Should We Expect a Breakthrough in the Transdniestrian Settlement?

Sergiu CHEBAN Despite the attempts to build a special background and certain expectations from the upcoming meeting between Igor Dodon and Vadim Krasnoselsky, it has yielded only modest results Yesterday, the seventh meeting between Igor Dodon with Vadim Krasnoselsky took place at the Moldovan President’s residence in Condrita (the previous meeting of the politicians was held last October, in Holercani). The agenda included in many respects the traditional issues of the banking sector, criminal cases, telecommunications, as well as one of the most acute problems related to the Pridnestrovian posts installed in the Security Zone. Dodon and Krasnoselsky were laconic at a press briefing, without reports on any specific agreements reached. On the other hand, the personal composition of the delegation enabled at least more or less in-depth discussions of all pressing issues. Was it a simple exchange without any coherent perspective, or the results were deliberately concealed from the watchful eyes of political opponents, we’ll see in the coming weeks or during the next 5+2 meeting. For example, before the event, many experts close to the Moldovan presidential administration mentioned a full-fledged customs control to be introduced at the Cuciurgan checkpoint since August 1 that could reinforce Chisinau’s position and make the Transdniestrian administration more compliant on a number of problems. However, this issue was also omitted during the press availability. What is really surprising is the fact that initially the joint control project was the exclusive prerogative of bilateral Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, later it gradually shifted to the level of political representatives of the parties, and today is apparently being discussed at high level of Chisinau and Tiraspol. By the way, a certain background was formed by the head of state at his press conference ahead of the meeting, who hinted there are preconditions to significantly step up the Transdniestrian settlement almost in the next month and a half. Though, as known, Mr. Dodon hasn’t succeeded with the major Western leaders. The willingness to raise the Transdniestrian issue on the international agenda was probably communicated through diplomatic channels, but no alternative signals or indicators that relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol have become the subject of high-level discussions were noticed. The president’s statements about international consensus and a deliberate dodging from voicing the legal model of the final settlement looked somewhat ambiguous. In fact, everyone is pushed to the idea that it is the external stakeholders who must determine the optimal formula, which the parties will be forced to accept. To prove this, let’s recall a number of Chisinau’s documents and requests made available to the public last year (in particular, drafted by Vasilii Sova, a well-known expert on the Pridnestrovian dossier), with a proposal for international partners to synchronize their positions regarding Moldova and actually predetermine the conflict settlement model. According to experts, Moldovan politicians on the diplomatic sidelines are urged to listen to the foreign partners’ opinion, especially if “planets are aligned” and a specific co-existence mechanism is offered to the parties. If Chisinau refuses, another freezing of the situation akin to the one that developed after the “Kozak plan” failure may not happen, and the excessively principled stance of Moldovan politicians may have unpredictable consequences, up to unilateral decisions like in Kosovo case. However, it looks like the Moldovan authorities are driving themselves into such a corner with their own hands, in every possible way disclaiming responsibility for the fate of the country and trying to shift it onto the shoulders of their “big brothers”. In light of these circumstances, the head of state’s attempt to “please” his Transdniestrian guest, whom he referred to as “President of Transdniestria”, looked very ambiguous, causing a storm of indignation among opposition parties and their supporters. Here it would be appropriate to ask the Moldovan president whether it was a reckless “sign of respect”, or whether the Moldovan society is being methodically prepared for some unexpected surprises. Despite the attempts to incite certain expectations from the upcoming meeting, its results, as expected by the experts, turned out to be more than modest. Apparently, the main outcome was the resumed communication at the highest political level of the parties after several months of mutual squabbles. Tactically, no one was left behind, and the negotiation process, with all the objective sticking points, is rather alive than dead. Meanwhile, strategically, the Transdniestrian settlement causes more and more questions, if not concerns. Furthermore, this meeting cannot be considered in isolation from the presidential elections, which, with a high degree of probability, also came up during the conversation. Especially, since Igor Dodon has already announced his intention to devote his second presidential term to the problem of the country’s reintegration. The pandemic, posts, Transdniestrian electoral support, the international partners’ position – all this is a totality of factors that can have a decisive impact first on the electoral process and negotiations, and then on the fate of the Transdniestrian settlement as a whole.