Chisinau Is Tightening Control Over Gagauzia

The existence of Gagauzia’s autonomy is unequivocally perceived as a political problem, one that PAS seeks to bring under control and, ultimately, to eliminate altogether

It is already clear that the current constitutional crisis surrounding Gagauzia has reached a critical point. At present, the situation is such that the People’s Assembly lacks a legitimate composition, as its mandate expired last year. Meanwhile, the Bashkan is behind bars, the Speaker of the People’s Assembly is on the run, and elections, scheduled twice, have been blocked at the initiative of the central authorities. On April 24, Maia Sandu and Igor Grosu met with the mayors of Gagauz villages ostensibly to address the protracted crisis. However, the likelihood of reaching a consensus between Chisinau and Comrat appears, as before, to remain low. More than thirty years ago, the autonomy was established as a compromise for the peaceful resolution of a sharp ethno-political conflict that erupted in the south of the country in the early 1990s. In the context of armed confrontation with the Transnistrian region, Chisinau could not afford a second hotspot of tension. Therefore, in 1994, the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia was adopted, guaranteeing the region the right to self-governance, the preservation of its identity, and participation in the national system of power. In return, the Gagauz renounced demands for independence. This was an act of political wisdom and a rare example within the post-Soviet space of a peaceful settlement of an interethnic conflict. For thirty years, this arrangement, albeit with difficulty, managed to hold. However, the nature of Gagauz-Moldovan relations in recent years suggests that the long-standing constitutional and political balance has effectively exhausted itself. The prevailing trend is that, instead of respecting the autonomy, Chisinau increasingly views it as a problem to be administered, controlled, and politically neutralized. Consequently, the 1994 law has become, for PAS, a legal obstacle. It is clear that the crisis did not arise overnight. It was methodically building step by step, entering an acute phase with the election of Evghenia Gutul as Bashkan in 2023. The central authorities immediately made it clear that they were not prepared to accept such an electoral outcome. This was reflected in the president’s refusal to include Gutul in the government, despite this being explicitly required by current legislation. The next step was the blocking of elections to the People’s Assembly. Initially, they were scheduled for March 22. However, at the request of the State Chancellery, the Supreme Court of Justice suspended the decision on the formation of the Central Electoral Commission of Gagauzia, making the March elections legally impossible. Local deputies refused to back down and formed a new composition of the CEC, setting a new date – June 21. But on April 7, the Cahul Court of Appeal, again at the request of the State Chancellery, suspended this decision as well, along with the resolutions concerning the commission’s composition and the procedures for holding the elections. At first glance, this appears to be a legal conflict over whether the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia has the right to form its own electoral commission. In essence, however, the struggle concerns Chisinau’s political desire to determine when and how the region is allowed to vote. Thus, if the electoral process in the autonomy becomes dependent on the political will of the capital, this can no longer be considered a rule-of-law state, but rather a case of selective application of the law. To understand what is happening, it is necessary to look closely at the details, as there the main intent of the ruling party is concealed. As early as March, the Ministry of Justice submitted a request to the Constitutional Court to review several provisions of the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, in particular the articles granting the People’s Assembly the right to form its own electoral commission. According to Chisinau, the electoral council in Comrat is sufficient, while the establishment of a separate Central Electoral Commission is an “entirely unlawful phenomenon”. All this appears to be a direct attack on the legal architecture of the autonomy, as it is not merely a specific law that is being challenged, but the very fundamental right of Gagauzia to manage its own political processes is being called into question. Having no other means of influencing Chisinau, the People’s Assembly decided to appeal to the leadership of the EU, the UN, and other international organizations, requesting intervention in the escalating crisis. Separate diplomatic support was also sought from Turkey, with which the Gagauz are linked by historical and cultural-linguistic ties. A clear indication that our authorities consider the Turkish factor undesirable and even dangerous was the incident involving Ilya Uzun, deputy head of Gagauzia, and public figure Mihail Vlah. They intended to travel to Turkey on April 22 for a working visit, but were detained, interrogated, and searched at the capital’s airport and, ultimately, were not allowed to board their flight. In light of all these developments the April 24 meeting should be assessed, when Sandu and Grosu invited the mayors of Gagauz villages and part of the members of the People’s Assembly. Officially, it was stated after the meeting that the parties had allegedly agreed to jointly draft a document on the specifics of elections in Gagauzia. However, according to behind-the-scenes information, after the discussions at the presidency, the invited participants became fully convinced that the current authorities are not willing to make any real compromises. Moreover, the strategic plan of PAS is based on the intention to increase pressure on the autonomy to such an extent that it ultimately comes fully under the political control of Chisinau. So, what is the reason for such a sharp escalation and change in the perception of Gagauzia by the central authorities? In its current configuration, it is “inconvenient” for several reasons. First, it is a region with a consistently protest-oriented electorate. Second, pro-European narratives and slogans are least effective there. Third, it serves as tangible evidence that there is no unified socio-political consensus in the country regarding the strategic course toward European integration. Having missed time and opportunities, PAS has opted for a path of institutional pressure. This is, of course, far easier than attempting to persuade people. It is much more convenient to accuse the autonomy and its population of overly pro-Russian views and Moscow’s influence than to acknowledge one’s own failure in communicating with local civic and political groups that shape the internal Gagauz agenda. Instead of engaging in dialogue with the electorate, the authorities have chosen the language of moralizing and coercive administration. However, if local governance decisions are blocked today, tomorrow this may result in such a level of distrust among the Gagauz that it could become a far more serious problem for Chisinau. The most dangerous aspect of the current situation is not the conflict itself, but its cumulative effect. Each new cycle of contradictions between Comrat and Chisinau reinforces in some the perception that the autonomy is “foreign”, while in others it strengthens the image of a hostile center. Such attitudes become embedded in public consciousness very quickly. And if the logic of mutual alienation is not overcome today, then tomorrow any trigger may generate an uncontrollable conflict inertia that would inevitably lead to socio-political upheavals of a destructive scale. Our country already has the painful experience of unresolved territorial conflicts. Adding fuel to a fading ember is not only risky but also completely irresponsible. Moreover, the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia explicitly stipulates that in the event of Moldova losing its statehood, the autonomy gains the right to self-determination. In this sense, the wave of statements across the country from several high-ranking politicians expressing their intention to vote in a referendum for unification with Romania was unambiguously perceived in Comrat as a familiar signal, echoing from somewhere in the early 1990s. The history of post-Soviet state disintegration teaches us that the most “reliable” way to generate uncontrollable separatism is to systematically deprive people of legal means to defend their rights. The current disagreements between Chisinau and Gagauzia reveal the main problem of the ruling regime: it is increasingly capable of loudly proclaiming democracy externally, but progressively less capable of practicing it internally. It is impossible to build a modern state along European lines while ignoring its own regions with specific characteristics, and it is equally impossible to attempt to unify the country while dividing citizens into pro-European “correct” and pro-Russian “suspect” categories.