globalist and “green” transformations and fueled by anti-Russian sentiment. However, fewer and fewer European capitals are willing to accept decisions made uniformly in the name of pan-European bureaucrats. Moreover, European support for preferred candidates in Romania’s elections has already demonstrated its short-lived nature, resulting in a political crisis and the absence of a functioning government in the country. Meanwhile, in Hungary, one group of sovereigntists has been replaced by another. The series of elections scheduled across Europe next year could become an unpleasant surprise for the European Commission, and consequently for Moldova’s authorities as well. If today the only obstacle to unlocking further EU negotiation clusters is Hungary, next year this could become a group of countries skeptical of further enlargement or, at the very least, opposed to the “exceptional accession” of Ukraine and Moldova bypassing the more “senior” Balkan candidate countries. It is therefore unsurprising that the ruling party and Maia Sandu, having chosen Brussels as their main (or sole) partner, are striving by all means to align themselves with the course promoted by this group of European politicians. This includes demonstrating full solidarity with Kyiv, withdrawing from CIS agreements, severing all ties and contacts with Russia, pushing out any forms of Russian presence from the banks of the Dniester, and providing logistical assistance, to the best of their ability, in the movement of goods to and from Ukraine through Moldovan territory. A separate point should be made regarding the tacit, almost silent sympathy of Moldova’s elites toward Brussels amid the growing tensions in US-European relations. Undoubtedly, the absence of the United States in Moldova in an official capacity over the past two years created favorable conditions for even closer rapprochement between Chisinau and European bureaucrats. However, the appointment of a new US ambassador to Moldova, which is now in its final stages, as well as the return of a US-backed figure to the position of head of the local OSCE field mission, could significantly alter the current balance of influence within the country’s political circles. It seems highly likely that the Americans, accustomed to protecting their assets at all times, will not blindly and silently accept an uncontrolled drift of this part of the North Black Sea region into Brussels’ sphere of influence. The energy and, consequently, economic rebalancing of the world, which entered a new phase with the beginning of the US military campaign against Iran, is contributing to a further rise in sovereigntist sentiments in countries that had previously largely followed a globalist agenda. For a united Europe, this carries the risk of reducing consensus over military and post-war support for Ukraine. Thus, Moldova’s current leadership is dependent on EU politicians who, in turn, are themselves reliant on anti-Russian sentiments fueled by the conflict potential of the Russia-Ukraine war. The end of hostilities will inevitably lead to greater volatility within Brussels’ political establishment. And the Sandu-PAS regime, having lost its unique patron, will inevitably complete the cycle: “opposition” – “success story” – “captured state” – “political oblivion”.