US Trade Wars’ Side Affects for Moldova

Home / Analytics / US Trade Wars’ Side Affects for Moldova
Anton SHVETS US sanctions against Russian gas pipelines strengthen the Ukrainian gas transportation system demand and indirectly cement the economical regime’s viability in the Transdniestrian region On May 17, expired the Russian-Polish agreement on gas transit through Poland to the European Union countries through the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. Lead by United States’ active support, the Republic of Poland authorities refused to renew the transit agreement and stopped buying gas from the Russian monopolist PJSC Gazprom. Instead, deliveries were arranged from Nordic countries while the United States and the Persian Gulf supplied liquefied natural gas. PJSC Gazprom will be able to continue using the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline capacities solely on the basis of short-term expensive contracts that will objectively affect the gas volume pumped to Germany and other EU states through Poland. The fate of the long-suffering Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline also remains uncertain. Its construction is currently suspended due to sanctions imposed by the United States in December 2019 on any companies involved in the facility’s construction. This led to the Swiss counterparties of PJSC Gazprom refusal to continue work. Moreover, on May 26, the scandalous US Ambassador to Berlin Richard Grenell (who is leaving his post) announced sanctions tightening against Nord Stream 2. The diplomat called on the German federal government to stop "feeding the beast", reconsider relations with Russia and pointed to party unity in the United States on sanctions issue against companies involved in servicing the gas pipeline. Meanwhile, four EU countries allowed laying the gas pipeline in their territorial waters and representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out to the United States the inadmissibility the to use within pandemic the “extraterritorial i.e. sanctions contrary to international law.” Despite the lack of Euro-Atlantic unity in the matter of Nord Stream 2’s future, its prospects at the moment do not seem very bright. The decrease in the potential of the two mentioned gas pipelines due to the aggressive foreign economic policy of the United States leads to actualization and to lack of alternativeness of the Ukrainian gas transportation system for the transit of Russian hydrocarbons to European countries. The ability of Ukraine to influence Russian gas policy in itself is useful to the West from the point of view of maintaining a balance in Eastern Europe and completely coincides with the strategic interests of Kiev and Washington. At the same time, maintaining significant pumping volumes through the Ukrainian gas transportation system has an interesting side effect. In particular, it allows the regime in Transdniestria to painlessly use Russian gas and support the life of the separatist enclave that is quite independent and certainly not isolated on gas issue. As long as Russian gas is supplied to Transdniestria in unlimited quantities and absolutely free of charge the leaders of Tiraspol are able to pursue a relatively sovereign policy, subsidize the population and ensure the operation of industrial enterprises, including the generation of electricity sold to the right bank. Moreover, for geographical reasons Tiraspol is able to influence the gas policy of the whole Moldova, which is failing to implement the project for reverse gas supplies through the Iasi-Chisinau gas pipeline. Ultimately, Transdniestria is even able to tighten the valve and temporarily leave Moldova without the Russian gas and cheap electricity, which is fraught with a significant crisis. Nord Stream-2 launching could significantly reduce the demand for the Ukrainian gas transportation systems and expand alternative opportunities for reverse gas supplies to Moldova, thus, on the contrary linking the Transdniestrian region with Moldovagaz JSC’s governing decisions. However, US sanctions and policies unexpectedly impede solving this problem, playing into the hands of the separatist regime in Transdniestria. Thus, being a “5 + 2” format participant, supporting Moldova’s territorial integrity and sovereignty the United States making these steps unwillingly hinder reintegration and strengthen the Transdniestrian region’s economy. Now, the question raises as to the need for additional harmonization of Washington and Brussels approaches towards more reasonable and consistent solutions with correctly calculated long-term effects. On the other hand, restraining Russia for Washington is undoubtedly a strategic goal of a much higher order than reintegration of one small eastern European republic and in this sense, Moldova’s interests were simply not lucky to once again find themselves in the rivalry “millstones” of large geopolitical players.