Anton ŠVEC
Political factors undermine regional stability amid the crisis, making it difficult to find workable solutions for water-flow regulation on the Dniester, energy cooperation, and other pressing issues
Since the beginning of the 2020s, relations between the key actors along the Dniester, who use the river for a variety of economic activities, have undergone significant shifts. Cooperation between Kyiv and Chisinau has steadily strengthened, effectively leaving Tiraspol out of the equation, while its contacts with both capitals have virtually come to a halt. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the two banks nevertheless found common ground, as reflected in the delivery of Russian vaccines to the Transnistrian region, the mutual recognition of vaccination certificates, and a functioning mechanism for importing goods into the left bank of the Dniester. In the face of a new crisis, however, the two sides are once again drifting apart, while publicly exchanging accusations.
The partnership between Ukraine and Moldova in this regard does little to help, given the specific grounds for competition and even mutual dissatisfaction, including historical factors. The governance of the Dniester has always been an area where reaching joint decisions has proved difficult. The current situation reflects long-standing problems with water-flow regulation, significantly exacerbated by adverse weather conditions and widespread drought in Eastern Europe.
Early last week, the Dniester Commission decided to limit water discharge from the Novodnistrovsk Reservoir to 85 cubic meters per second. Environment Minister Gheorghe Hadjder hastened to defend Kyiv’s position, showing footage of the reservoir, reservoir, where a water shortage is already evident. However, he also warned that Chisinau would not support further reductions in discharge (Ukraine had stated its intention to reduce it to 70 cubic meters per second), citing the needs of not only Chisinau but also Odesa, located downstream on the Dniester and relying on the river for its water supply.
Tiraspol, in turn, criticized both sides early last week, saying that even a discharge of 85 cubic meters per second is fraught with agricultural and environmental problems, and requesting consultations to increase water discharge from the Novodnistrovsk reservoir.
Chisinau responded with accusations that the Dubasari Hydroelectric Power Plant, controlled by regional authorities, was releasing less water than it was receiving. The authorities denied this. On Monday, the CEO of the hydroelectric power plant, Boris German, cited specific figures and promised that the facility would discharge exactly as much water as it received. He stressed the needs of the agricultural sector and also explained that currently only one of four available hydroelectric units is running, resulting in a significant reduction in electricity generation. In Transnistria, according to local officials, power conservation efforts are continuing, including by switching off streetlights.
Local authorities also showed the condition of the region's pumping stations, nine of which, despite water shortages, are already operating in violation of technical standards. Nevertheless, Tiraspol was not invited to yesterday’s meeting of the Dniester Commission (the Reintegration Bureau explained last week that there were no legal grounds for such participation), essentially leaving Moldova with few arguments amid Gheorghe Hadjder’s damaging media campaign and pressure from Kyiv. Kyiv was ultimately able to push through a further reduction in water discharge to 75 cubic meters per second, which will worsen the situation for farmers, as fruit crops require daily watering.
Moreover, the lack of trust between all parties involved affects more than just the governance of the Dniester. The situation is further complicated by a critical decline in power generation. Ukraine’s electricity shortage is linked to ongoing Russian shelling. Problems are also affecting Romania’s key Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Due to low water levels on the Danube, one of the plant’s two reactors has been shut down. The second is likely to cease operation within the next two days, as military measures to maintain water levels in the Danube have had a limited short-term effect. Bucharest has partially relied on coal-fired power generation, but Romania and Moldova are experiencing persistent shortages and emergency purchases, which is reducing the availability of electricity and driving up prices severalfold.
Against this backdrop, discussions in Chisinau have intensified around purchasing electricity from the Cuciurgan Power Plant (Moldavskaya GRES) in Dnestrovsk. Using reserve gas previously purchased by Energocom, the plant could offer electricity at a favorable price. At least, that is what the opposition argues. However, the government categorically rejects the option of returning to supplies from the left bank, especially given the recent imposition of EU sanctions against INTER RAO, the owner of the Cuciurgan Power Plant.
Meanwhile, reports are emerging of Ukraine’s interest in using Moldovan railways for cargo transit to the port of Constanta. Media reports suggest Kyiv needs a “grain corridor” and a 50% discount on rail freight rates. In any case, the two capitals will have to engage with Tiraspol, which controls its own railway section and will charge its own tariff. It is difficult to predict how accommodating local elites will be if their positions on the Dniester and energy issues are ignored.
Political factors undermine regional stability amid the crisis. The sides are unable to reach agreement on sustainable governance of the Dniester, on cooperation in the energy sector, or on any other issues. The unfortunate result of this collective intransigence is that it artificially narrows the options available for addressing these problems while driving up prices, hitting people’s pockets. At the same time, no one in the government is willing to take responsibility for changing its approach or attempting to temper its ambitions in order to support the population.