The End of Hungary’s “Sovereigntist No. 1”?

Sergiu CEBAN

Hungary may be approaching the end of Viktor Orban’s long-standing rule. In the coming months, Moldova will face the challenge of solving a complex diplomatic equation, not only to seize the moment and accelerate EU accession talks, but also to proactively build a pragmatic dialogue with a “new” Budapest

Last Sunday, something occurred that until recently seemed unthinkable in Brussels offices and Washington think tanks. Viktor Orban, one of Europe’s most seasoned politicians, a master of political survival, and a principal challenger to the European establishment, has ultimately suffered defeat in Hungary’s parliamentary elections. Orbán’s defeat must be interpreted correctly from the outset, as this is not merely a rotation of elites, but the dismantling of an elaborate system of governance that for nearly a decade and a half served as an alternative to the liberal mainstream in most European countries. The political system that the now former prime minister methodically constructed, through constitutional changes, the reshaping of the media sphere, and the integration of loyal business networks, was, in essence, a state within a state. Therefore, Orban’s departure carries a quasi-revolutionary effect, the consequences of which will be felt in Hungary for a long time, provided that the victorious Tisza Party can retain power beyond a single term. The election results also clearly demonstrated that Hungarian society has grown weary of the constant confrontation with Brussels, while sovereignty in Orban’s interpretation has become too costly for the average citizen. Frozen EU funds, limited access to infrastructure subsidies, and the weakening of the forint – all of this socio-economic fatigue ultimately became the electoral trigger. At present, the main intrigue lies in the transfer of power. The winners likely understand that they have inherited a complex architecture of political, economic, and foreign policy ties that cannot be dismantled overnight. Formally, Orban has conceded defeat, but the handover of power is clearly set to be anything but smooth. In any case, Peter Magyar will initially have to operate within a system of coordinates he did not design. If he begins to make concessions to the European Commission on key contentious issues, his predecessor will find grounds to loudly move into opposition and overshadow the political start of the new ruling group from the very first weeks. Orban’s defeat is also a significant blow to the current White House administration, for which Budapest had been one of the few footholds within the EU. With his loss, a key lever of influence, via a non-systemic leader who allowed the United States to pursue its own game inside the EU, is effectively gone. The setback is all the more painful as it comes at a time when the U.S. is already overstretched by the Middle Eastern conflict, and Hungarian voters openly ignored Vice President J.D. Vance’s call to support the leader of Fidesz. The main misconception in assessing the situation in Hungary is to view it as a small and insignificant country. While Budapest has not achieved the status of an independent geopolitical actor, under Orban it became a key node where the interests of Trump, Xi Jinping, and Putin converged. As a result, this small Eastern European state effectively served as a “gateway to Europe” for Chinese investments and Russian energy resources. It is likely that the new leadership, even with a clearly pro-European orientation, will be reluctant to abandon such a выгодное geopolitical positioning. In the regional context, Viktor Orban was widely regarded as the undisputed leader of the right-conservative movement in Europe. But does his departure mean that Europe’s liberal elites have achieved a strategic victory? The answer is not obvious, and it is too early to draw far-reaching conclusions. The socio-economic conditions that gave rise to “Orbanism”, such as migratory pressure, the erosion of cultural identity, and the widening gap between major cities and the provinces, have not disappeared. Therefore, the ground for sovereigntist ideology remains just as fertile for the emergence of its various political manifestations. The baton may temporarily be picked up by Robert Fico in Slovakia, who displays similar rhetoric, albeit with significantly greater caution toward Brussels. A far more important question is how other regional sovereigntists will behave: whether they will gradually soften their course and rhetoric, recognizing that, without the Hungarian vanguard, confronting the European Commission alone is politically risky, or whether they will attempt to raise the “fallen banner”. Early signals from Warsaw, Prague, and Bratislava point more toward caution than toward a willingness to continue active confrontation. If distancing ourselves from the polarized assessments of various experts, Orban’s defeat is clearly not the end of the sovereigntist project, but rather its transition into a phase of reassessment and reorganization. Given the broader geopolitical balance, the Hungarian prime minister’s loss signifies the weakening of one of the key centers of the “sovereigntist international”, but by no means the winding down of this ideological project, which for many years has spread across Eastern Europe, finding resonance among politicians in our own country as well. Despite its apparent geographical remoteness, Moldova is situated within the broader epicenter of Eastern European processes. Developments on this flank of the EU directly affect the stability of the country’s European integration course and its political regime. As is well known, Orban’s position on Ukraine for a long time also slowed Moldova’s European path, and each Hungarian veto translated into lost time and a missed political momentum for us. With Orban’s departure, a ‘thaw’ could hypothetically be expected; however, it would be premature to rush into optimistic forecasts. The new Hungarian leadership is unlikely to abandon, overnight, its protection of the rights of its minority in Ukraine. Consequently, its veto stance will not disappear; it may simply change in both rhetoric and tone. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the same bargaining points between Budapest and Brussels will persist, albeit formulated in a more sophisticated manner. The most worrying aspect for Moldova is that, under pressure from the European Commission, which is increasingly inclined to eliminate any form of Russian energy presence in European countries, Hungarian authorities may terminate or revise agreements with Moscow regarding gas supplies to the Transnistrian region. As a result, Moldovan authorities would be faced with a large-scale crisis management challenge. It is one thing to keep Tiraspol in a state of managed vulnerability in the absence of alternative energy sources, and quite another to contain a socio-economic "fire" in the region, when the Kremlin gains an ideal pretext for more decisive action of both a humanitarian and military-political nature. Another energy destabilization of the left bank under current conditions is clearly not in Chișinău’s interests, as it would undermine all reintegration planning scheduled for the coming years. Therefore, in the coming months, Moldovan authorities will have to solve a complex diplomatic equation, not only to take advantage of the moment to accelerate negotiations with the EU but also to proactively build a pragmatic dialogue with a "new" Budapest. And finally: to which contemporary politician does a U.S. vice president travel as part of an electoral campaign, while the American president openly calls on voters to support him? World leaders who can drop in to see Putin at any convenient moment can also be counted on the fingers of one hand. This is to say that Orban, having led a relatively modest country in terms of resources and international weight, has effectively become a figure operating at the level of the first geopolitical league. That, in itself, is a difficult achievement, comparable, in relative terms, to becoming a Hollywood star while acting exclusively in Hungarian cinema. Therefore, regardless of the antipathy he may evoke among our authorities and various NGO commentators, he remains a major political figure in terms of scale. And the young Peter Magyar will now face a very difficult task, as his predecessor has set the bar extremely high.