“A Tight Grip on Elections”. PAS’ Next Move

Anton ŠVEC

Maia Sandu’s administration is facing the PAS’ inability to compete successfully in competitive elections, and is preparing undemocratic mechanisms to retain power well in advance

The results of the US midterm congressional elections proved to be a crushing defeat for Donald Trump’s current administration. The Democratic Party secured a majority in both chambers, and the number of Democratic governors also increased significantly. For our ruling regime, this situation could prove to be quite favorable. At the same time, the tariffs and immigration restrictions introduced by the White House are unlikely to be revised in the near future. Given the US president’s powers in foreign policy, advancing Moldova’s key interests, including the resumption of funding for the NGO sector and projects under the so-called “democracy agenda”, would require not only a Republican defeat in the midterm elections but also a change of administration following the 2028 presidential election. Even now, however, Moldova’s ambassador in Washington and other groups of influence could use their established ties with the Democratic Party to discuss the restoration of traditional forms of cooperation in the future. In addition, the Democrats could partially constrain Donald Trump’s initiatives on war and diplomacy. Much of the current discussion centers on how to curb the White House’s actions in its conflict with Iran. However, the presidents of the United States and Belarus have recently made statements at separate events that nevertheless pointed quite clearly to the possibility of an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict within the next few months. Both Lukashenko and Trump have long advocated negotiations and an end to hostilities, but neither had offered predictions of an imminent ceasefire for quite some time. A trilateral meeting involving delegations from Russia, Ukraine and the United States is due to take place in Abu Dhabi as soon as next week. A Democratic comeback could have a significant impact on the course of international conflicts, particularly in the longer term, and could lead to Washington partially restoring its involvement in European affairs, including the war in Ukraine. At the same time, even at this current, interim stage, the PAS has free rein to retain power through methods of usurpation. Brussels has long turned a blind eye to the numerous excesses of Maia Sandu’s team. Now the US Democratic Party, which traditionally defends the interests of globalists and works in alliance with European Commission bureaucrats, will also support the PAS regardless of the quality of the political process in Moldova. The democratic process itself in our country has deteriorated significantly, especially in terms of the relationship between political parties and the electoral system. The crisis has not yet reached the depths seen in neighboring Romania, where, just a couple of years ago, the results of the first round of voting were annulled due to Calin Georgescu’s success. However, the experience of our neighbors appears quite tempting to PAS officials given the ruling party’s unpopularity. The local elections on November 1 once again confirmed the regime’s low approval ratings. In all five localities where elections for mayors (or local councils) were held, the PAS lost – to independent candidates, Socialists, and even a member of the “Party of Change”. The ruling party is not even fielding its own candidate in the election for bashkan of Gagauzia, realizing that for residents of the autonomous region, affiliation with the party would immediately be seen as a “stigma”, which would inevitably nullify any electoral prospects. In Gagauzia, opposition representatives are also significantly undermining the electoral process. Alexandr Stoianoglo, who once posed a strong challenge to Maia Sandu, agreed to run for office and play by the rules imposed by the central government through the curtailment of powers and the reconfiguration of local electoral bodies. Moreover, the former prosecutor general, who was once imprisoned by the PAS team, systematically advocates for the separation of powers and dialogue with the central government, effectively legitimizing Chisinau’s “curtailment” of Comrat’s autonomy. The Socialist Party candidate, Fiodor Gagauz, who is polling in second place, went so far as to declare before the election that he was ready to cooperate with all his rivals and include them in the Executive Committee. Making such a statement before the results have even been announced undermines the very idea of a competitive electoral process and is a textbook example of the deal-making tactics that have become characteristic of the PSRM in recent years. These conciliatory overtures may well be linked to the pressure being exerted on Socialist Party leader Igor Dodon by Maia Sandu’s regime through criminal proceedings. For the opposition as a whole, violations of procedures and the logic of political struggle are becoming systemic, which undermines the integrity and quality of state institutions. Igor Dodon, for the sake of publicity, submitted a petition for amnesty for former Gagauzia Bashkan Evghenia Gutul. Meanwhile, the procedure in all countries requires the prisoner to admit guilt, after which the conditions arise for the president to make a decision on amnesty. Evghenia Gutul has not yet expressed such intentions. Consequently, from a legal standpoint, the PSRM leader’s petition is meaningless, yet he has already attempted to curry favor with the residents of the autonomous region in order to promote Fiodor Gagauz. The PAS regime, for its part, took a long time to settle on its candidate for the post of Mayor of Chisinau. Its choice fell on Victoria Belous, the Finance Minister in Vasile Tofan’s government. She is a decidedly weak politician and administrator, with little public profile, but is firmly embedded in the PAS system. She is unlikely to stand much of a chance of winning the capital’s mayoral race through campaigning and funding alone, even with the use of administrative resources. Manipulation at the software level may prove necessary. Allegations of interference with the Central Electoral Commission’s databases, including by foreign nationals, have been raised repeatedly in recent weeks. From a purely statistical standpoint, worrying trends have also been apparent in voting patterns over the past two years, during the referendum, presidential election and parliamentary elections. Attention is currently focused on the issue of the leak of citizens’ personal data. The authorities’ crisis-management campaign is built around the claim that citizens’ money and bank accounts were not compromised. As a result, the issue of voters’ personal data and potential manipulation of the vote, including through the diaspora, is being kept out of the discussion for now. However, the local elections could see the authorities make active use of a system for pre-programming the results. Combined with the administrative-territorial reform, which is consolidating the country’s districts in a way that serves PAS’s interests and strengthens its dominance, it risks undermining the very principle of local elections. The icing on the cake is a new bill regulating the procedure for declaring martial law and a state of siege. It is drafted in such a way that elections could simply be cancelled altogether. The bill, submitted by Nosatii, provides that under certain circumstances, which the ruling party could easily engineer, Maia Sandu would be able to remain in power even after her second term expires. It is clear that, should the conflict surrounding Ukraine escalate, Moldova is quite likely to become more actively involved, and the resulting consequences could provide a convenient pretext for the measures in question. The use of a state of emergency has been thoroughly tested in Moldova in recent years. Indeed, one remains in force in the hydropower sector even now. European partners who are pushing Moldova towards direct confrontation with Russia and sponsoring its militarization would undoubtedly welcome both the country’s transition to a special legal regime and the temporary curtailment of democratic principles and procedures. The PAS authorities can now also count on support from a strengthened Democratic Party in the United States. As a result, PAS is unlikely to face any serious constraints in the near future when it comes to either consolidating its hold on power to the point of outright usurpation or distorting the electoral system to serve its own interests.