Will Plahotniuc Be in Moldova Soon?

By the end of summer, Moldova’s electoral landscape was largely shaped by a positional struggle among the three main forces, all of which were sure to get into the new parliament but saw their ratings stall. The pre-election narrative needed a dramatic twist, one that arrived with Vlad Plahotniuc’s arrest in Greece. The key question now: how soon will he return home – and will he return at all?

The arrest of Vladimir Plahotniuc at Athens airport on July 22 at Interpol’s request immediately triggered a wave of speculation. Pro-government commentators are focused on whether and when he will be extradited to Moldova. Meanwhile, Plahotniuc and his lawyers claim that Chisinau is blocking his return and has even asked France to grant him asylum. A press release from the Prosecutor General’s Office, however, appears to contradict this. It confirmed that the extradition request from Moldovan authorities was submitted promptly on July 24 and is scheduled for review by the Athens Court of Appeal on August 13. Afterward, the Greek Ministry of Justice will issue a final decision. Even with all legal procedures observed, Plahotniuc could return to Moldova before the end of the month after six years of wandering. He has already pledged to prove his innocence and urged his supporters to unite to “bring back normal times.” The question now is how serious the PAS government is about pursuing the extradition of the former “coordinator.” Moldova maintains close ties with Greece across a range of areas, including liquefied gas purchases via Greek maritime terminals. In June, Dorin Recean hosted Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Chisinau, and just last week, Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Harris Theocharis visited Moldova’s Foreign Ministry. The two sides likely “synchronized their watches” on the next steps in the Plahotniuc case, though the official press release made no mention of it. One way or another, the fact remains that the once all-powerful oligarch, unlike Vyacheslav Platon, could soon return to Moldova. Athens, however, will take Chisinau’s views into account when deciding the timing of his extradition. If it does not happen before the parliamentary elections, it would signal that PAS is not prioritizing it. The oligarch’s arrest clearly caught the ruling party off guard, throwing them into confusion. Assessing their position is difficult for several reasons. First, the trial would divert public attention from the election campaign and undermine the talking points that the government’s political strategists had carefully prepared. Even the largely predictable sentence handed down to Gagauzia’s Bashkan, Evghenia Gutsul, sparked significant public and media tension and drew criticism of the regime and Maia Sandu personally, including internationally. In Plahotniuc’s case, the impact is expected to be far greater. Another factor concerns the fact that Plahotniuc almost certainly possesses compromising information which, in the context of an open and competitive trial, could influence the parliamentary elections. In this regard, former president and Socialist leader Igor Dodon is in a particularly delicate position, as the criminal case against him has been stalled for some time. Under these new circumstances, the so-called “bag story” could reveal some intriguing new details. At the same time, many PAS figures, including several in the top ten on the party’s election list, previously worked with Plahotniuc. If he chooses to “undermine the regime,” the party’s ratings could take a serious hit. His testimony might also spark a battle of compromising revelations: Vlad Filat recently hinted that he “knows well” Igor Grosu, the formal leader of PAS. The Alternative bloc is not entirely safe either. Ion Chicu, who became prime minister under Dodon, also served as secretary of state and finance minister in Pavel Filip’s government, Filip being a protégé of Plahotniuc. The key point in negotiations between Chisinau and the Greek authorities is expected to be potential compromise material. Law enforcement says numerous flash drives and other devices were found during the arrest and in the rented mansion of the former PDM leader, which could contain damaging information on many Moldovan politicians. If he returns without this evidence, PAS-aligned justice – with the presidency reportedly already eyeing a loyal, controllable judge – would be free to steer the trial in its favor, both in media coverage through pro-government outlets and in the final verdict. Maia Sandu and her team face a strategic dilemma: the temptation to deliver on one of the government’s promises by prosecuting Vlad Plahotniuc, including over the billion-dollar theft case, is strong. Yet, the potential risks of his physical presence in Moldova and starting the trial are difficult to calculate at this point. Time is running short. For now, the Prosecutor General’s Office is moving slowly – a formal request has been filed, and consultations with Greek authorities are underway. The suspicion is that the final decision will rest with Sandu based on recommendations from external curators, who are now drafting them in a hurry. The ruling party’s main asset is administrative control when oversight of institutions goes well beyond the traditional system of checks and balances and classical democracy. Even the slightest threat to this control, such as a “black swan” event a month before parliamentary elections, alarms the regime. This is particularly acute as current polls suggest no party will secure an outright majority. As a result, protracted coalition talks, early elections with a caretaker government, or a full-blown political crisis with Vlad Plahotniuc in the background could make the country unmanageable, even by outside forces.