PAS Conducts a “Sorting” of Moldova

Semyon ALBU, RTA: Anyone who naively hoped that PAS would show a “new face” after the elections is probably already disappointed. Judging by the current situation, they don’t even plan to change the top leadership – the magic trio of Sandu, Grosu, and Recean will remain with us for an indefinite period. No major reshuffles in the government are expected either and why would they be? In short, it’s the same people in the same arena, and their policies will remain more or less the same: thoughtless, reckless, and detached from the real needs of the country. Take, for example, the internal integrity of the state. Is its preservation a good thing for Moldova? Undoubtedly, yes. But can we say that PAS’ actions contribute to achieving this goal? Certainly not. In fact, the way the central government treats its more problematic regions is difficult to explain from the standpoint of logic or national interest. We are talking here about Gagauzia and Transnistria. Despite their differences, the general features of the regime’s policy toward them are quite clear – above all, a desire to politically isolate and segregate these territories and their populations. Different methods are applied depending on the specific legal status of each region. In Gagauzia, from the very beginning, we saw PAS’ desire to bring everything under its political control. It is obvious that the “yellows” were irritated by the pro-Russian sentiments of the Gagauz people and their resulting orientation toward opposition forces. But instead of trying to establish a dialogue with the autonomy, win the sympathy of local residents, and persuade them to support the course toward European integration through a civilized explanation of its advantages, the newly dominant party chose simply to ignore Gagauzia, as if it did not exist on Moldova’s map. The result of this attitude was a protest vote that brought Sor’s group to power. From that moment on, the autonomy was effectively blocked politically: its leadership was excluded from decision-making, the bashkan was not included in the government, contrary to the law, and contacts were maintained only with a tiny group of loyal local officials and deputies. The authorities began openly taking revenge on the Gagauz, depriving them of part of their revenues, worsening the business climate (which led to the flight of economic agents), and sentencing Evghenia Gutul to seven years in prison as a result of a blatantly unscrupulous court process. Now, after the parliamentary elections in which PAS received a meager three percent of the vote in Gagauzia, discussions have begun about allegedly introducing a form of temporary administration in the region to “stabilize the situation”. This idea was voiced by the government-appointed head of the ATU Gagauzia State Chancellery, Serghei Cernev. In his view, as long as the “Sor network” remains intact, there is simply no other option. The new administration, together with law enforcement agencies, must carry out a “cleansing” of the autonomy, even despite public discontent, since the current situation could pose risks in the event of Russian troops advancing toward Moldova (!). In fact, this is what we’ve been warning about for a long time – an intent to finally break what’s left of Gagauzia’s autonomy. Bypassing legitimate, lawful local authorities and Gagauzia’s constitutional framework, the plan is to install a power that, first, suits Chisinau and, second, can “break” the local population’s outlook and steer it in the desired direction. If that fails, there is a second option: stigmatize the Gagauz as “wrong Moldovans”. I wouldn’t rule out a scenario of de facto partial disenfranchisement – this government is capable of anything, as we’ll see below. Society is already being primed with the idea that the autonomy is hopelessly “infected” by Sor, his dirty money, Russian propaganda, and is almost a “sore” on the body of the country. As for Transnistria, we see the complete suspension of any political contacts, except for the occasional formal meetings between negotiators, held only to comply with diplomatic protocol and OSCE requirements. Despite repeated calls for dialogue from the head of the “PMR”, Vadim Krasnoselsky, addressed to the official authorities in Chisinau, they are either ignored or arrogantly dismissed. It is now quite clear that no one intends to engage in dialogue with the leadership on the left bank. The authorities have likewise chosen a strategy of pressure and suppression in this case. PAS officials likely assume that Transnistria, already in a dire situation and encircled on all sides, will soon capitulate and effectively fall into their hands, so there’s little point in talking to it. They feel free to do whatever they want to the region and its population. This attitude was vividly demonstrated during the parliamentary campaign, when an attempt was made to isolate Transnistrian residents from the electoral process. What PAS did in this sphere deserves thorough judicial scrutiny, once or if we finally have a normal government. Notably, all of it was carried out in a deliberately open manner, with full awareness of support from external partners and without fear of the opposition, which never really showed its “fangs”. For about a decade and a half now, Transnistrian residents have participated in national elections with varying, but cycle-to-cycle increasing, levels of engagement. Whether anyone likes it or not, this is a crucial element of the country’s reintegration. Ultimately, the more Transnistrians are involved in the republic’s political processes, the better, because it means that, in their eyes, our government becomes both legitimate and, in a sense, “their own”. Before the PAS government came to power, official Chisinau did not in any way restrict the voting rights of residents from the left bank. However, since last year, we have witnessed the testing of various technologies and methods aimed at limiting their turnout and this year, those measures were applied in full. Most importantly, by a purely “willful” decision of the Central Election Commission and under an utterly absurd pretext, the number of polling stations was reduced threefold. Then, half of these stations were moved farther away from the demarcation line with Transnistria – for reasons that are quite obvious. Moreover, significantly fewer ballots were printed than the number of people who had voted in the previous elections, and as a result, in some polling stations, they ran out long before closing time. Shortly before the start of voting, supposedly “scheduled” repair works suddenly began on all the bridges across the Dniester. In reality, of course, nothing was being repaired, but traffic across them was deliberately obstructed. As early as September 28, the police began conducting intensified inspections and checks of everyone entering from the left bank, that is not applied on ordinary days. At certain crossing points, the “software wasn’t working”, and people were either not allowed to proceed at all or were kept waiting in long queues for hours. In effect, Chisinau openly told the residents of Transnistria that it does not wish to see them participating in the country’s political life, and that their votes are neither valued nor needed. It must be acknowledged that PAS’ lawlessness achieved its goal – voter turnout from the left bank barely exceeded 12,000 people. By comparison, in 2020 it was over 30,000 – a striking difference. By focusing on short-term objectives, primarily the consolidation of its own anti-democratic rule, the PAS is making strategic flaws that could prove irreparable. The repressive measures in Gagauzia risk leading to widespread disillusionment with the central authorities and may further inflame the already simmering separatist sentiment. Even if such sentiments never materialize into real political action, the result will be a permanently unstable region, no longer disloyal merely to the current ruling regime, but to Chisinau as a whole. And where this path might ultimately lead, no one can say. Moreover, PAS is squandering a historic opportunity to achieve a stable and definitive settlement of the Transnistrian issue, instead deepening tensions and antagonism with Tiraspol. Many officials in Chisinau believe that such a strategy is destined to succeed under the current geopolitical circumstances. Yet those circumstances can change at any moment and Moldova’s present policy of isolating Transnistria and alienating its residents may ultimately serve as a compelling argument for certain international actors to reconsider their commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity. As a result, the country may never again be restored within its original borders. Most importantly, the ruling party should seriously reflect on where its policy of “sorting” Moldovans into categories is leading the country. While it pampers the diaspora and a narrow circle of loyal supporters at home, it relegates the rest to the status of “second-rate Romanians”, and treats Gagauzians and Transnistrians as outcasts who have no place in the “bright” projects of a so-called “European Moldova”. Such a policy can have only one outcome – an irreversible societal rupture and the eventual disintegration of the state.