Chisinau and the Approaching Endgame of the Russia-Ukraine War

Kyiv and Moscow are entering a pivotal summer stage of their military confrontation, while simultaneously positioning themselves for negotiations and interim arrangements that will inevitably affect Moldova’s position

The situation involving Ukraine, which led to the Kremlin’s loss of strategic positions in Europe, has become a unique political resource for Moldova’s ruling regime. The war in the neighboring country has not only accelerated Moldova’s pro-European and pro-NATO trajectory and enabled Maia Sandu to consolidate an increasingly authoritarian model of governance through restrictions on basic freedoms but has also allowed the authorities to isolate both Gagauzia and Transnistria with relatively limited consequences. The southern autonomy may, in practice, be dismantled by the end of this year, while the pro-Russian region on the left bank of the Dniester, despite retaining remnants of its subjectivity, is experiencing a dramatic decline in living standards due to border closures and the painful process of extending national legislation to its territory. The absence of a direct military threat to Moldova from Russia, along with the changed dynamics surrounding the Transnistrian settlement, allows PAS to exploit the anti-Russian card with relative impunity, extracting both funding and political backing from Brussels. The repeated summoning of the Russian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry, withdrawal from the structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States, sanctions, and pressure on the Russian language and pro-Russian historical narratives have become central elements of the authorities’ political line at the current stage. At the same time, Chisinau is increasingly turning into an important military-logistical hub for Kyiv, operating within strategic frameworks coordinated from foreign centers that remain committed to prolonging the Russia-Ukraine conflict at virtually any cost. However, the military and diplomatic processes between Kyiv and Moscow operate according to their own internal logic, which does not align with the interests of Maia Sandu’s team. Ukraine is not only not planning to restore transport links with Transnistria; on the contrary, it has strengthened its border – with various engineering structures installed, including so-called “dragon’s teeth”. At the same time, conditions for the launch of negotiations may emerge in the medium term. Washington has become deeply entangled in the Iranian campaign, where the latest military escalation has been paused by Donald Trump, reportedly at the request of Arab monarchies. There have also been reports of a proposal to transfer Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium to Russia, which, together with the worsening crisis on the global energy market, could create preconditions for a diplomatic breakthrough. Stabilization in the Middle East would allow the US administration to return to more active efforts to facilitate dialogue between Moscow and Kyiv. The United States is already laying the groundwork by exerting sustained pressure on the Ukrainian presidential office – with the criminal prosecution of Andriy Yermak and other key associates potentially increasing Volodymyr Zelensky’s willingness to compromise. Meanwhile, Russia is demonstrating its determination to achieve its primary objectives. On 19-21 May, large-scale nuclear exercises are being held, intended to showcase Moscow’s capacity for strategic deterrence and, if necessary, its readiness to use the last remaining “trump card”. Given the adverse consequences of the conflict for the Kremlin (ranging from the accession of Scandinavian countries to NATO and deteriorating relations with Armenia to widespread sanctions and inflation) Russia is unlikely to exit the Ukraine conflict without securing the vast majority of its stated demands. In the European Union, preliminary discussions have also begun regarding future negotiations with Russia: at the initiative of Vladimir Putin, potential negotiators and a list of demands are being debated. Turkey, Finland, and even India have expressed interest in acting as mediators. However, voices arguing that Kyiv should further strengthen its position through offensive actions and strikes against Russia remain part of the mainstream discourse. Meanwhile, Putin is undertaking a major visit to China, where he aims to secure Xi Jinping’s support on a broad range of issues. Combined with repeated warnings that Russia’s approach will change in May and that the terms for Ukraine will become stricter, the international situation clearly points to a looming escalation. On the ground, the war between the two sides continues as a positional conflict, marked by reciprocal deep strikes into each other’s territories, causing significant damage to military and strategic infrastructure as well as civilian populations. The confrontation is exhausting both adversaries but does not produce a decisive advantage, while advances in frontline areas have remained minimal in recent months. Ukraine’s mobilization base is gradually shrinking, yet no critical shortages in supplies or budgetary resources are currently observed. Conditions have emerged for a decisive ground military campaign aimed at reshaping territorial control and strengthening negotiating positions in its aftermath. It is not excluded that both sides may launch offensives in different sectors of the front: Russia with a focus on pushing Ukrainian forces out of Donbas, and Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia direction. There is a high likelihood that, depending on the outcome of the summer battles, one of the parties may be forced to make concessions in order to accept compromise solutions and avoid scenarios involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Alternatively, intervention by Washington and/or Beijing could significantly accelerate the end of the conflict or lead to a prolonged pause in hostilities. Chisinau is not yet prepared for a rapid transformation of the Ukrainian scenario. Maia Sandu needs the war to continue until Moldova’s European prospects are clarified, as well as until Gagauzia is effectively dismantled and the Transnistrian issue is resolved. However, time is not standing still. The authorities are clearly going to accelerate pressure on Brussels to open negotiation clusters, while simultaneously intensifying pressure on Comrat and Tiraspol. The option of seeking at least temporary compromises with them, which could help hedge risks and create a platform for more sustainable solutions, is not currently being considered. Chisinau is looking toward Kyiv and Brussels, but risks instead facing the abyss of yet another planning miscalculation.