Kremlin’s Bid to Reassert Control on the Dniester?

Sergiu CEBAN

It appears that Chisinau’s abrupt reintegration push has acted as a catalyst for the opposite process – an accelerated reinvestment by Moscow into the Transnistrian project

The past week has been marked by a series of developments around the Transnistrian settlement, which remains a defining factor in Moldova’s geopolitical trajectory. And, to be frank, they do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether the authorities are capable of untangling (or ultimately cutting through) the historical knots that have bound the country for a long time, and likely will continue to do so. The decision to accelerate the restoration of control over the left bank may, to some extent, appear logical, but it is hardly timely. Instead of a gradual weakening of Moscow’s influence in the Transnistrian region, Chisinau has encountered the opposite effect. According to the country’s leadership, prospects for reintegration are directly linked to the Russian military presence on the left bank of the Dniester in the form of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF). Recently, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas, who visited Moldova, stated at a joint press conference with Maia Sandu that the European Union intends to consider, at the end-of-May meeting of foreign ministers, a full list of demands to Russia, which will include the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. In other words, Brussels appears to want to integrate the Transnistrian issue into the broader Ukraine peace framework, turning it into a component of a wider European bargaining process with the Kremlin. The logic is clear. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the Russian military presence in Transnistria has increasingly been perceived in the EU as part of the broader architecture of Russian influence in Eastern Europe. The problem is that Chisinau has neither the political nor the coercive instruments to neutralize this perceived threat. That is why the response from Tiraspol (and, in essence, Moscow) was almost immediate – once again firmly rejecting any possibility of withdrawing the OGRF until the Transnistrian conflict is fully resolved. Overall, the situation on both banks of the Dniester has been steadily escalating for several weeks, since the authorities adopted specific decisions to extend tax legislation to the entire territory of the country. However this is framed rhetorically, in practice it is undoubtedly an attempt to bring the region’s economy under tighter control. The Tiraspol leadership has been issuing almost daily accusations against Chisinau and demanding the return of funds paid since 2024 by regional enterprises for customs clearance. Chisinau, in turn, refers to the so-called “Convergence Fund”, which is intended to compensate part of the region’s expenses. However, it is evident that the distribution of these funds will serve as a lever of political influence. This is further reinforced by Maia Sandu’s statement that no financing of the Transnistrian region is planned as long as Russian troops remain stationed there. Thus, the region’s economic survival is being directly linked to broader military and geopolitical conditions. It is therefore not surprising that international engagement around Moldova is also intensifying. Notably, both Chisinau and Tiraspol were visited by the current OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and the OSCE Secretary General. The very fact of such diplomatic synchronization signals heightened attention from international mediators. Particularly noteworthy is Switzerland’s position, which appears ready to step up its involvement in facilitating dialogue between the left and right banks, even offering its territory for contacts, in order to prevent the crisis from moving beyond a state of managed freeze. This is also reflected in a statement by Luminita Odobescu, adviser to the Romanian Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister, who acknowledged that Transnistria remains an asset for Russia, which will not simply give it up. This suggests that in Bucharest, as well as in other European capitals, there is an awareness that the issue is not merely local in nature, but reflects a broader confrontation between major centers of power. In fact, back in April, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, the same official who oversaw the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, directly accused the Moldovan authorities of attempting, with EU backing, to push out the OGRF. He also described the declaration of its command as “persona non grata” as evidence of Chisinau’s intention to further escalate tensions. In addition, he issued a series of warnings, stating that any attempt to resolve the issue by force or to replace Russian peacekeepers with Western forces would lead to negative consequences for Moldova. Against this backdrop, a vote in the Russian parliament takes on particular significance. On 13 May, lawmakers passed a bill allowing the use of Russian armed forces abroad to protect Russian citizens. In the current international context, such a measure can hardly be interpreted as anything other than a signal addressed to multiple audiences. Following a series of visits and statements, on 15 May Russian Ambassador Oleg Ozerov arrived in Tiraspol, where he held meetings with local leaders and business representatives. There, he announced Moscow’s firm intention to continue supporting both the region’s economy and its population. Symbolically, the Russian diplomat effectively took a seat at the head of the table in the local “government” building, as if signaling Moscow’s intention to bring ongoing processes under direct control. In the evening of the same day, Putin signed a decree simplifying the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of Transnistria. One does not need to be a seasoned analyst to see in these developments a coherent strategy aimed at the institutional consolidation of Russia’s presence. Mass passportization has traditionally been used by the Kremlin as a tool to establish long-term political and legal grounds for maintaining its influence. This model has been repeatedly tested in separatist regions of Georgia and in Donbas. In essence, the logic is straightforward: the more Russian citizens there are on the left bank, the more plausible the justification for their protection becomes. It appears that, in this way, Moscow is effectively placing a geopolitical marker and sending an initial clear signal of its willingness to view the Transnistrian region as something distinct from the rest of Moldova. Earlier, Ozerov had already issued veiled warnings that all options and scenarios regarding a possible escalation are being considered, adding that “even if they are unlikely today, tomorrow may be different”. It would likely have been more appropriate for us to wait for a more favorable geopolitical context, while continuing a gradual policy of integrating the left bank, which, despite its slow pace, had delivered tangible results. However, following last year’s parliamentary elections, in which PAS secured victory, Brussels appears to have sent an unambiguous signal that the authorities should accelerate the Transnistrian settlement process. Chisinau responded to this expectation, but the outcome has been the opposite of what was intended. As a result, by abandoning a long-term, step-by-step approach to reintegration, there is a risk of ending up with an even more closed, militarized, and Moscow-dependent Transnistrian enclave. The key question arises: is this the kind of outcome that official Chisinau was aiming for? I believe PAS had a different scenario in mind. It was assumed that Russia, overstretched by the war in Ukraine, sanctions, and its broader confrontation with the West, would gradually scale back its peripheral spheres of influence. Such processes are indeed observable in several parts of the post-Soviet space. However, Transnistria has proven to be an exception. Moreover, the abrupt reintegration push itself has likely acted as a catalyst for the opposite process – an accelerated reinvestment by Moscow into the Transnistrian project. A particular concern is whether there is a deeper diplomatic layer underpinning these developments. While it is certainly desirable to avoid any conspiratorial interpretations, it is impossible to ignore the broader international context and the intensification of contacts between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. In such circumstances, small territories often become elements of larger geopolitical bargaining, which can significantly narrow Moldova’s room for independent man oeuvre. The main danger is that a historic opportunity for a gradual and relatively peaceful reintegration of both banks of the Dniester could be lost.