Moldova Braces for Protests

A wave of protests has swept across several European countries, creating pockets of instability across the continent and posing risks to certain vulnerable states, including Moldova

Just under a month ago, Socialist Party leader Igor Dodon announced plans for protests at the end of October. His announcement was accompanied by a joint opposition move to table a motion of no confidence in Maia Sandu. Dodon himself cited rising natural gas prices and higher utility tariffs in general as the main reasons for potential public discontent. Since the announcement, electricity prices have risen significantly. Gas prices had also increased twice in September, although both hikes occurred before the Socialist Party leader’s statement. Meanwhile, a delegation of Socialists had time to visit Moscow, where it declared that it could secure much more favorable terms for Russian gas supplies. The country has once again been swept by a wave of scandals that are undermining the authorities’ approval ratings and fueling public discontent. The illegal crossing of Moldova’s state border by Ukrainian border guards; a closed-door parliamentary session discussing an increase in the size of the army; warnings of further spending on armaments, including radar systems and air defense, as well as the possibility of manufacturing and exporting combat drones. This is the list of developments packed into literally just one week. Among other things, these developments place a big question mark over Moldova’s constitutional principle of neutrality, which, according to opinion polls, continues to enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the population. Moldova has virtually halted its exports to the US. At the same time, under pressure from Washington, whose influence in Chisinau has recently grown considerably following the appointment of a new ambassador and a new head of the OSCE Mission, investigations have been launched into the activities of some fraudulent call centers, as well as the use of US aid funds. The hydrological drought affecting the country’s two main rivers, the Prut and the Dniester, continues, although light rainfall has eased the pressure on the government. This comes amid repeated discrepancies between the prime minister’s statements and the actions of members of his team and PAS lawmakers, including on medium-term gas procurement contracts, reductions in the state apparatus, and unjustified spending on overseas business trips. The Constitutional Court’s ruling that the provision allowing Herman von Hebel to be appointed to the commission responsible for the external evaluation of prosecutors was unconstitutional is a remarkable case. In any democratic country, it would have triggered a political or constitutional crisis. In Moldova, however, it went relatively unnoticed by most of the population. This is because PAS’ political control over the Moldovan judicial system, extending to the removal of all those deemed undesirable, has become an established reality, as has the overall failure of judicial reform. For now, the population remains relatively tolerant of Maia Sandu’s regime, despite the daily emergence of scandals that would normally warrant serious political consequences, as well as a gradual decline in living standards. Meanwhile, the rising cost of living in Moldova reflects broader European trends. Today, civil disobedience actions of varying intensity are taking place across a number of European countries. The most striking images of protests are coming from France and Italy, where PAS recently held an off-site party congress to establish its first territorial branch abroad. Protests are also taking place in Albania, Austria, Spain and Portugal. In all these countries, the main issues on the agenda are inflation, utility tariffs, prices and fuel affordability. Relatively good news for Chisinau has come from Bucharest, where the political crisis has temporarily subsided. Parliament has approved the government led by Luca Niculescu, composed of technocrats and nominees of the Social Democratic Party. Maia Sandu has already expressed her support for the new cabinet, which, given President Nicusor Dan’s own approach, may take a moderately favorable stance towards Moldova. Romania, like many other countries, must now tackle its budget deficit amid the European Commission’s unwillingness to compromise, while also dealing with a hydrological and energy crisis and growing public discontent. Due to the overall ineffectiveness of governance, lack of pragmatism and corruption under PAS, Moldova is experiencing the consequences of global problems more acutely than most European countries. Maia Sandu’s regime benefits from a high level of public tolerance for government missteps and regularly attempts to “sell Moldovans the European dream”. Recently, however, the second pillar of PAS’ power has been encountering significant difficulties. The EU summit ended without any breakthrough decisions for Chisinau, apart from the allocation of substantial funds for further militarization. Moreover, Volodymyr Zelensky has demanded that Moldova’s and Ukraine’s applications for EU membership not be treated separately, and this approach is so far being reflected in the EU’s political leadership. As a result, Hungary, which has historically taken a relatively relaxed attitude towards Moldova’s accession, recently refused to approve the opening of the final two negotiating clusters for either country. It is becoming clear that the deadlines cited by PAS during the election campaign, namely 2028 and even 2030, are unrealistic for completing the accession process, even under the terms of limited participation recently outlined by Berlin. Kyiv, for its part, is not yet ready to accept those terms either. The energy crisis and the budget crisis, compounded by declining living standards and the growing discrediting of the European integration agenda, are likely to pose serious problems for Maia Sandu’s government. Nevertheless, the regime remains fairly confident, encouraged by the opposition’s inaction. So far, the opposition has yet to produce a figure capable of leading a protest movement. Alexandr Stoianoglo, who once posed a serious challenge to the incumbent president, is effectively withdrawing from national-level politics and will instead seek the position of bashkan of Gagauzia. In light of this choice, a united opposition protest within the timeframe announced by Igor Dodon no longer appears to be on the horizon. What form any action by the opposition or the public might take, particularly without external backing from Brussels, Paris, Berlin and Bucharest, and whether it will take place at all, remains an open question. One thing is clear: through its managerial incompetence and infighting between rival factions, PAS will continue to provoke public discontent and test the population’s patience.