2024 Political Overview in Moldova

RTA Editorial On the eve of the New Year holidays, we recall the key political trends of the past year that have impacted the present and future of the republic   Election year The year 2024 was unusually full of electoral events, both in Moldova and abroad. Many of them, one way or another, have affected our country. RTA tried to keep the key electoral processes in focus: we analyzed how Donald Trump’s new term threatens the republic, what lessons can be learned from the sensational results of the first round of the presidential election in Romania, why the results of the parliamentary vote there signal trouble for Chisinau, drawing parallels between Georgia and our country. But first of all, we were certainly interested in the outcome of the battle for the presidential post in Moldova. A year ago, we predicted a confident victory for Maia Sandu, unless some “dark horse” appeared in the race. Both predictions partly came true. Sandu’s main opponent was the former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, who was “promoted” by PSRM and personally by Igor Dodon, who himself duly stepped aside. At the same time, another potential rival of Sandu, the mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, contrary to expectations, preferred to abstain from nomination, apparently as a result of external offers that he couldn’t resist. Stoianoglo, logically, adhered to centrist positions, promoting himself as a “candidate for everyone”, supported neutrality, healthy European integration with good relations with non-Western countries. An adequate programme, clean reputation and anti-rating of his rival eventually allowed him to win in the second round on the territory of Moldova - but it was not enough. Although Maia Sandu was the obvious favorite, as shown by the polls, we predicted that she could face many traps and pitfalls in the presidential race. At the same time, both the state machine and external partners, who actively invested their political weight and finances in “number one candidate”, were actively working for her victory. However, even these factors did not help the incumbent head of state to win the sympathy of the population, and her victory was achieved only at foreign polling stations. This gave her opponents a reason to derisively and disparagingly call her “diaspora presiden”. And some Moldovan political forces refuse to recognize her legitimacy at all. However, the main outcome of the presidential election is a severe split in society, which risks only getting worse during the parliamentary campaign. Energy crisis Under Maia Sandu and PAS, energy crises have become a common phenomenon. This is quite natural given the policy of severing any ties with Russia and, above all, energy ones, which are considered to be the main element of Moldova’s “dependence” on Russia. At the start of 2024, few expected that by the end of the year the situation would be so drastic. Although in early January, we already assumed that falling into crisis by the end of the year was a very likely scenario. Nevertheless, at one time everything was trouble-free: it seemed that the mechanism of gas purchases on the stock exchange had already been elaborated, the past mistakes of Spinu had been taken into account, and the issue of electricity was reliably resolved due to the long-term contract with the MoldGRES in Transnistria. It is hard to believe it now, but at one point we had reduced electricity tariffs, even though we pointed out that it was not that simple, and also drew attention to the strange maneuvers of a corrupt nature around gas purchases. Most likely, in their calculations, the authorities assumed that gas could be purchased in autumn at the most favorable price, the transit of Russian fuel through Ukraine to the left bank would continue in one form or another, which would provide cheap electricity for the right bank. Thus, everything would be calm in the energy sector in the most crucial year of parliamentary elections. But these plans went awry. They are forced to purchase gas at a price that is much higher than the summer one. Prime Minister Dorin Recean got away with showy resignations, but most importantly, his promise not to raise gas prices for consumers was broken. Ukrainian transit is also in trouble. Back in August, we wrote about how the attack on the Kursk oblast increased the risks for Moldova. The country’s leadership had a choice as to which path to take in the new realities - compromise or confrontation. Apparently, they chose the latter. As a result, the Transnistrian region may be left without gas as early as January, which means complete uncertainty with the country’s electricity supply. No one can say how much capacity deficit there will be in the energy system and how severe the schedules of blackouts will be. In the meantime, electricity and heat tariffs have increased, and it is clear that it is far from over. At the same time, the government, as it seems, has withdrawn itself from the problems, making accusations against the Russian Federation, suggesting us to be patient in the name of freedom and to wait until “green energy” blossoms in Moldova. Although there are questions about it too. We can only wait to see who and how will solve the gas dilemma on the Dniester, and whether it will be resolved at all. EU integration This year was much less generous in terms of gifts from Brussels to the ruling regime. While in 2023 there was the European Political Community summit in Bulboaca and the opening of negotiations on EU membership, in 2024 it was necessary to create positives on its own. The referendum on European integration, which was conceived as the main feature of Maia Sandu’s election campaign, was intended to serve this purpose. It should be noted that it was clear from the beginning how risky a bet this was. And the people really quickly realized the essence of this scheme, as a result of which they used the plebiscite to express a vote of no confidence to the authorities. In Moldova itself, the population voted by a noticeable margin against the introduction of articles on European integration into the Constitution and, in fact, further usurpation of power by the PAS party. Once again, it was the diaspora that saved the day, as if to pull the vote into the green zone by the narrowest of margins. We can also recall the sudden maneuver of Tiraspol, which at the last moment complained that it was not given the opportunity to participate in the referendum. In other respects, the “triumphal procession” into the European family of 2022-2023 has been replaced by a routine of little interest to the majority of ordinary people. As we said, the EU now expects from Chisinau concrete achievements, not only loyalty and geopolitically correct rhetoric. Moreover, the unpleasant price of “Moldova’s European-style repair” with the sale of land and the creation on our territory of camps for migrants deported from the EU began to surface. Finally, at the end of the year, Brussels made it clear that the date of Moldovaэs accession to the EU - 2030 - publicly mentioned by PAS has nothing to do with reality and there are no such plans. Solidifying the authoritarian regime Over the past four years, we have already got used to the fact that the current authorities do not hesitate to resort to non-democratic practices: banning political parties, cancelling election results, mass closure of local and foreign media, rule in a state of emergency, etc. This year this trend has continued. We have seen an obvious desire to create their own version of reality (they muzzle sociological centers that give ‘bad’ results of polls), to suppress any pluralism, even on the Internet, to establish surveillance of citizens if necessary, to put on trial all dissenters thanks to amendments to the Criminal Code. Domestic policy flaws PAS managers again failed to convince us that they are at least mid-level professionals. This year was memorable for a whole cascade of various internal political scandals that rattled in one sphere and another. The symbol of the mess is the notorious judiciary, which Maia Sandu herself called and still calls the main point of endeavor. The struggle of party clans turned this crucial reform into an obvious rigmarole, where competitions are cancelled without any reason, where the members of the Pre-vetting Commission turn out to be dishonest, and information about its operation is swiftly destroyed. At the end of the year, Maia Sandu herself had to admit the failure of the reform. Now they promise that it will go in a new way, “in the Moldovan style”, that is, apparently, without observivng any democratic procedures and norms of the law. The crisis in the agricultural sector easily takes one of the first places in the top list of failures of the authorities both to solve the problem and to communicate competently with the society. The discontent of farmers, which periodically erupted into street protests, was observed throughout the year and was more than justified. The government failed to provide effective support measures for the affected farmers, to establish dialogue with them, or to attract external assistance, leaving farmers essentially at a standstill. The situation with the Moldova Railway is even more deplorable. The “efficient managers” of PAS missed all the unique opportunities offered by freight transit to/from Ukraine, and the enterprise is sinking into a growing depression: the debts on salaries of its employees have already reached 180 million lei, and it is not yet clear where the government will find the required funds. Things are no better with other state assets. Schemes have almost blossomed in the Chisinau airport, which was returned to the state (but there’s worse to come), Moldovan energy companies are being hastily sold to Romania, which may also get our sea gates. And even a small state port in Giurgiulesti is ready to be given away by the authorities with an obvious corruption margin. Gagauzia and Transnistria Both regions remained sources of troubles for the country’s leadership. As usual, Chisinau had difficulties with Comrat under PAS. Political contacts were frozen under the pretext of Ilan Sor’s protégés being at the head of Gagauzia, an active attack on the rights of the autonomy continued, accompanied by the demands of some “hotheads” to eliminate it. In April, Maia Sandu made a provocative attempt to visit the region, ignoring both the Gagauz leadership and the population, having met with a few loyal local politicians and a lecture at the university. As a result, both in the referendum and in the presidential elections, the Gagauz demonstrated an impressive rejection of the president. As for the Transnistrian conflict, this year the events around it developed in waves. The beginning of the year was immediately marked by a major crisis, when Chisinau started charging customs duties to economic agents on the left bank. Tiraspol literally exploded with indignation and even held a congress of deputies of all levels (usually a landmark event for the region, where the most important political decisions are formalized). There were rumors that the Transnistrian administration might ask Russia for either recognition or accession, but everything was limited to appeals for help. After that, the dust settled. Our officials tried to find the parameters of a possible reintegration strategy, to establish communication with the region and to interest it in the prospects of European integration. The result of these efforts, however, is not obvious. Now, when we are standing on the threshold of the gravest energy crisis, it is clear that the next year 2025 may become a turning point in the Transnistrian settlement - however, we will obviously not “wear the pants”, as the keys to the conflict are now abroad due to Chisinau’s previous passive attitude. Breaking up with Russia Already at the beginning of the year, one could confidently predict the lack of chances for improvement of Moldovan-Russian relations. On the contrary, mutual skirmishes and scandals continued: Chisinau was outraged by the holding of the Russian presidential election on the territory of Transnistria, began to sever even informal ties, and fueled new espionage scandals. Moscow, for its part, has clearly put an end to the current Moldovan regime and bet on its replacement, supporting opposition projects like Victory. By the end of the year, the fervor of mutual denunciatory rhetoric had reached a peak. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova almost weekly accuses the Moldovan authorities of one sin or another, for example, of preparing a bridgehead for confronting Russia. And recently the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service dealt a heavy information blow with its press release about Maia Sandu’s plans to organize the seizure of MGRES and occupation of Transnistria. Therefore, it would hardly be wrong to say that we should not expect any special improvements in relations with Moscow next year, unless PAS fails completely in the parliamentary elections. Ukraine’s plans The war in Ukraine, despite the increased talk of peace after Trump’s victory, does not yet seem to be subsiding: hostilities are taking place on many parts of the frontline. Escalating events are occuring: the assassination of a Russian General Staff commander in Moscow, Western long-range strikes on recognized Russian territory, retaliatory attacks on the Ukrainian energy system, the Oreshnik test, etc. Our leadership adheres to full solidarity with Kyiv. Bilateral relations now seem serene, although it is difficult to say what plans our neighbors have for us. Many people in Moldova were frankly frightened this spring when the scandalous secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, was sent to us as ambassador. But recently it became known that this decision had been reconsidered and Paun Rohovei, a staff diplomat familiar in our region, is being considered for the post, which may indicate that Ukraine’s plans in the region have changed to more moderate ones.