16 Years Later. What Does Dmitry Kozak’s Visit to Moldova Mean?

Regional Trends Analytics regular author Sergey Cheban reflects on what may stand behind the visit of Dmitry Kozak to Moldova many years after the failure of the namesake plan to unite the banks of the Dniester. The expert is sure that the Russian Deputy Prime Minister can have several tasks at once. Sergey Cheban, RTA: When it comes to the work of Dmitry Kozak on the Moldovan track, there is always one thing – the Russian Deputy Prime Minister is inevitably haunted by the shadow of the events of 2003. They were first remembered when Kozak was appointed Putin’s special representative for Moldova. They are kept in mind when trying to understand Russia’s position on the situation in the region. They will be remembered when Dmitry Kozak comes to Moldova next week. However, Kozak himself, being a tough pragmatist, and his leaders in the Kremlin drew their conclusions from the events of 2003. Therefore, there is no question of high-profile political campaigns from the Russian Deputy Prime Minister: Kozak does not work too publicly and decided to visit Moldova only 11 months after his appointment. Most likely, this visit also does not set too high goals, but certainly there is a specific and extremely pragmatic mission. First: Kozak is likely to bring the agreed position of Moscow on the formation of the ruling coalition in the country. The moment is right: the leader of Democrats and bad guy #1 Vlad Plahotniuc, laying low for a while, is preparing a loud return to the political arena, according to all estimates. In this sense, the Kremlin reasonably fears that many deputies from different political forces of Moldova will simply not resist pressure of the refreshed and initiative oligarch. Kozak’s arrival in Chisinau should signal to all political forces that Russia does not accept the coalition with the participation of the Democratic Party. Perhaps it will be the last ‘happy hour’ for both ACUM and PSRM to join forces. Otherwise, the arrival of Kozak means a signal for early elections. Second: Kozak, of course, comes to support the socialists – including in Gagauzia. Despite the clearly dented positions and belief in the brilliant prospects of the PSRM, Moscow does not intend to just abandon a powerful political asset and the only allies in Moldova. The arrival of the Deputy Prime Minister, who is known as a tough negotiator, looks like a certain signal to the mandarins in Chisinau: The Kremlin is ready to engage in the early elections and strictly administer the process on the side of the Socialists. Finally, they can hardly do without the previous capacity of Kozak. Tectonic shifts around the conflicts in Europe are about to happen, primarily in Kosovo and Donbas. It is obvious that the parameters of these transformations are being formed inter alia through multilateral consultations with stakeholders. If the assumptions about the ‘single package’ of agreements between Moscow and Brussels on hot spots are correct, neither Moldova nor Russia can ignore the problem of Transdniestria. It is important for the Kremlin to retain the initiative in the region against the backdrop of increased attention to the situation on the Dniester from Romania, the US and Europe. Moscow needs not only to understand the situation around the unrecognized republic, but also to influence the settlement scenario. Otherwise, Russia may find itself in the position of catching up, despite the unofficial status of the main ally and guarantor of the actual independence of the region. If Kozak comes to Tiraspol during his visit, it will become clear that Moscow is not ready to lose its position on the Transdniestrian issue. Together with the circulating guesswork about the appointment of Mikhail Babich as an official overseeing the LDNR and other unrecognized enclaves, the arrival of Cossack may be a certain Rubicon. In the future, Moldova will either experience a series of dynamic transformations – if there is a consensus between Brussels and Berlin, or further deepening of problems, if there is no such consensus. Anyway, the sluggish and fruitless process of formation of the ruling authorities ceases to suit both Russia and Europe: following Kozak, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Johannes Hahn will arrive in Moldova.