Romania on the Path to Snap Legislative Elections?

The once-powerful Social Democratic Party is attempting to regain its leading position by provoking a domestic political crisis and potentially allying with the sovereigntists from AUR and SOS

After Marcel Ciolacu stepped down from the pinnacle of power, the Romanian Social Democrats found themselves in a very awkward position. Last summer, the party with the largest number of seats in parliament was forced to enter into a rather humiliating agreement to support a government led by Ilie Bolojan of the National Liberal Party, a representative of its traditional rival. Without a strong leader, without a clear strategy, and amid the triumph of Nicusor Dan and the Eurocrats, the PSD was forced to become the coalition’s main contributor in exchange for the promise of the prime minister’s post in two years. It certainly secured its ministerial posts, but failed to advance its own interests, encountering active resistance from the new Romanian prime minister. After some time, Bolojan turned out to be not so much a technocratic prime minister, as initially imagined, but a steadfast politician, a beacon of hope for the crisis-stricken PNL, and an effective implementer of decisions made by European officials. Just a year ago, it was clear that Romania would have to implement unpopular measures to reduce its budget deficit – such as deregulating energy prices and cutting spending – in line with standard requirements from Brussels. It could be said that it was precisely the substantial state support provided in recent years under Marcel Ciolacu that allowed his party to remain in power. It would have fallen to any other prime minister to rectify this situation and return the country to a normal “market-oriented” path after the Social Democratic Party (PSD) left power. However, it was Bolojan who became that inconvenient partner who began to undermine the Social Democrats’ prospects with the president’s tacit consent. A party either fights for power or faces collapse. The Social Democrats had long been unwilling to continue propping up Bolojan, who was effectively the country’s de facto leader, but they had not found a pretext to do so. The energy crisis, which hit Romania hard, became the very trigger that pushed the PSD leadership to provoke a political crisis. The party’s grassroots structures endorsed this course of action, legitimizing the process of dismantling the governing coalition. At the “Moment of Truth” meeting, 97.7% of party members voted to withdraw support for Bolojan and to have their ministers leave the government. Amid events in Hungary, where Viktor Orban’s sovereigntists suffered a fiasco, the gambit unfolding in Romania could create a new source of tension and a challenge for Brussels. The fact that the crisis was initiated by a party that had been in power for many years should not create the impression of obvious continuity in policy. After all, its main allies in this struggle are the sovereigntist parties AUR led by George Simion and SOS led by Diana Sosoaca. A potential power configuration of this kind could prove strong enough to stand up to Brussels, with all the ensuing consequences. This is the very coalition that was on the horizon immediately after the parliamentary elections, but which European bureaucrats rejected at the time. The leaders of AUR and SOS have already announced plans to initiate a vote of no confidence in the government and demand snap elections, essentially outlining the Social Democrats’ basic strategy, which the latter have not yet openly discussed. So far, the only formal demand put forward has been the resignation of Prime Minister Bolojan, who is held responsible for the economic crisis of the past ten months. However, it is clear that there will be no other “caretaker” prime minister. The National Liberal Party will stand by Bolojan until the end. Internal conflicts and threats to cut off financial support from Brussels may come into play, but the legitimacy of the interim government will continue to decline nonetheless. In 45 days, it will need to ask parliament again for support for the revamped cabinet. This one-and-a-half-month period gives the Social Democrats time to effectively launch a new election campaign in its various forms, including protests. The simplest and quickest way to bring forward the snap elections would be to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. However, the parliamentary math doesn’t add up yet, and this remains a key challenge for all players. A potential ally in the collapse of the coalition, the POT party, could not withstand the pressure and fell apart on the very day the PSD ministers resigned, leaving it without a parliamentary faction. Ten of the sixteen deputies left the party, forming the “United for Romania” group. Prior to this, Prime Minister Bolojan himself and his allies from the USR had made it clear that they would seek support for a minority government even among opposition MPs. The moment the Social Democrats made their move, Bolojan and his allies responded. A vote of no confidence requires an absolute majority – 233 out of 465 deputies. Neither the PSD nor the AUR has that majority. The PSD cannot rely solely on George Simion’s AUR. In the Chamber of Deputies, the two parties have 156 representatives, and in the Senate, another 64. In total, this is not enough to pass the motion. “The deciding vote” lies in the hands of the small opposition parties. SOS has 15 MPs remaining in the Chamber of Deputies, the PACE group has 12 representatives in the Senate, and POT, as already mentioned, has split into two groups of 10 and 6 MPs. At this point, the opposition camp is guaranteed only 177 votes. In addition, there are independent lawmakers who could be persuaded to support the no-confidence motion. The prospects for such a scenario appear more realistic, as it is in the interest of the entire opposition to secure early elections. A majority is required to pass the motion, and votes against or abstentions will not allow the government to survive. The government camp opposing the motion consists of about 130 deputies (PNL – 51, USR – 40, UDMR – 22) and another 17 parliamentarians who usually vote with the current government. However, in the end, real-world politics – with its bribery, pressure, and the “political tourism” we’re all too familiar with – will decide everything. The sums involved in these deals could be substantial. For the pro-sovereignty parties AUR and SOS, which regularly clash with one another, it will be difficult to participate in the campaign in supporting roles alongside the Social Democrats. This still needs to be explained to voters. It is possible that no-confidence motions will be introduced by different parties in turn, and parliament will support the most viable option. At the same time, the risks of conflict within the opposition remain high. Unity among even parties like SOS is not guaranteed. It is also possible that there will be leaders within the PSD leadership who are willing to sacrifice the party for the sake of their personal ambitions. In that case, after several months of crisis, there will be another reshuffle of the coalition government. After all, the PSD currently bears some responsibility for what is happening in the country. Some Social Democratic ministers seemed reluctant to leave. For instance, on the very day of his resignation, Transport Minister Ciprian Serban decided to sign a decree raising the metro fare from 5 to 7 lei. It’s hard to call such a decision well-thought-out given the expected opening of the election campaign, but simple miscalculations are also possible. Both Washington and Brussels are closely monitoring the situation. For the Trump administration, the Romanian situation may seem quite interesting. The Social Democrats have long established communication with his inner circle and can count on some support. In that case, the risks of reputational damage, as in Hungary, will be lower, since polls are expected to show high disapproval ratings for the government, which Bolojan will represent as the conduit for Brussels’ interests. For our government, what is happening across the Prut River creates a tactical problem. Moldova, as a model of stability for the EU in its new configuration, is becoming even more important; however, in this scenario, Maia Sandu’s party would have to support a pro-European government in Bucharest that lacks broad public support and faces strong opposition. In Moldova itself, there is no such opposition, but following a hardline course imposed from outside could lead to its emergence. This could involve right-wing, unionist forces whose potential could prove greater than that of the current parliamentary opposition.