Expert: The Battle for 2027 Is Taking Shape

There is still more than a year to go before the local elections but the major political players have already begun preparing for the new campaign. Next autumn’s voting will mark the first stage of a major electoral cycle that will determine the balance of power in the country for years to come

There is still quite a bit of time left before the next local elections, but the preliminary balance of power is already taking shape. At least, that is what a number of political signals suggest. This is because next fall will mark the first major stage of a protracted electoral marathon that will largely determine the future face of Moldova’s government. Moreover, the contours of the upcoming electoral battle are already quite clearly visible in some areas, allowing us to draw relevant conclusions. The main feature of the 2027 campaign is that it will take amid a large-scale administrative-territorial restructuring. In other words, these will be the first elections held under the new local government structure, which significantly raises the stakes for all candidates. The battle for municipalities, districts, and consolidated administrative centers will determine not only the local balance of power but also the positions of the parties and their leaders ahead of the subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections in 2028-2029. The main challenge for PAS is the need to translate nationwide support into concrete local results. Loyalty to the pro-European course at the national level does not guarantee automatic victory in a specific city, where political criteria are important but not paramount. Chisinau will most likely become the key battleground, as it is not only the country’s largest municipality but also a crucial symbol for a party aspiring to national leadership. Moreover, control over the capital’s city hall means influence over the country’s largest electoral base, as well as a significant portion of the economic elite. Therefore, a victory here, as before, is a strategic objective; achieving it will allow the ruling party to consolidate its political hierarchy and further strengthen its monopoly on power. That is why preparations for the campaign in the capital began well before the official election period. Alexandru Vornicu, the current mayor of Stauceni, is considered one of the PAS leading candidates in the Chisinau elections; during a recent party convention, it was decided to appoint him as chairman of the PAS municipal organization in the capital. This may not yet be a final decision, as, according to some reports, there are other candidates in the running who could compete with the incumbent mayor, Ion Ceban, who enjoys strong personal popularity. PAS currently holds a significant advantage, maintaining a steady lead in the polls. In fact, it has become the focal point for the consolidation of a broad pro-European segment, within which most of the unionist electorate, which previously represented a separate faction, has been absorbed, along with other ideologically similar movements. This situation gives the party a strategic advantage and the exclusive right to act as the main driver of European integration. On the center-right, the picture is less clear-cut but no less interesting. Two political groups and populist leaders – Vasile Costiuc’s “Democracy at Home” and Renato Usatii’s “Our Party” are actively vying for votes. Both are vying for the same niche of voters who avoid supporting mainstream parties but are not ready to vote for openly pro-Russian groups. This segment is small, but in a competitive race, it could prove decisive in a number of districts and municipalities where center-right parties may attempt to strengthen their positions ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. At the intersection of several electoral segments lies the MAN, led by the capital’s mayor, whose personal popularity has not fully translated into support for his political project. Just a few years ago, some experts viewed Ceban’s party as a potential alternative to PAS and one of the main contenders for leadership within the opposition camp. However, following its questionable collaboration within the “Alternativa” bloc, MAN is now in a state of crisis. And if Ceban loses the mayoral race, the prospects for this project will become even more uncertain. The left wing of the political spectrum remains a distinct “thing in itself” in Moldovan politics. Currently, according to polls, a significant portion of it is concentrated around the Party of Socialists. However, under Igor Dodon’s leadership, the PSRM as an organization has long ceased to be a force in the substantive sense of the word, and it seems there is little hope that this situation will change. Olga Cebotari’s recent resignation from her position as a member of the party’s Political Executive Committee, a post she had held since 2023, resembles a process of internal purges and restructuring aimed at reducing the Kremlin’s direct influence. Given her background and connections, she was seen as a figure through whom attempts to strengthen Moscow’s influence within the party might be channeled, including a potential shift in the internal party balance that could even lead to Dodon’s ouster. By neutralizing this factor, he has preserved not only his exclusive position but also the role that the PSRM has played in the country’s political system for many years. And this function, to call a spade a spade, boils down to the role of a controlled quasi-opposition. This mechanism, honed back during the Plahotniuc regime, has been operating virtually without a hitch for several years under the current government. The Socialists, in essence, absorb the protest vote, maintain communication with the Kremlin at a level acceptable to the ruling party, and at the same time do not threaten the strategic pro-European course. Following this logic, PAS will seek to preserve the left wing in its current form, with the Socialists acting as the “vacuum cleaner” to siphon off the relevant electorate. This explains the European Union’s recent imposition of personal sanctions against Irina Vlah, which is part of a well-established practice of discrediting and exerting pressure on a number of political figures in Moldova. Overall, the current political landscape indicates that the space for genuine competition is gradually shrinking. Therefore, the overall picture is unlikely to change significantly over the coming year. The ruling party is consistently strengthening its position, using its extensive resources to limit the influence of those political forces that are theoretically capable of posing serious competition to it. At the same time, the token “opposition”, which does not fulfill the classic function of a political alternative, creates the most favorable conditions possible for the ruling regime and the implementation of its electoral plans for the coming years.