PAS Divided: The Contours of a Regime in Disarray

Anton ŠVEC

The PAS regime, historically incoherent, incompetent, and ineffective, sustained itself for years on external legitimacy and European integration fantasies. Today, the authorities are facing a perfect storm, brought on by internecine clan warfare. But is the rot eating away at the regime purely an internal affair?  

This summer is all but guaranteed to become the most difficult and unpredictable political season since Maia Sandu and PAS came to power. Rather unexpectedly, given that there are no elections this year, scandals are shaking the regime almost daily, raising the question not of preserving ratings or voter trust but of whether the entire edifice PAS has constructed over five years of one-party rule can even function at all. The deadlock over finding an acceptable prime minister is merely the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the surface lurk the risks of losing control, of forfeiting the parliamentary majority, of derailing European integration prospects and, for certain officials whose corrupt dealings have spilled into the public domain in recent weeks, the risk of losing their personal freedom. Of course, arrests will only happen if Maia Sandu herself requires them, acting on the instinct of self-preservation. But the ruling party has most definitely entered a period of turbulence on a scale never seen before. What is more, this war of all against all was not triggered by the much-invoked “Russian hybrid interference” or by foreign propaganda. It was unleashed by pro-government media and the authorities themselves. MP Alex Trubca, for example, got ahead of the game and started sharing with Igor Grosu and with the wider public the sordid details of his own business dealings conducted under the cover of a parliamentary mandate. In doing so, he chose not to wait for the publication of journalistic investigations on channels that operate in close cahoots with the regime and its handlers (alternative media outlets having, for the most part, already been shut down or blocked inside the country). It is worth remembering that the regime itself actively stoked division and instability in Moldova, violating electoral law, terrorizing citizens, applying criminal pressure against the opposition and pro-Russian public figures, and imposing sanctions on its own citizens. On top of that, it has placed the country on a war footing, backing Ukraine and driving the militarization of the economy, public consciousness, and the information landscape. Add to this the utterly disgraceful assault on the Gagauz autonomy, which on Thursday was marked by yet another shameful act: the Constitutional Court ruling that bars Comrat from independently forming its own electoral body and from influencing the appointment of police, justice, and security officials. In effect, the central authorities are trying to seize control of the region, stripping local voters and elites of their right to choose. Something similar can be observed in relations with Tiraspol, where dialogue is entirely absent and risky, clearly half-baked moves are being made, pushing the Transnistrian settlement along a dangerous trajectory. The political atmosphere in the country, poisoned by the authorities’ arbitrariness and impunity, has caused the situation to spiral out of control. The PAS cudgel, wielded against rebellious regions, the media, the Orthodox Church, ordinary citizens, and political opponents, has come swinging back at the back of the head of those who believed they alone held the reins. Caught in the millstones, the party’s top brass has feverishly set about hunting for scapegoats and provocateurs. Igor Grosu, who is being actively pressed to take the premiership, and Dan Perciun, who is indeed one of the candidates, have unearthed in the unfolding events the fingerprints of Vladimir Plahotniuc: a convicted man currently behind bars who, in their telling, continues to shape Moldovan politics through affiliated figures. The sheer absurdity of this reading of events points to a regime that has lost its footing and any grasp of how and on what terms to pull itself out of the crisis. Significantly, this time around, not a single member of the parliamentary opposition rushed to offer their cut-rate services to rescue the faltering regime. Virtually every faction has stated that it will not attend Maia Sandu’s consultations on forming a new government. Moreover, rather than joining the commission headed by Dinu Plingau, the opposition has pledged to launch its own investigation into violations and corruption at state-owned enterprises. If this work is carried out lawfully and professionally, the parliamentary group’s findings could have the effect of a bombshell. The infighting among clans within PAS, as well as between the party and figures who are affiliated with and control financial flows, has been going on for several years now. It was one of the reasons behind the political disqualification of the seemingly unsinkable Andrei Spinu. The sidelining of Dorin Recean from the premiership is likewise the product of similar under-the-carpet intrigues. Until now, however, this infighting had never served as a prelude to political catastrophe for PAS. The unfolding events suggest that Maia Sandu’s key resource, her external legitimacy, is now crumbling. It is highly likely that certain international players have had a hand in destabilizing the situation in Moldova, not least through media outlets operating on grants they provide. We are hardly talking about the Euro-bureaucracy. In that segment, support for Moldova is far from exhausted. The latest signals from the European Commission and the European Parliament’s resolution of 8 July show that Brussels is perfectly content with Moldovan reality and that Maia Sandu still successfully manages to trade in Russophobia and flirt with the theme of “unirea”, accumulating goodwill among EU leaders. The Americans and the Russians, if they were acting in concert, would certainly have the wherewithal to play such a game of solitaire. But Moscow no longer objectively has those capabilities (and were the Kremlin actually in on this game, we would be seeing active moves from Comrat and Tiraspol, which, for now at least, is not the case). Washington, meanwhile, remains bogged down in the Middle East and has yet to properly engage with Moldovan affairs; the arrival of a new US ambassador is still only at the announcement stage. It follows that the “shaking up” of Moldova may well be the handiwork of certain influential EU member states, ones that know the real situation on the ground and do not share the Euro-bureaucracy’s plans to fast-track our country’s membership. It is they who are now signaling, bluntly (since subtle hints like suspending the Moldova Support Platform meetings fell on deaf ears), that Maia Sandu’s team is not the unchallenged favorite, nor a genuinely useful asset, for some EU national capitals. Tellingly, German Ambassador Hubert Knirsch stated yesterday that Chisinau itself invented the 2030 accession date: “…I cannot make forecasts regarding the pace of reforms in Moldova, reforms which, first and foremost, the Republic of Moldova itself needs”. This is a signal that Chisinau must focus on real reforms, rebuild the economy, and defeat corruption, not simply usurp power and crack down on the opposition. It is an ultimatum to Sandu: stop toying with the “unirea” topic, because this speculation, in and of itself, only creates problems and paints Moldova not as a candidate country but as a failed state with an undefined identity. Failing that, the regime will be pushed toward a schism and if Washington, Kyiv, or Moscow should then join the fray for their own reasons, Maia Sandu and her protégés could well repeat the unenviable fate of Vladimir Plahotniuc. Whether this message gets through to the presidency is a difficult question. The answer will be written in the country’s subsequent political trajectory. One cannot wholly rule out that, at some stage, external intervention might produce a more balanced, fairer, and more competent power structure in Moldova, along with a normalization of Chisinau’s relations with the outside world and with its own regions.