Pre-Election Intrigue in Moldova Is Gaining Momentum

This vote will determine not only the next parliament but also the country’s foreign policy course – continuing integration with the EU or returning to Russia’s sphere of influence

For the first time in recent years, the balance of power ahead of the parliamentary elections is so unpredictable that not a single expert dares to name a clear favorite with absolute confidence. After a series of appeals and court hearings, the Central Election Commission has finalized the ballot for the upcoming vote. There will be 23 participants in the elections – four electoral blocs, 15 parties, and four independent candidates. This reflects a high level of political competition, despite the fact that, in the past, the PSRM – and now PAS – have done everything possible to clear both the left and right flanks of serious rivals. Although the high concentration of participants is a hallmark of democratic elections, it also increases their unpredictability and carries the risk of fragmentation in the future parliament. The clearest sign that the ruling party is far from confident about its victory is the growing unease and nervousness within its ranks. This is evident in their wavering campaign strategy and mixed messaging. All of this leads to frequent blunders that make the campaign look chaotic and unprepared. A striking illustration came with Labor Minister Alexei Buzu’s recent remark about “the people or the mob”. One slip like that, with all the backlash it sparked, could easily cost the race’s favorite a few precious points. The latest iData poll, released just yesterday, marked a clear shift in the race. In August, PAS comfortably led with around 25% support, but by September its numbers had edged downward. This was enough for the Patriotic Bloc to pull ahead – hardly a surprise, as the unification of the previously scattered “left” has presented voters with a credible alternative and attracted much of the traditionally pro-Russian vote. The sudden emergence of the “Great Moldova” party in the electoral race, virtually at the last moment, also plays a significant role. If the authorities fail to exclude it from the elections, the balance of power after the vote could change substantially. The party’s close ties to Ilan Sor’s structures and the support of his electoral “network” could secure it more than ten parliamentary seats. In a coalition with the Patriotic Bloc and deputies from other factions (either entirely or partially from the “Alternativa” bloc), this could give the so-called “pro-Russian” camp a real chance to form its own government. Given this trend, PAS cannot rely solely on its traditional resource – the diaspora, which mostly votes for pro-European parties – as this advantage could be neutralized by “Great Moldova”. Thus, as of today, the future political landscape revolves around the key question: whether the ruling party will be able to mobilize the right-leaning electorate amid the growing influence of opposition forces, and who could become its potential partner in forming a governing coalition. It seems that, in the eyes of PAS, the “Alternativa” bloc has lost even the status of a technical ally. The ruling party is throwing everything it has at dragging its ratings below the threshold. Ion Ceban, the bloc’s emblematic figure and its chief vote donor, has become target number one. Personal attacks, sanctions from Bucharest, and mounting pressure on the mayor of the capital have already significantly undermined the bloc’s support, and judging by current dynamics, it may continue to decline. In this situation, PAS will likely attempt to win over a share of the Alternativa bloc’s pro-European voters, while the scenario of a coalition with Renato Usatii’s party is gradually shifting from hypothetical to highly probable. In addition, there is a notable “dark horse” on the right flank – the “League of Cities and Communities”, which has openly declared its readiness to join a coalition with PAS in order to preserve the European course. Unlike other political projects, the League has a strong positioning focused on local development and regional representation. In the recent municipal elections, the political formation secured 56,000 votes locally, while approximately 80,000 votes are needed to enter parliament. One of the most striking findings of the iData survey published yesterday was a noticeable surge in public demand for sovereignty. More than 40% of respondents stated that Moldova should develop its own path, free from external interference and patronage. This trend is creating additional opportunities for opposition forces, not only on the left, traditionally dominated by Moldovanist-sovereigntist groups, but also on the right. In particular, this refers to the “Democracy at Home” party, which is closely linked to Romania’s AUR and former Romanian presidential candidate George Simion. The main intrigue of the campaign lies in the enormous share of undecided voters. According to various sources, the number of citizens who have not yet decided whom to vote for ranges from 30% to 40%. This represents a decent reserve capable of overturning any, even the boldest, scenario or forecast. For the ruling party, this pool provides an opportunity to achieve “critical-level” mobilization, similar to what occurred in the second round of last year’s presidential elections. For the Kremlin, it represents potential for further boosting the ratings of opposition forces. And for new political actors, it offers a real chance to break through and enter the future parliament. Despite the complexity of the current pre-election landscape, as of today, there are 3 main scenarios for how events may unfold after September 28. The first, and most desirable for continued European integration, is a convincing victory for PAS and the formation of a pro-European governing coalition. In this case, the ruling party would need to secure 35–40% of the vote and be prepared to make compromises with junior partners to create a stable parliamentary majority. The second scenario involves a revival of left-wing forces, which collectively gain more support than the pro-European parties. Such an outcome would slow down the “EU integration at any cost” agenda and strengthen Russia’s position in Moldova, creating conditions for a significant reassessment of the country’s domestic and foreign policies. The third scenario envisions a fragmented future parliament, in which neither PAS nor the left-wing forces receive enough votes. In this case, no one would be able to form a majority. Ultimately, this situation would lead to everlasting political crises and, most likely, the holding of snap elections in the near future. Several key factors will influence the outcome of the elections. First and foremost is voter turnout, as an increase would reduce the number of undecided voters, who currently make up at least a third, and could lead to a non-trivial election result. Diaspora participation is also important, although its impact may be offset by diminished interest in the parliamentary elections and the lack of a genuine alternative among pro-European parties. The next three weeks promise to be tense and heated. The intrigue is likely to persist until the very end, as much depends on the upcoming vote: political (in)stability, economic prospects, and relations with neighboring countries and international partners. For many, it has long been clear that the September 28 vote is not simply a battle between parties for parliamentary seats, but a determination of Moldova’s strategic course. For this reason, the current campaign is perceived not as a local electoral struggle, but as part of a broader geopolitical confrontation.