Maia Sandu’s Political Rollercoaster

During the week, the president faced a blow to her personal approval rating and another round of setbacks involving her key international confidants, casting a shadow over the opening of the first cluster of accession negotiations with Brussels

Mid-June was, on the whole, a positive period for Maia Sandu, thanks to developments on the foreign policy front. First, Hungary’s decision to lift its veto allowed Moldova and Ukraine to open negotiations with the European Union on the so-called First Cluster covering fundamental issues. Although there is no guarantee that Chisinau will be able to convince all EU member states that it has made sufficient progress in the areas of the rule of law, democracy, and justice, the event marked the first tangible step forward in the country’s European integration process in several months. The celebrations, however, were significantly overshadowed by the publication of proposals from Berlin and Paris for a reduced form of EU membership for Moldova and Ukraine (featuring limited access to EU funds and no voting rights) as well as by yet another reaffirmation of Chisinau’s European integration tandem with Kyiv, which continues to clash regularly with EU member states and remains far from bringing its military conflict with Russia to an end. Compensation came in the form of the second Moldova-EU Summit, held on Monday in Brussels. During the meeting, attended by Maia Sandu, the EU reaffirmed its support for Moldova through financial assistance, diplomatic backing, positive assessments of the country’s reform efforts, and sanctions targeting Moldovan politicians competing with PAS. The European Commission chief has promised Chisinau half a billion euros by year-end, contingent on completing the reforms (though the bulk of the sum is actually unconditional and earmarked for specific projects). She also noted a 93% implementation rate on the reform agenda. The ritual call for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria was duly voiced as well, framed in terms of the so-called “Istanbul commitments” – a reference that Chisinau itself invokes with some regularity. A positive boost of this magnitude might have allowed the presidency to use the summer break as a springboard into strategic priorities (European integration, administrative reform, the electoral calendar). Instead, it finds itself locked in yet another round of reactive damage control, absorbing the fallout from internal scandals and self-inflicted wounds. The party managed, with no small effort, to partially defuse the row over Constantin Oboroc’s offensive speech at the PAS congress – though it took something highly uncharacteristic for this government: an admission of fault and a carefully hedged apology, delivered by the party’s two principal spokesmen, Igor Grosu and Radu Marian. No sooner had that fire been dampened than a fresh one flared up: the cushy taxpayer-funded patronage appointments handed out to Maia Sandu’s extended clan. The sins cover the full spectrum: salaries well above the national average, positions secured without competitive selection, blatant conflicts of interest, and, in the plainest terms, sinecures: individuals who barely work, or don’t even reside in Moldova, yet draw a steady paycheck from the public purse. What makes this episode particularly striking is who picked up the story. It wasn’t just the usual opposition politicians and Telegram channels; mainstream media outlets joined in, along with investigative journalists funded by Western institutions. The whole affair bears the unmistakable hallmarks of a managed campaign, calibrated to send Maia Sandu a very specific signal. Most likely, this is a crude but effective nudge from certain handlers overseeing Moldova – an incentive for the head of state to drop the speculation around unification with Romania, which generates unwelcome friction among EU member states. The presidency came back from Brussels with a clear task list: further militarization of the country and the severing of trade, economic, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. Talk of merging the two “Romanian states” fits nowhere into that agenda. In Bucharest, a political crisis is coming to a head, triggered by President Nicusor Dan and his attempts to impose an executive by circumventing any real dialogue with his original coalition partners. Adrian Vestea, handed the mandate by the Romanian president to lead consultations on forming a government, has now fallen out with his own party leadership and will try to cobble together a majority relying on sovereigntists and Social Democrats. Even if such a construct materializes, it is difficult to imagine it proving durable. Should the talks collapse, as seems entirely foreseeable, Nicusor Dan will face the very real prospect of a referendum on early removal from office – the votes to secure a majority against him in the Romanian Senate are all but guaranteed. Either way, Bucharest’s political infighting has traditionally been a headache for Chisinau, and this time the Moldovan capital has managed to become the actual backdrop for the squabbling. Acting Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan was forced to make an abrupt departure from Chisinau precisely because of the presidential maneuvering around handing the mandate to Adrian Vestea. Compounding the turbulence on the external front is the long-anticipated collapse of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. A replacement has been lined up from within Labor’s ranks, but the real story is the steadily rising popularity of Nigel Farage’s project – one that could fundamentally reorient London’s diplomatic trajectory. The same dynamics are unfolding among Chisinau’s other traditional partners: in France and Germany, right-wing forces, decidedly Eurosceptic and open to a gradual normalization with Russia, are seeing their ratings climb with remarkable consistency. The Baltic states, too, are in flux: just this week, Lithuania’s cabinet resigned, and a new coalition will now have to be stitched together. For PAS, a party heavily dependent on external legitimacy, these tectonic shifts threaten to erode the comfortable international partner base it has long relied upon – to the point where even its European integration ambitions could be imperiled. All these domestic scandals and external irritants play out against the backdrop of a chronically dysfunctional judiciary underscored most recently by the Superior Council of Prosecutors effectively nullifying the vetting outcomes for several individuals close to the ruling party. Meanwhile, another drama is unfolding around the tax reform, the core thrust of which is to scrap the progressive VAT rate and replace it with a flat 20% across the board. The government’s draft legislation cannot even command unanimous support within PAS itself. Health Minister Emil Ceban has come out swinging against the initiative, warning that it could, in his words, “kill” the country’s healthcare system. Maia Sandu thus continues her presidency in a state of perpetual political oscillation, with no credible prospects for stabilization, economic growth, or a functioning public dialogue. The growing disequilibrium on the external front, compounded by misfiring reforms, steadily erodes both the legitimacy and the electoral viability of the ruling party.