Opinion: “Growing Crisis in the Transnistrian Settlement Is Hard to Conceal”

The approach toward Tiraspol adopted by the ruling party is increasingly pushing the Transnistrian settlement into a state of deep and uncontrollable crisis

The official Transnistrian settlement process is once again close to collapse. Although the main participants of yesterday’s meeting in Tiraspol stated at a press briefing that contacts should be continued and even made more dynamic, these statements clearly did not align with what was taking place at the OSCE office. It is clear that Moldova has significantly hardened its policy toward the left bank. This approach was chosen in light of the geopolitical context and Brussels’ requirements regarding the country’s prospects for EU membership. The authorities are now attempting to convince donors and partners of its correctness and viability, but so far, they are clearly failing to do so. First of all, serious economic pressure measures targeting the region’s business sector were announced. The initial step among them is expected to be an increase in gas prices, with 8% VAT directed to the state budget. This will be followed by a phased expansion of the list of goods subject to VAT, as well as the imposition of excise duties on goods entering Transnistria. The structure of revenue collection from local enterprises, according to the submitted draft law, will be determined by the government. However, the chair of the parliamentary Economy Committee, Radu Marian, plans to raise revenues under the new measures to 3.3 billion lei by 2030. Taking into account customs duties, transit payments (including gas-related ones), VAT in trade between the two banks of the Dniester, as well as already applied excise, registration, licensing, customs, environmental and other fees, the total amount could reach 5 billion lei (for example, customs duties alone generated over 230 million lei last year). This figure is comparable to the entire tax burden in the Transnistrian region, which is stated at 5.2 billion “PMR rubles” this year. This suggests that Tiraspol’s alarmist claims about “double taxation” are, in fact, reasonable. Transnistria warns that the central authorities’ decision could eventually paralyze all processes, bring industry to a halt, and leave Chisinau unable to collect any revenues. It appears that the government holds a similar view, even if it is not stated publicly. The authorities believe they have effectively issued a final verdict for Tiraspol and set a deadline aligned with the EU integration process – 2030. They now expect that the population and elites on the left bank will themselves “come forward” by that time. For Chisinau, there is essentially nothing left to do but wait and watch. This strategy was indirectly revealed by Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri himself during a press briefing, when he suggested that the non-paper he had taken to Brussels was not actually a formal document and was far less important than the draft law on the economic dismantling of the separatist regime. Notably, the draft law was symbolically introduced on the day of the first meeting between political representatives of the two sides in late February. However, its consideration was later postponed ahead of the second meeting due to a wave of outrage in Tiraspol, which forced a pause for reassessment of both the plan and the surrounding PR strategy. Symbolic actions have nevertheless been sufficient even without this. If in February Maia Sandu revoked the citizenship of nine regional elites, prompting a counter-lawsuit from them, then this week five commanders of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) were declared persona non grata. This gesture is even less substantial than the previous one, but still clearly symbolic. The intention was that, within the newly hardened context, Valeriu Chiveri would be able to engage with Tiraspol representatives “from a position of strength”: reproaching, demanding, and issuing warnings, thereby creating the impression of an irreversible reintegration process on the one hand, while on the other avoiding any costs associated with negotiations with Tiraspol. However, the official did not handle this task particularly well, thereby putting the entire PAS strategy at risk. Even more concerning is that doubts, it appears, have also emerged among international partners, above all Brussels, which can hardly continue to ignore what took place at the meeting and, more broadly, within the Transnistrian settlement process. The unsuccessful rhetoric and behavior of our delegation also undermined the OSCE Mission, which effectively provides the only viable platform for negotiations: as a result of this demarche, it risks being associated with verbal confrontations and a loss of control over the situation. To a significant extent, the escalation was triggered by the statement that Chisinau and Tiraspol are not engaged in negotiations or diplomatic work. According to Chiveri, these can only be considered working meetings and a platform “to present the vision of the country’s reintegration”. The provocative nature of this position, combined with its clearly confrontational tone, provoked a predictable and sharp reaction from the Tiraspol delegation, which accused Chisinau of lacking a mandate for practical engagement. Moreover, the Deputy Prime Minister stated that the “5+2” format no longer exists, which calls into question the prospects for interaction within the platforms that are still used by the parties. Ultimately, meetings between political representatives, and even the very designation of these positions, are governed by the documents of this format. These contacts involve diplomats from the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the United States, precisely because of their status as mediators and observers within the “5+2” framework. By rejecting this foundation without offering an alternative, Valeriu Chiveri is effectively undermining the reintegration process and the levels of interaction that have so far remained operational. The media coverage showed a scene that leaves little doubt about the ambiguous reaction of the meeting participants to such a dismissive attitude toward agreed approaches to joint work. By excluding the possibility of signing agreements with Transnistria, contrary to long-established practice, the government is de facto leaving the issue of a final settlement through peaceful means in limbo. Overall, Chisinau’s tactics can hardly be said to have come as a revelation to anyone, but the poor choice of language, complete lack of flexibility, and apparent disregard for the opposing side clearly surprised the public. We appeared as a party entirely unwilling to assume responsibility for the settlement process, including the consequences of its own decisions. If the intention was to signal that this issue should now be handled by Brussels or another international structure, then the objective has been achieved. However, it remains unclear whether these actions are coordinated with the EU leadership, which is unlikely to welcome a “gift” in the form of a humanitarian crisis, as well as a complete breakdown of trust between the parties and the loss of instruments for managing the situation. If, however, this is simply the new norm in the authorities’ approach, it will clearly become a problem for the international community, as the “bull in a china shop” tactic ends badly for everyone involved – the shop, the bull, and the observers alike.