Scandals Rock Maia Sandu and PAS

It would be premature to describe what is unfolding as the death throes of the ruling regime but, strategically speaking, its fate is already sealed

The political history of Moldova offers no shortage of examples of ruling regimes collapsing, though such collapses seldom happen overnight. Even the most robust power structure begins to lose its integrity not during some single grand crisis, but rather when it becomes riddled with a multitude of small fissures: an erosion of trust, internecine elite conflicts, mounting public exasperation, protracted economic decline, and the loss of any monopoly on moral superiority. We are witnessing this combination with growing frequency today when it comes to the conglomerate of PAS and Maia Sandu. And, by extension, we can already discern the logical denouement that awaits it. The concentration of scandals that has engulfed the ruling camp in recent months has reached a critical mass, which PAS leaders and their attendant mouthpieces have stopped explaining themselves and have finally begun, quite simply, to admit mistakes and offer excuses. This marks a qualitative shift in behavior, a departure from the political arrogance and disdain for public criticism on display until now. The grievances over cadre policy, the placement of relatives in official posts, financial privileges, and the hermetic insularity of the decision-making apparatus have become especially raw for PAS. For society at large, these episodes make plain that the ruling party has itself begun to reproduce the very practices it once railed against at the outset of its political journey. The scandal surrounding MoldATSA became the apotheosis that the authorities could neither silence nor defuse with the anti-crisis toolkit at their disposal. For the first time in years, an abscess burst open, and figures from the top echelon of power were caught in the discharge. The dismissal of several of the president’s sisters amounted, in effect, to a public acknowledgment of a problem the regime had tried to conceal until the very last. One of the loudest recent reverberations has been the resignation of Radu Marian. Formally, he occupied the modest post of parliamentary committee chair, but according to those in the know, in another, shadow hierarchy of functionaries he served as the overseer for entire sectors of the economy – a protégé of one of the most influential internal factions within PAS. The removal of such a figure is a thunderous signal that a redistribution of power is underway inside the ruling apparatus, one that, absent proper restraint, could tip it into full-blown disarray. Ritualized purges have long been a standard tool for any political regime that senses a mounting threat to its hold on power. In our case, however, the sacrifice of those in the inner circle does nothing but vindicate the very accusations the authorities once denied. If a resignation has taken place, then by definition there were grounds for it. And if grounds existed, then the regime either knew or ought to have known, yet, plainly, it sat on the information until the moment everything burst into the open. Another stinging blow to PAS came from the tax reform it set in motion that has opened up nothing less than a second front. The draft fiscal policy, which envisages flattening VAT at 20% on essential goods including gas, medicine, and food, has struck a raw social nerve. The government may frame it however it likes: as an attempt to “modernize the system”, as a “developmental leap” for the country, but for a society already buckling under deepening poverty, it is unequivocally perceived as an additional burden. In the end, partly under pressure from the street, the authorities began to speak of the need to rethink the reform and then declared a full pause in its implementation altogether. It was, in all likelihood, Sandu’s personal intervention that proved decisive in this reversal. And that marks a significant precedent: for the first time in a long while, the street factor has forced the ruling group into retreat, even at the cost of defying the fiscal overhaul demanded by external partners. The opposition voiced its demands publicly on 28 June outside the parliament building, where mass protests took place. Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces took to the streets simultaneously, and the protest leaders deliberately eschewed party symbols, aiming to draw together everyone weary of the ruling regime, irrespective of political affiliation. What was particularly striking was that, for the first time, consolidated calls were heard not only for the government’s resignation, something to which we have long grown accustomed, but for that of the president as well. Until now, as is well known, an unspoken regime of “political immunity” had surrounded her. That appears to have been lifted: the restraints are off, and from this point forward Sandu, too, will be openly subjected to both information warfare and political assault. Any regime begins to look vulnerable the moment its opponents stop believing in its invincibility. That realization, it would seem, is now dawning on our opposition. For a long time, PAS prevailed not solely on the strength of its own supporters but also thanks to the absence of any coherent alternative. The opposition camp was fragmented, at odds with itself, and incapable of presenting a unified, appealing project. If, however, this new protest movement coalesces around the socio-political grievances of ordinary citizens, rather than around party insignia, it stands a genuine chance of bringing about political change. Beyond its internal disarray, the Sandu-PAS regime faces an additional driver of crisis: an unfavorable external environment. The stability of the incumbent authorities is directly contingent on financial and political backing from the European Union, as well as from individual member states. Any delay in tranches, any signal of a renegotiation of cooperation terms, any cooling of bilateral relations, all of this registers immediately on the political stability in Chisinau. In this respect, it is particularly significant that our key regional ally, Romania, is in the grip of an acute internal political crisis, one that is pushing the country toward snap parliamentary elections and the ascendancy of Eurosceptic forces. The potential surge of sovereigntist currents in Bucharest poses risks to the Moldovan authorities that are not merely symbolic but thoroughly practical: a weakened Romania automatically means a diminished voice championing Chisinau in the corridors of Europe. The situation is so unpredictable that one can readily envision a scenario in which Bucharest unexpectedly transforms from Moldova’s long-standing “advocate” into its “prosecutor”. It would be rash to describe what is unfolding as the death throes of the regime, but strategically, its fate is most certainly sealed. For the time being, however, Sandu and PAS retain an iron grip on the system and its political institutions, while the opposition lacks both a unifying leader and a coherent program capable of mounting a genuine challenge. A political collapse overnight is not in the cards: the incumbent governance mechanism is embedded too deeply and too securely in the state organism for that. For now, the process more closely resembles the gradual weakening of load-bearing structures, the only question being when they will buckle and give way. It is no secret that the political backbone of PAS consists of factional groupings coexisting under the common roof of party unity. In the wake of a string of scandals and resignations, they will be forced to renegotiate a new equilibrium among themselves. Will they manage it? Will fresh, irreconcilable contradictions surface? Might centrifugal processes be set in motion by recent events? For any ruling force, crises of this magnitude impose colossal internal strain. Moreover, the signal from Maia Sandu that she is prepared to sacrifice her most loyal comrades and demand the resignation of PAS vice-chairman Radu Marian is hardly conducive to party cohesion.