PAS-gate Aftershocks: Superficial Cleanup or Structural Reset?

Intra-party infighting within the ruling party has once again escalated into a full-blown political crisis that has directly affected key PAS officials and Maia Sandu personally. Initial expectations were that the authorities would quickly contain the fallout from the revelations about the unsavory underbelly of the state exploitation regime they had built, while the media and media experts would organize an “information quarantine”. This was also evident from the fact that PAS officials implicated in corruption schemes were in no hurry to abandon their plans for further enrichment or to quell the scandal. Apparently, out of habit, they expected that the civil society circles close to them would provide a reliable shoulder to lean on. Moreover, the government tried until the very last moment to push through an exemption for a number of state-owned enterprises, including MoldATSA, and joint-stock companies with state capital from transferring a portion of their profits to the budget, so that approximately 25 million lei could be “appropriated” by the enterprises. The opposite happened. Exposing information about officials’ misdeeds poured in like water from a cornucopia, forming the ever-widening vortex of the “PAS-gate” scandal. Leaking compromising material during power struggles over key revenue-generating assets in Moldova is nothing new, but the attention and synchronized response of all our “independent” media outlets and pro-government bloggers in their coverage of the events speak volumes. In fact, virtually the entire press and experts funded from abroad have begun to echo the narrative that had previously been promoted only by opposition civic activists, former politicians, and various semi-anonymous news sources. This indicates, at the very least, several things. First, ignoring or keeping existing compromising material under wraps has become dangerous for the reputation of all projects that claim to be mouthpieces for public opinion. Second, the MoldATSA scandal has prompted many ambitious individuals to add their own “fly in the ointment” in the form of new facts, details, or simply scathing comments about how officials in the current administration are profiting at the expense of citizens. Third, certain external entities, the ones “pulling the strings”, have a vested interest in the scandal’s development. In our small country, everyone knows everything about everyone else, but scandalous stories only become public knowledge when those speaking out realize their own safety is at stake. That is why the president’s calls for law enforcement agencies and, above all, the SIS to conduct detailed “integrity” checks on candidates for high-paying government positions seem rather amusing. That is precisely what they do, with the sole caveat that such actions, including leaks, require political approval. From the SIS and other law enforcement agencies spokespersons like Dragos Galbur receive information about various instances of corruption. And public revelations by former officials, such as ex-MoldATSA head Sorin Stati, are only possible if there are serious guarantees of personal safety. It is worth noting that the parliamentary opposition, which should have been the direct initiator and driving force behind this wave of revelations and outrage, effectively remained on the sidelines. The opposition’s necessary, albeit belated, statement calling for protests came across as a mere attempt to stay on the news agenda. The rally announced by Costiuc’s party outside the parliament building, albeit with some delay, was initially supported by Dodon and later by other parliamentary forces. In practice, however, it proved impossible to hold a mass rally without the opposition’s party symbols. This was yet another demonstration of the opposition’s complete detachment from current events and its obvious inability to capitalize on the situation to strike a blow against the government. The current scandal is not unfolding as a confrontation between the government and the opposition, but rather as an inter-clan power struggle involving external partners who evidently see strategic risks in maintaining the PAS’ current parasitic model of governance. Under this model, maintaining the ever-expanding entourage requires exorbitant resources, while the efficiency of the governing structure approaches zero. State budget revenues for the last six months have remained at last year’s level, despite an additional billion lei received due to the increase in the customs value of petroleum products. The real sector of the economy continues to decline. The investments promised by the government have not materialized. According to the Minister of Labor, there will be no external budgetary support this year to subsidize the population. Under these circumstances, a significant increase in the tax burden as part of the announced fiscal reform will only exacerbate the situation. PAS officials, who have firmly entrenched themselves in the country’s financial flows, were adamant about not changing the status quo. This likely explains the direct attack on Sandu herself, who is perceived by the public as the chief overseer of the government (and who, along with the heads of parliament and the government, was also slated to receive a pay raise). It can be said that the president was forced to take responsibility for everything that was happening and publicly declare her readiness for a certain shake-up of the ruling regime. Reputational risks for Maia Sandu can no longer serve as an excuse for distancing herself from the toxic domestic agenda. A third term is not yet on the horizon for her. For now, nothing threatens the PAS’ dominant position either. It is clear that there will be no “mass purge”, as Sandu claimed. Among the measures she announced is a requirement to return to the state funds obtained without merit, as well as to hold those responsible accountable. However, this is not a hint at criminal prosecution, which law enforcement agencies might interpret as a political signal. In other words, the proposal is to legalize the model of accountability previously outlined by the president’s cousin, Anastasia Taburceanu: public repentance and the voluntary transfer of funds to charity. Nevertheless, it appears the authorities will still have to implement certain changes to the system that will make it more difficult to openly plunder state resources for personal gain. Such measures include Sandu’s proposals to reorganize the Public Property Agency, revise the principles for forming administrative councils, and reform the procedure for entering into externally funded consulting contracts. It may also be necessary to shut down operations related to the patronage of cross-border schemes involving call centers and other regional models of enrichment. One could say that through this unique approach external partners are urging the authorities to implement the reforms necessary not so much to advance European integration as to maintain a minimum level of state stability. However, it is by no means certain that these efforts will succeed.