The ‘Visa Card’ Draw: How Moldova Is Trading the CIS for the EU

With the almost inevitable cancellation of visa-free travel for Russians in the near future, Moldova will finally take its geopolitical place in the sanitary cordon being built by the West against Russia

At tomorrow’s meeting, the government plans to approve a package of documents denouncing another group of agreements within the CIS framework. Among them is one of the most symbolic and high-profile – the agreement on visa-free travel for citizens of the CIS countries. Its cancellation marks another important stage in the methodical dismantling of ties with the post-Soviet space and a definitive move toward an institutional exit from Moscow’s orbit. For this reason, the event expected tomorrow may become a prelude to the introduction of a visa regime with Russia – a step that officials in Chisinau are not yet willing to say out loud, but one that fully fits within the logic of the current state policy and the overall process of European integration. Therefore, all the present assurances that no drastic changes will occur are nothing more than a tactical move aimed at buying additional time. Our country has never been the most active participant in the CIS. Even in the 1990s, Chisinau preferred to take a selective approach, using this structure where it was beneficial and avoiding issues related to political loyalty to Moscow. With the application for EU membership in 2022, cautious distancing turned into accelerated political escape. Since February 2023, the government has announced its intention to terminate 119 out of 282 agreements concluded within the CIS framework. This plan has already been implemented almost halfway. Of course, the authorities claim that important and useful agreements will be preserved. However, the criteria for this “importance” are increasingly determined by ideological considerations – more precisely, by the Eurointegration vector, which dictates the need to harmonize legislation and synchronize policies with Brussels. The issue of visa-free travel takes on particular significance here. Formally, Moldova maintains a separate bilateral agreement with Russia that allows citizens to cross borders without unnecessary bureaucracy. However, the durability of such an arrangement under the current circumstances appears rather illusory. Firstly, we are not the first EU candidate country to undergo a visa policy transformation. Other states have already faced the need to align their policies in this area with common European standards, even at the expense of their national interests. In October, Montenegrin President Jakov Milatovic openly stated that his country would have to introduce visas for Russians, as this is an EU requirement. Moldova is following the same path, but unlike Montenegro, it is doing so in a more politicized context – in our case, the issue is not about the tourism sector, but about demonstrating loyalty to the European course. Secondly, there is the example of Ukraine, which introduced a visa regime with Russia in the summer of 2022, justifying it with obvious national security considerations. For our politicians, this serves quite well as both a reference point and a justification for taking similar measures. Thirdly, Brussels itself has significantly tightened entry procedures for Russian citizens as of November 7, banning the issuance of multiple-entry visas and switching to single-entry permits with thorough background checks. It is quite possible that the ruling PAS, which seeks to align its arsenal of sanction measures with that of the EU, will have to follow the same logic. By the way, Moscow is already noting a de facto “pre-visa regime” with our country, given that dozens of Russians are being denied entry and that crossing the Moldovan border itself involves additional procedures lasting many hours. Therefore, everything indicates that the formal legal introduction of the new regime is only a matter of time. And here we come to the most vulnerable part of our authorities’ strategy. In Chisinau and, evidently, in Brussels, they see only one side of the coin – the symbolic and political gain. Undoubtedly, this step will be welcomed enthusiastically in European capitals, and it will gladly be added to the achievements of our negotiating team as yet another piece of evidence of the irreversibility of the pro-European course. But behind this short-term political effect lie quite tangible risks that are treated with frightening indifference in our country. First and foremost, ordinary people will be the ones to suffer. Moldova and Russia remain interconnected states, both in terms of migration and in the cultural and humanitarian sense. Thousands of mixed families and hundreds of thousands of citizens work or have relatives on both sides. For many of them, the visa barrier will become a dividing bureaucratic obstacle. The social cost of such a policy is enormous. Against the backdrop of economic difficulties, any additional isolation from the Russian labor market or from remittances will hit the most vulnerable segments of the population. Although tourist flows from Russia are small, the Russian market remains important for Moldovan producers. Any retaliatory measure – from tariff restrictions to the suspension of certain supplies – could have a noticeable impact on our economy. Russia has repeatedly shown that it is ready to act asymmetrically, using economic, transport, and humanitarian levers. In addition, Moscow will gain an additional argument in favor of a “hard perimeter” policy along its western borders and may seek new forms of pressure. The visa divide will inevitably affect Transnistria, where a significant number of Russian citizens reside. This factor may become an argument for strengthening Russia’s presence and political influence on the left bank of the Dniester. Thus, a step intended to reduce dependence on Russia may, on the contrary, reinforce its position in one of the most sensitive regions of our country. The political logic of PAS is generally understandable. A country that has spent decades balancing between East and West is now betting on the inevitability of the European choice. But at the same time, it must be understood that the EU is certainly interested in demonstrating “success and loyalty” on its eastern borders. Yet whether it is ready to compensate for the economic losses we will incur due to the deterioration of relations with Russia is a question to which there is no clear answer. In the next two years, Moldova will most likely complete the establishment of a visa system synchronized with the Schengen Area. This means the automatic introduction of visas not only for citizens of Russia and Belarus, but also for almost all CIS countries. By 2027, the republic may be integrated into the European visa data exchange system, and Moldovan consulates will operate under the unified rules of the European Union. With the cancellation of visa-free travel, Moldova will, in geopolitical terms, firmly take its place in the sanitary cordon being built by the West against Russia. This, in turn, will make the country a hostage of a broader conflict, depriving it of room for maneuver and turning it from a subject that traditionally balanced between centers of power into an object in a larger game. In this new configuration, Moscow will no longer view us as an independent player, but rather as part of the West’s “single front.” Accordingly, the retaliatory measures applied to us will be directed not at a sovereign state, but at an element of this hostile framework.