Kozak in Tiraspol: Attack on Chisinau or a Courtesy Visit?

On June 4, during his official visit to Moldova, the Special Representative of the President of Russia for Moldova Dmitry Kozak made a trip to Tiraspol and met with the leader of Transdniestria Vadim Krasnoselsky and officials of the local administration. Prior to that, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister’s stay in Chisinau has already brought some ‘surprises’. In spite of the statements by the President of Moldova Igor Dodon about the exclusively commercial-economic agenda of the visit, the Russian official spoke much about the political situation in the country. For example, he unexpectedly criticized adoption of the mixed electoral system, for which the Kremlin-backed socialists voted at the time, and also clearly hinted at the shape of the coalition in the Moldovan Parliament, which Moscow wants. Apparently, one of the key tasks of the visit of the Kremlin envoy was exactly a series of ‘preventive’ meetings, which were to increase the desire of certain Moldovan political forces to come to an agreement. Such a ‘heart-to-heart’ conversation was especially needed given the long-stalled negotiations between ACUM and the PSRM, which, according to some estimates, were initially endorsed by Moscow. After a busy day in Chisinau the next day Dmitry Kozak travelled to Transdniestria. He has specific professional experience with the unrecognized region: once, thanks to the efforts of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Tiraspol and Chisinau were on the verge of a final resolution of the conflict. At the last moment, the talks were curtailed by the then President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin. The failed ‘Kozak Memorandum’ has been haunting the Russian politician for a decade and a half. So, anticipating the Kozak’s first trip to the region in 15 years, many experts and journalists were intrigued by the question of what Putin’s special representative in Tiraspol would say and whether Transdniestrian leaders would receive their share of criticism. Especially a few days before his visit the Moldovan media and social networks circulated information that Kozak’s visit will be pronouncedly ‘cold’, and the left bank politicians will hear numerous claims of Moscow. The first thing that many observers have noticed is the protocol formalities, which are more typical for visits of the interstate level: carpet, honor guard company, forming-up of the top officials. It is obvious that such formalities could take place only with the consent of the Russian side. It is difficult to judge whether this move was a deliberate gesture to Chisinau, but many saw it as a certain symbolism. The working part of the visit continued in Tiraspol, at first glance, went unexpectedly calm for the Tiraspol leadership. There were even opinions that such an extremely well-coordinated and friendly visit was only ‘on camera’, and the Kremlin allegedly just decided not to criticize publicly the left-bank authorities. Nevertheless, the results of the conversation suggest certain conclusions. It is obvious that Russia is not going to distance itself from Transdniestria and while making formal statements about the integrity of Moldova continues to support the sovereignty of the unrecognized republic at a basic level. This may be confirmed by some statements of Kozak in Tiraspol, which were undoubtedly quite strong for Chisinau’s perception. For example, he stressed the positive role of the peacekeeping operation in the region of exactly the “Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict”. Moreover, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister expressed readiness to provide assistance and support to Transdniestria in any necessary form – if there are appeals not from the central Moldovan authorities, but from the Tiraspol administration. The latter Kozak even called “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”, at the same time noting the need for closer ties with the authorities of the “PMR”. Another sensitive issue for Chisinau that was raised was further facilitation of the procedure for obtaining Russian passports in the region. Drawing parallels between Dmitry Kozak’s trips to Chisinau and Tiraspol, it is easy to understand that the overall picture is clearly not in favor of the Moldovan side. If the politicians of Moldova, even pro-Russian, got a portion of fair criticism, the Transdniestrian authorities received assurances of further assistance to the region, as well as a nice picture for the local media. It is too early to say whether Moscow has again adjusted its strategy on the Moldovan track, but its dissatisfaction with the development of the domestic political situation in Moldova is very obvious.