Sandu Travels to Kyiv Bearing a “Political Bow”

Sergiu CEBAN

The logic behind Moldova’s growing dependence on Ukraine is that the country is becoming increasingly constrained in its foreign policy actions, and each subsequent step will further limit its room for maneuver

Over the weekend, Maia Sandu visited Kyiv on a working visit officially timed to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. To be honest, this is clearly not the kind of occasion that warrants a visit by a head of state. Nevertheless, such trips always have two levels of substance: the public, ceremonial aspect – to make the necessary statements at a joint press conference – and the private aspect, where truly important issues are discussed. It’s easy to guess that the latter usually determines the true significance of a visit to a particular country. Therefore, everything that was said on camera in Kyiv is merely the tip of the iceberg, with the bulk of it remaining off-camera. The major question is: why did Sandu feel the need to travel to the Ukrainian capital right now? What has changed, given that the Chisinau authorities already regularly reaffirm their commitment to European integration and solidarity with Ukraine? It seems that the explanation lies in the fact that for over a year, the PAS-friendly media and expert circles have constantly been hyping the idea of charting a separate European course, distinct from Kyiv’s. The logic behind these speculations is more than clear. Ukraine is at war; its path to negotiations is objectively more complex and politically more difficult, hence the tempting idea of speeding up by breaking away from a partner that has become a burden. However, the reality turned out to be much harsher. One of the main obstacles to launching full-fledged EU accession negotiations was the Hungarian veto. Overcoming it required intense political maneuvering, including public pressure on Budapest from multiple fronts. Incidentally, Kyiv participated in this campaign with the utmost openness and vigor, while Chisinau, as usual, stayed on the sidelines. The realization within our presidency that Zelensky had, in essence, become the political “undertaker” for Orban, as well as the fact that without Ukraine – and certainly against its interests – Moldova’s European integration course is rapidly losing momentum and support in Brussels, apparently became the main motive for Maia Sandu’s hasty “trip”. Ultimately, instead of the previous distancing, we saw clear confirmation of the integration partnership between Chisinau and Kyiv. Sandu stated that the two countries have fully met all the necessary conditions for the start of negotiations and that Brussels must act immediately. This can be seen as evidence that we are ready for close coordination, a unified European agenda, and a common pace of negotiations. In effect, this puts a political end to the “decoupling” narrative, and it no longer aligns with the official position. In other words, Moldova is voluntarily “returning” to the same team as Ukraine, albeit as a junior but extremely loyal partner. The “Coalition of the Willing” in support of Ukraine deserves special attention; according to Sandu, Moldova is ready to join it. The president’s verbal consent serves as the starting point for entry, to be followed by a set of corresponding obligations. At the same time, it seems that the very fact of discussing participation in military-political initiatives requires serious public and parliamentary dialogue. Not to mention how this aligns with our country’s constitutional neutrality. Kyiv is becoming increasingly demanding of its partners and coalition allies, expecting not just rhetorical support but concrete action. Consequently, the position that “Ukraine is defending Moldova by keeping the Russian army away from its borders” – which Sandu has been repeating for several years without making any real contribution to the common cause – is unlikely to satisfy the Ukrainian authorities indefinitely. Therefore, upon joining the “Coalition of the Willing”, Moldova will inevitably be required to translate our president’s political statements into concrete forms of cooperation to meet the needs of the Ukrainian army. In this regard, reports emerging from Romanian sources of the production and testing of military drones on Moldovan territory suggest that we are already gradually becoming involved in military-logistical and military-industrial cooperation with Ukraine. And the extent of this involvement, by all accounts, is only set to grow. It is not out of the question that in the near future, discussions will also turn to expanding infrastructure support, including repair facilities, transit routes, and the training of specialized personnel. All of this will mark a gradual transition from mere verbal solidarity with Ukraine to full-fledged practical participation in meeting its military needs. As expected, the presidents also touched on the Transnistrian issue. Sandu acknowledged that she had discussed with European partners the possibility of establishing external oversight over the region as part of the so-called “reintegration vision”. The very fact that this purely internal matter is being commented on in Kyiv at a joint press conference with Zelensky speaks volumes in itself. It appears that both the EU and Ukraine are waiting for and pressuring Chisinau to demonstrate real efforts and progress towards a settlement. The problem is that, for now, our efforts amount to more talk than action. Despite its standard assurances of support for our sovereignty and territorial integrity, our neighboring country has no plans to actively engage in the Transnistrian settlement. Kyrylo Budanov’s recent statements were quite unambiguous, making it clear that Ukraine does not intend to shoulder any additional military burden, let alone responsibility for Moldova’s security. Nevertheless, the situation on the left bank of the Dniester remains unstable, especially given Shoigu’s latest statements. Therefore, Sandu and Zelensky likely did discuss coordination scenarios in case the situation deteriorates sharply. When assessing the overall picture of the president’s trip, a whole range of diverse observations and criticisms comes to mind. But, as is well known, Maia Sandu’s main rhetorical shield against all uncomfortable questions is European integration. Any decision, any agreement, any rapprochement with Kyiv is presented under the guise of the “European path”. Hence the simple formula: “European integration is an absolute good”, including everything done in its name. Consequently, anyone who expresses doubts or sees any risks for Moldova is automatically counted among the opponents of a “bright European future”. Joining the EU is undoubtedly a strategic goal shared by a significant portion of society. But this is by no means a free pass that absolves the government of its accountability to its citizens. Declaring on behalf of the country that it will join a military coalition, discussing external control over an entire region of one’s own state, and aligning negotiating positions with war-torn neighboring Ukraine requires transparency, public oversight, and democratic debate. The main political outcome of the trip is that Moldova is voluntarily aligning itself with Ukraine as a disciplined partner in European integration, pledging allegiance to both Brussels and Kyiv. And this, in turn, means abandoning attempts to defend its own position even on issues that fall within the country’s sovereign jurisdiction. The logic of growing dependence on Ukraine is that our state is becoming increasingly constrained in its foreign policy actions, and each subsequent step will further narrow the room for maneuver. Moldova is being tightly integrated into the geopolitical and military-political reality of the regional space without much choice and, by all accounts, without a serious understanding of where exactly this path leads in the medium and long term.