A Reality Check: The True Face of Soviet “Occupation” in Moldova

As they prepare to launch an active phase of “decommunization” as an integral part of the country’s European integration path, the authorities are intensifying criticism of Moldova’s Soviet-era development, which, in reality, was the period of its greatest prosperity

Alongside the intensification of anti-Russian and Russophobic sentiment, the authorities have increasingly begun to subject the period of the country’s Soviet period to derogatory criticism, referring to it more and more frequently as an “occupation”. In the minds of our policymakers, even 35 years after independence, the USSR is still held responsible for poor infrastructure, the low energy efficiency of residential buildings, and, in general, for having “separated” Moldova from the European family, that is, from Romania. A wave of accusatory statements, often bordering on the surreal, has accompanied the emergence of a so-called “decommunization” policy in Moldova, similar to Ukraine’s. While still relatively moderate, efforts to relocate or remove Soviet monuments are advancing, and history textbooks have already been rewritten in line with the official narrative. In these accounts, the USSR is portrayed as an aggressor and occupier that for half a century “trampled” the Moldovan nation and drained its resources. At the same time, the 22-year period of belonging to Greater Romania is being glorified, with pro-government experts and researchers, in a propagandistic fervor, referring to it as a “first European modernization” and a “golden age”, describing alleged democratic reforms, cultural flourishing, rapid industrial growth, and other such narratives. The fact that isolated figures do not correspond to reality is conveniently ignored. It is enough to note that by 1940 only 13% of Bessarabia’s population lived in urban areas – 2.5 times less than in the Soviet Union at the time. This clearly reflects the region’s level of industrialization and its role as an agrarian appendage-colony assigned by Bucharest And what about Moscow? After bringing Moldovan territory back under its control – and I say “brought back”, because since 1812 it had been part of Russia, and before that had spent nearly three centuries under Ottoman rule – it began rapidly increasing its economic and social potential. Take a key indicator such as fixed capital investment, which refers to any investment in development, including infrastructure construction and industrial expansion. From 1940 onwards, this indicator grew at a very high pace, far outstripping other republics. For example, by 1950 it had increased on average by 1.9 times across the USSR, while in the Moldavian SSR it rose almost tenfold. It is easy to guess where these investments came from – namely, from union’s center, which had to “bring up” the territory to a viable level after the so-called “Romanian golden age”. This dynamic continued until the collapse of the USSR: overall, while fixed capital investment in the Russian SFSR increased 28.5 times over 50 years, in Moldova it grew by 275 times. However, Moscow provided not only financial resources. Industrialization and the development of the education system required qualified personnel, which the republic simply did not have. As a result, various specialists arrived in the Moldavian SSR, helping to build what later became the Soviet-era brand of a “flourishing Moldova”. In today’s PAS-aligned textbooks, these people are, in a striking display of “gratitude”, referred to as “vagrants and alcoholics”. An interesting kind of “invader” it turns out, one that sends both money and personnel to the “occupied territories”, whereas in historical practice the exact opposite usually occurs. As a result of this “malicious aggressor’s” actions, over half a century the output of industrial production alone in our country increased almost 77-fold – more than, for example, in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In a remarkably short time, the Moldavian SSR was transformed from a backward colony into a strong industrial-agrarian republic. Unlike the Romanian period, under Soviet rule Moldova saw the emergence not only of small-scale food-processing workshops, but also of large industrial enterprises, hundreds of them, and not limited to food production. Remarkably, tractors, computer equipment, televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines were all produced here. By today’s standards, this may seem almost unimaginable. Importantly, it was not only industry that developed, but also scientific and technological capacity, with numerous research institutes, design bureaus, laboratories, and other institutions, which are now in a deeply degraded state. The agricultural sector also performed well. Yields were steadily increasing thanks to the introduction of advanced technologies and a large-scale irrigation system covering as much as 300,000 hectares. Today, by contrast, artificial irrigation exists on only around 4,000 hectares. As a result, agriculture now resembles a medieval system, relying almost entirely on favorable weather conditions. Another illustrative set of figures was once mentioned during a television appearance by then-Minister of Agriculture Vladimir Bolea: the cattle population in present-day Moldova stands at around 15,000, whereas in the Moldavian SSR it exceeded one million. Some members of the “yellow flock” might now exclaim that Moscow did all this solely for its own benefit, so that Moldova could “feed” the Soviet Union. But this is yet another myth: the Moldavian SSR accounted for just over 2% of the agricultural output produced in the USSR. In terms of output relative to land area, this was a strong result for Moldova, but not one that would justify attributing any critically important role to it in supplying such a vast country. But leaving aside the economy, what about the main form of capital – human one? Did Moldovans “wither away” as a nation under Moscow’s rule and decline in numbers? The answer is no. In just fifty years, the population grew by 76%. The population of the Moldavian SSR increased even faster than the Soviet average, reaching more than 4.3 million people by 1990 that will likely never be achieved again. Moreover, there was no “Russification” of our people. On the contrary, there was a rise in Moldovan culture and education, and in Moldovan identity as a whole, which, according to this narrative, was ultimately destroyed by PAS in favor of a Romanian one. In light of the figures and data presented (see here for more detail), it should be clear to any reasonable observer that Moscow was exploiting Moldova, but rather the opposite: we made full use of the Soviet framework to our advantage, ensuring decades of accelerated development and prosperity. It is therefore unsurprising that once the “occupation” ended, the country rapidly slid into demographic decline and economic depression. Ironically, just as we were among the fastest to build up capacity during the Soviet period, we were also among the fastest to lose it after the dissolution of the USSR. This is also highly telling. As a result, instead of growing human capital, we are witnessing its seemingly irreversible loss. Even according to official statistics, under the current regime people are leaving the republic more actively than before. Instead of industrial strength, only remnants of past capacity remain, while major investors are now a near-miraculous occurrence. Instead of a robust agricultural sector, we see a declining industry burdened by numerous unresolved problems, symbolized by repeated farmers’ protests and tractors blocking the central square of the capital. Instead of an export-oriented economy, there is a predominantly import-based one – so much so that we now import more food than we export. As for scientific and technological potential, it hardly even warrants separate discussion. Some may object: the USSR was a system of totalitarianism and repression, whereas today we supposedly have democracy and human rights, which are more important than any economy or demographic indicators. This can be countered as follows: how much democracy does Moldova actually have today? Elections have a predictable outcome, a de facto one-party system dominates, and freedom of speech is constrained within the boundaries of official propaganda narratives. Moreover, even Western democracy indices note Moldova’s drift toward “hybrid regimes”, with the country now ranking at levels similar to those during the period of the “captured state” under Plahotniuc. The fact that Moldova was able to develop with Moscow’s support and within a state project led by it does not fit into the current domestic political course, which is dominated by a form of European integration heavily interwoven with unionist ideology. As a result, the authorities will continue to erode the historical memory of the real Moldavian SSR, instead constructing myths about a “territory of repression, deportations, famine, cultural genocide”, and similar narratives. And, unfortunately, the process of feeding such narratives to the public is unlikely to be reversible in the foreseeable future.