Can Moldova Turn a Second Chance into a Rail Transit Hub for Ukraine?

The blockade of the Greater Odesa ports has once again placed Moldova among Ukraine’s priority transit routes, but our authorities are in no hurry to seize this opportunity

On August 10, preferential 50% tariffs for the transit of Ukrainian cargo by rail through Moldova came into effect. Kyiv had been seeking this decision since the effective suspension of maritime exports at the end of July, following retaliatory Russian strikes against the logistics infrastructure of the Greater Odesa ports. It was then that it became clear that rail transport would have to bear the main burden of moving grain exports from Ukraine westward. Considerable attention was also devoted to the route through Moldova for the transit of cargo to Ukrainian Danube ports, as well as to Constanta in Romania. This was followed by a series of bilateral political consultations on how to reduce logistics costs for Ukrainian businesses, accompanied by highly optimistic statements about mutual benefits. Ukraine’s Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, Mykola Kalashnyk, even let slip that Chisinau was planning to transfer 20 locomotives to Kyiv. Given the growing threat posed by Russian drones hunting Ukrainian rolling stock, such assistance has become particularly valuable. As for the sensitive issue of tariffs, our negotiating position initially focused on the traditional demand for guaranteed volumes of cargo to be transported. Later, however, it was announced at the highest political level that the Moldovan authorities had decided to offer a 50% discount on Ukrainian transit through the end of the year, with no preconditions attached. The Ukrainian background of Prime Minister Vasily Tofan, who announced the decision by the Moldovan authorities, immediately aroused suspicion and discontent in local business circles. During the harvest season, providing Ukrainian competitors with discounted rates for transporting goods through Moldovan territory, while domestic farmers are facing significant costs without any meaningful assistance from the state, is a direct recipe for yet another wave of protests. Having realized their mistake, the authorities launched an information campaign aimed at calming the dissatisfied public. The Moldova Railways (CFM) stated that priority in transportation is always given to domestic economic operators and that the company’s rolling stock remains fully available to Moldovan agricultural producers. Officials also assured the public that, in the case of Ukrainian cargo, only Ukrainian locomotives and grain wagons would be used. Yet, one way or another, there is only one railway network, and its capacity is limited. The media also began juggling the figures. The Moldova Railways’ management sought to convince the public that the published tariff of CHF 11.72 per ton for Ukraine did not reflect the full cost, allegedly because it excluded the use and return of Ukrainian railcars. The final tariff for Ukrainian cargo was subsequently raised to CHF 20.64 per ton, while exports by Moldovan farmers cost CHF 15.30 per ton. However, even this explanatory campaign aimed at the domestic audience proved unsuccessful. Outside experts were already having to spell out the benefits of attracting Ukrainian cargo to the public, arguing that “preferential tariffs are better than rusting rails”. Looking at the year-by-year statistics, it becomes clear that the 2.4-2.5 million tons of cargo transported in 2024-2025 are mere crumbs even compared with 2007-2008, when volumes were measured in double-digit millions of tons. Yet the reality is that the capacity of Moldova’s railways for the current year, as announced by our officials, stands at 4.5 million tons, less than twice last year’s figures. Moreover, the seasonal nature of agricultural freight means that transport volumes cannot be spread evenly throughout the year, at 350,000-400,000 tons per month, as our railway officials would like. Everyone is interested in moving the harvest as quickly as possible in order to avoid storage costs. Hence the bottlenecks. In short, despite the constant statements by PAS officials about positive changes in railway infrastructure, the latter continues to deteriorate year after year, facing seasonal shortages of rolling stock during the harvest period and, more importantly, objective limitations on the capacity of the railway network. It is easy to see that the justifications offered by the officials responsible, along with certain changes in logistics, have effectively wiped out the entire initial positive political effect of the decision for Kyiv. Following intensive consultations at the beginning of last month, the Ukrainians had expected to move 500,000-800,000 tons through the Moldovan corridor, or roughly 100,000-150,000 tons per month. The media fallout from the contradictory statements by their Moldovan counterparts left an unpleasant aftertaste, but the practical results of the cooperation have made it impossible for Ukraine to maintain its previous optimism. Specialists in the field understood that attempts to channel significant volumes of cargo could run into capacity constraints on the Moldovan side. But 18,000 tons in August is a deeply discouraging result, even though the figures for the first seven months of 2026 through Moldova’s border crossings were considerably better. A total of 1.5115 million tons of cargo was reported to have been transported, 35% more than during the corresponding period of 2025. The increase in grain shipments was even twofold. Ukrainian Railways acknowledges a significant decline in grain export shipments. Over the first 25 days of August, 461,000 tons were transported, 67% less than in July and 77% below the figure recorded in August last year. And while the Hungarian and Slovak routes are among those showing growth in freight traffic, Ukrzaliznytsia has so far remained silent about the Moldovan route. Apparently, one of the main reasons for the decline in shipments was the Moldovan side’s refusal to accept cargo through the Transnistrian segment. While the original plan was to transport the bulk of the cargo through the Cuciurgan-Novosavitskaya border crossing, CFM later demanded that the train formation plan be changed and that agricultural products be transported through the less suitable Basarabeasca border crossing instead. The rationale for such a decision is difficult to explain solely in terms of technical and organizational considerations, since Ukrainian agricultural products had been transported through border crossings in the eastern districts of the country since 2024. Given the announced historic decision to introduce VAT and excise duties on economic operators in the region, it can be assumed that Chisinau has simply decided to exclude Tiraspol from any profitable logistics schemes, while demonstrating additional opportunities for exerting economic pressure. The authorities’ inability or unwillingness in Chisinau to reach agreements with the administration in Tiraspol in the interests of common goals is nothing new. However, this situation once again casts our country in a highly unflattering light and threatens to result in yet more missed opportunities to curb the processes of economic decline.