Another Reform Failure Under PAS

Local government reform has long been overdue, but not the kind that is being designed in pre-election haste, without broad public debate and, most importantly, without an analysis of potential consequences

On April 8, the Secretary General of the Government, Alexei Buzu, presented to the press the concept of local government reform, which promises to radically reshape the country’s administrative map. Despite all the polished rhetoric about “modernization”, “quality of public administration”, and “alignment with European standards”, the proposed changes raised numerous questions regarding both their practical implementation and Moldova’s already fragile internal balance. It is difficult to dispute the arguments that 34% of households lack access to water supply and sanitation, and that small mayoralties are unable to meet regional development needs, thereby accelerating population outflow. At the same time, the changes planned by the authorities do not provide answers to these issues either. As a result, PAS is once again falling into the same trap: a reform designed to address a real problem is being implemented in haste, under strong political pressure, without discussion of risks, and with a predictable outcome. At first glance, the proposed changes are expected to lead to the consolidation of administrative units, a reduction in the number of mayoralties, and, ultimately, a redistribution of powers between central and local authorities. Formally, this is presented as an effort to improve governance and the efficiency of public spending. However, a closer look clearly reveals an opposite trend, aimed at the strict centralization of the state. The clearest indicator is the government’s intention to reduce the number of districts from the current 32 to 10, as well as effectively transforming district councils into bodies providing methodological support to the central administration. In essence, this amounts to Chisinau suppressing any expression of regional political life. Moreover, in the context of our country, where local authorities traditionally have limited resources, the consolidation of territorial units will not lead to optimization, but rather to a de facto distancing of power from citizens on the ground. In rural areas, where infrastructure is already in a deplorable state, this will increase the distance between the population and officials not only in a physical but also in an institutional sense. For many villages, the mayoralty is not just an administrative body, but an important socio-political institution. Its disappearance, alongside the “optimization” of schools and kindergartens, will only deepen the sense of neglect and marginalization of these communities. The government insists that the reform will be voluntary, meaning that mayoralties will decide for themselves whether to merge, and therefore no pressure will be applied. At the same time, the concept provides that those opting for mergers will receive a threefold increase in funding over the 2026-2030 period, with the state allocating around 6.5 billion lei for these incentives. Those who refuse, however, will remain with the current modest central transfers. In essence, what is presented as “incentives” in practice resembles financial coercion and administrative-political pressure. Particular attention should be paid to the decision-making procedure at the local level. According to the amendments currently under discussion in parliament, the merger of mayoralties can be approved by a simple majority, meaning that a margin of just one vote would be enough to permanently alter the fate of a locality. Any administrative reform affects not only specific individuals, but also officials, local elites, and entrepreneurs. Reducing the number of primars therefore means a loss of influence for many local leaders. It is important to understand that, unlike in Chisinau, politics at the local level is often built on personal ties and informal arrangements. Once the authorities begin to administratively dismantle these “local networks”, they will inevitably face increased non-political forms of resistance, sabotage, and rising social tensions. This will be especially pronounced in regions where local identities play a key role, as “consolidation” there will be perceived as an attempt to suppress them. The most acute consequences of the reform may emerge in the south of the country, in the Gagauz autonomy, where the situation goes far beyond issues of administrative efficiency. The region is already experiencing a deep electoral and political crisis, as the next elections to the People’s Assembly have been blocked by court decisions due to disputes over the status of the regional electoral body. As a result, the administrative reform is likely to be perceived by the Gagauz as yet another instrument of interference and pressure from Chisinau. Notably, the concept presented by Alexei Buzu contains virtually no special provisions for the autonomy. Experts have repeatedly warned that the new administrative reform could become another serious trigger in relations between Chisinau and Comrat. If the reform applies general rules to Gagauzia without taking into account its special status, the region will face a difficult choice: either comply with the center on issues directly affecting the structure of its self-governance, or enter into an open legal conflict. The reform’s impact on the Transnistrian settlement is more indirect, yet no less unpredictable, as the authorities are reshaping the country’s administrative-territorial structure without any regard for the future reintegration of the left bank. As is well known, any potential political settlement implies the inclusion of the Transnistrian region into a unified administrative space of the country on special terms. The new administrative map will, in effect, become a fixed reality into which the left bank simply does not fit. Moreover, if the reform leads to greater centralization of the state, this will directly contradict the principles of settlement, which предполагают a high degree of autonomy for the left-bank districts within a single country. The problems of local self-government in Moldova are indeed real. More than four hundred mayoralties with populations of fewer than one thousand people are clearly unable to provide citizens with quality services and adequate infrastructure. The reasons for this situation are well known: constant underfunding, staff shortages, and, as a result, the inability to effectively utilize European and other donor funds. Therefore, reform is necessary and long overdue. But not the kind that is designed in pre-election haste, without broad discussion, without special provisions for specific territories, and, most importantly, without an analysis of potential consequences. The Secretary General of the Government admits that the reform will not produce results overnight. This raises a logical question: why, then, is there a need to rush its completion specifically before the 2027 local elections? This fact suggests that the entire process has a clear political motivation, as the consolidation of administrative units could significantly alter electoral dynamics in favor of the ruling party. It is no coincidence that the authorities first initiated a population census and are now using its data to launch an internal administrative redrawing. In response to criticism and suspicions, government officials appeal to European experience, claiming that the reform aligns with EU standards. However, PAS overlooks a key point: European models of decentralization are built on strong institutions, a high level of trust, and well-developed infrastructure that simply do not exist in Moldova. Consequently, the blind transfer of foreign practices without adapting them to the country’s specific context may produce the opposite effect, exacerbating the dysfunction of the entire local administrative system. This combination of factors and the questionable provisions of the proposed concept make the reform highly risky, as there is no guarantee that the current ruling regime is capable of implementing it without disrupting the already fragile internal balance of the country. Moldova’s history contains many examples of reforms launched with great fanfare but quietly failing, not because the idea itself was flawed, but because their implementation ignored the country’s socio-economic and political realities. There are few reasons to believe that this time will be any different.