What New Reintegration Phase Brings?

Over the decades that have passed, Moldova has still failed to restore control over all of its internationally recognized territory. Moreover, Chisinau and Tiraspol are now drifting ever further apart politically and in terms of their values

At the turn of summer and autumn, the Transnistrian issue was marked by three symbolic dates. On August 31, the new head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Christopher Smith, took office. On September 1, Chisinau began applying VAT and excise duties to the first group of goods imported by Transnistrian companies. Finally, on September 2, Tiraspol marked the 36th anniversary of its self-proclaimed, unrecognized entity. It is against this backdrop of mediation, economic coercion, and competition between two socio-political projects that Moldova is celebrating its 35th anniversary. A milestone anniversary marking Independence Day would normally be an occasion to take stock of the country’s achievements. In our case, however, any such assessment inevitably leads back to the Dniester. Although our state has existed for decades within certain internationally recognized borders, it has never exercised full control over them. For this reason, the Transnistrian issue is not some kind of historical footnote. It could be said to be one of the fundamental questions of modern Moldovan statehood. After the 1992 armed conflict and the July ceasefire agreement the institutionalized division on the two banks of the Dniester became firmly entrenched. Chisinau gained independence without securing a monopoly on power across the entirety of its own territory. Tiraspol, meanwhile, established functioning de facto institutions, but to this day has still failed to obtain international legitimacy. It would be convenient, but incorrect, to reduce the origins of the conflict solely to a language dispute. Concerns over the unification of Moldova with Romania, language laws, and competing versions of historical memory did indeed play a role. However, underlying them were the interests of the Soviet industrial and administrative elite on the left bank, the struggle over property and resources, the presence of the 14th Army, and, later, the pursuit of Russian military and political guarantees. None of these underlying causes have disappeared to this day. Moreover, they are taking on new forms and a new political vocabulary, intertwining the historical contradictions between Chisinau and Tiraspol with new geopolitical, economic, and value-based fault lines. Three and a half decades on, the issue of the status of the Transnistrian region remains unresolved. The “5+2” format, in which Russia and Ukraine serve as mediators alongside the OSCE, while the United States and the European Union act as observers, is effectively no longer functioning. Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a full revival of the format appears almost impossible, while the prospects of reaching a definitive settlement formula likewise remain highly uncertain. For now, we are watching the two sides engage reluctantly on purely technical matters that have no bearing whatsoever on the overall state of the negotiation process. In August, the relevant working groups discussed transportation, the condition of bridges, vehicle registration, taxation, exports, environmental permits, and food safety. This is evidence that the political settlement has stalled, while the management of day-to-day interdependence continues. The main change over the past couple of years is that Chisinau has increasingly stopped treating Tiraspol as a party with which matters must first be agreed, and has instead acted as though reintegration can be built from the bottom up: through unified customs rules, tax declarations, national documents, licenses, sanitary regulations, and access to public services. In this context, new realities have been created as of yesterday. VAT and excise duties now apply to alcohol, tobacco products, perfumes, jeweler, fur goods, certain vehicles, and other non-essential goods imported by operators from the left bank. In January and April 2027, the list is expected to be expanded to include petroleum products, metals, gas, and electricity. By 2030, Chisinau intends to fully harmonies the tax regime across the entire country. The funds collected are expected to be channeled into a Convergence Fund for infrastructure and social projects in the region. The official rationale is clear. In principle, economic operators on both banks should operate under equal rules, particularly if our country is bringing its legislation into line with European Union standards. However, this policy also has a weak point. Harmonization carried out without a transparent assessment of its consequences can easily turn from reintegration into economic coercion. The same Convergence Fund will only be convincing when residents of the left bank see not a promise that the money collected will be returned, but a transparent budget, clear project-selection rules, and specific hospitals, roads, or public utilities financed by the fund. Otherwise, Chisinau will provide Tiraspol with a convenient basis for accusations of a “blockade” and give further impetus to appeals by left-bank politicians for greater support from Moscow. Moscow, for its part, just a few days ago once again issued, through the Foreign Ministry, warnings concerning the potential escalation of tensions around the Transnistrian region. Meanwhile, Tiraspol continues to operate according to its own logic and is calling for a return to full-fledged negotiations, accusing the constitutional authorities of “double taxation and the destruction of industry”. By calling for dialogue, the de facto authorities in the region are essentially insisting on a model based on two equal parties. In doing so, they are seeking to pre-emptively establish precisely what should itself be the subject of the settlement process. On the eve of its anniversary, Tiraspol made a point of emphasizing its ties with Russia. In May, Moscow simplified the procedure for residents of the region to obtain Russian citizenship, and according to Vadim Krasnoselsky, more than 60,000 applications had been submitted by August, while several dozen people had already been granted Russian citizenship. With financial support from Russia, new school textbooks are being printed. Meanwhile, for the September elections to the State Duma, Moscow plans to open 17 polling stations on the left bank, as usual without Chisinau’s consent. Undoubtedly, these steps have not only political and symbolic significance, but also very practical implications for residents of the region. Simplified access to Russian citizenship expands opportunities for education, employment, and social support, while Russian funding helps modernize educational infrastructure and preserve cultural ties. At the same time, the economy on the left bank is going through a difficult period of adapting to a new energy and logistical reality. Its future resilience will depend on a combination of Russian support, access to European markets, and predictable arrangements with Chisinau. Into this complex and multifaceted situation steps the new head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Christopher Smith, an American diplomat who has worked on the US National Security Council, focused on Eastern Europe, and served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Kyiv in 2022-2023. At the initial stage, Smith’s task will most likely be to restore regular contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol, prevent the dialogue from breaking down completely, and keep the situation from shifting into a military confrontation. Objectively speaking, the OSCE is currently capable of maintaining channels of communication and securing targeted, practical solutions, but it is certainly not in a position to resolve the conflict on its own. Looking at the situation from a medium-term perspective, the risk of a major escalation remains limited for now, but it is directly dependent on the war in Ukraine. Any change in the front line near Odesa oblast would immediately alter the calculations of all the parties involved and raise the cost of political miscalculation. At the same time, Moldova’s European course will not be put on hold. This summer, the country opened negotiations with the EU on clusters covering fundamental issues and external relations. Chisinau is right to fear that formally tying accession to a prior settlement of the Transnistrian conflict would effectively give Tiraspol and Moscow a kind of veto power. However, talk of “two-speed” integration, with the right bank joining the EU first and the left bank following later, remains more of a contingency scenario than a ready-made legal framework. It could accelerate the movement of the territory under Chisinau’s control toward the EU, but at the same time further entrench the alienation of the left bank. Moldova will not complete the project of its statehood simply by extending national legislation to the Ukrainian border, just as Tiraspol will not resolve the issue of its international status by preserving the existing order. The main obstacle lies not only in the dispute over powers and territory, but also in the mutual alienation of societies shaped by different historical experiences and identities. A resolution to the conflict will become possible when people on both banks are able to recognize each other’s right to these differences, understand their mutual concerns, and agree on an acceptable form of coexistence. Such coexistence will be inevitable under any scenario and regardless of any territorial settlement: geography, economic ties, infrastructure, and human connections are not going anywhere.