Russian Troops Set to Stay in Moldova?

It appears that Moldova has missed a strategic window of opportunity to make headway on the issue of withdrawing the Russian task force from its constitutional territory

Behind the negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, which in recent years have focused primarily on social, humanitarian, and economic issues, lies a far more complex layer of the Transnistrian settlement related to security. It is this layer, not disputes over license plates, the environment, or taxes, that lies at the very heart of the conflict, upon which the prospects for its final resolution actually depend. For this reason, one cannot ignore the recent developments surrounding the Operational Group of Russian Forces and, more broadly, the Russian Federation’s military presence on the country’s constitutional territory. For several years, our leadership has firmly maintained that the key obstacle to reintegration is the presence of Russian military forces on the left bank of the Dniester, which also violates Moldova’s neutrality. On the surface, this position seems logical. However, upon closer inspection, these bold statements masked the absence of a concrete plan of action. The issue of the OGRF was often used more to attract international attention and mobilize the domestic electorate than as the subject of any concrete diplomatic efforts. Take, for example, Maia Sandu’s decision last year to strip five residents of the Transnistrian region serving in the OGRF of their Moldovan citizenship. What did it actually change? Well, strictly speaking, nothing. The group did not shrink, active-duty soldiers did not begin terminating their contracts en masse, the recruitment system remained intact, and, consequently, Moscow’s position did not weaken in any way. In other words, as in other cases, we saw something akin to a symbolic gesture with no practical effect. Last week, the authorities unexpectedly declared OGRF Commander Dmitry Zelenkov and five of his subordinates persona non grata. The pro-government press quickly spread the narrative that an uncompromising and unprecedented fight against the illegal Russian military presence had begun. But let’s ask ourselves a simple question: who were these people to Moldova up until this point? “Persona grata”? If these officers posed a threat, why have they only now been declared persona non grata? If there was no threat, then why the current spectacle? And most importantly, doesn’t this imply that all along there were certain tacit agreements between PAS and Moscow that the authorities preferred not to disclose to the public? What exactly have we achieved with this decision? It is well known that since the rotation of the Russian contingent effectively ceased in 2014, most OGRF officers have already been restricted in their movements. None of them go to Chisinau on weekends to shop. These people have long lived in isolation and fully understand their role. Their lifestyle will not be affected by the new status, nor will their official duties change. Consequently, declaring them persona non grata is a purely symbolic gesture. There will likely be no answer to these questions. However, there is an understanding of the context, and it makes our authorities’ decision not a display of strength, but, in essence, an admission of their weakness – a belated and, frankly speaking, humiliating act. For a long time, Chisinau operated on the tacit assumption that a diplomatic resolution to the war in Ukraine would automatically create the conditions for resolving the Transnistrian issue, and above all, for determining the fate of the OGRF. This idea has been voiced repeatedly and officially: as recently as late March, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi explicitly linked the prospects for the withdrawal of Russian troops to changes in the regional situation. It was a reasonable, if somewhat passive and wait-and-see, stance. The idea was that, as long as hostilities were ongoing, any agreements regarding the Transnistrian region would be frozen by default. However, later on, as part of a broader peace process, a window of opportunity would open, during which, with the support of allies, it would be possible to demand that Moscow withdraw its forces, along with their weapons, from the depots in Cobasna. But this window, it seems, has closed – and faster than anyone here had a chance to even glance through it. For instance, last week, Kyrylo Budanov, head of Zelensky’s administration, publicly stated that a future peace agreement on Ukraine would not include provisions for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria. Moreover, according to him, Moscow is actively seeking to maintain its military presence there in any possible form. All of this means that the issue has already been discussed at the diplomatic level and, moreover, has been left out of the broader Russian-Ukrainian deal. This means one thing: the OGRF issue ceases to be a lever for Kyiv and the West to exert direct pressure on Moscow. And once the war ends, it remains solely a matter of Russian-Moldovan relations. The entire previous logic behind our government’s strategy is collapsing, and it seems we were completely unprepared for this scenario. Simply put, by leaving issues of strategic importance to our country outside the scope of the military-political settlement, Kyiv and Moscow are thereby automatically determining Moldova’s future security status. So, what happened, and why did Chisinau find itself left out of the negotiations that directly determine its strategic prospects? The answer, apparently, lies in a political choice made consciously, the consequences of which will have to be dealt with for years to come. At some point, our leadership refused to allow Kyiv and Washington to include the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops on the agenda of the current trilateral negotiations on Ukraine. I assume this was done at the request of Brussels and other political centers in Europe, which are not interested in reaching the compromise deal that the White House is actively imposing on Russia and Ukraine. And if anyone in Chisinau had acted in the national interest, they should have pushed to include the issue of the OGRF in the list of key demands made of Moscow. They could have insisted that without resolving this problem, there can be no talk of a long-term security architecture in the region. They could have made it one of their diplomatic priorities. But our authorities chose to take a more cautious stance. At the same time, it must be understood that small countries like Moldova do not have the capacity to resolve such complex geopolitical challenges on their own. They need allies who are willing and able to exert pressure. They need windows of opportunity, which open rarely and for only a short time. And, most importantly, they need the willingness to seize these windows of opportunity, even at the cost of acknowledging their own dependence on decisions made in other capitals. But the problem is far more serious than it seems at first glance. The issue of foreign military presence is not only a matter of security and reintegration, but also one of the key factors in European integration. We can talk all we want about opening negotiations with Brussels as soon as possible, but the presence of a foreign military contingent on the territory of a candidate country is a fundamental political obstacle. It is easy to notice that PAS hardly mentions the example of Cyprus anymore, as it is becoming increasingly clear that leading European capitals are not prepared to apply the “Cyprus model” – with a deferred status regarding part of the territory – to Moldova. The EU already has enough crises of its own, so Europe is certainly not ready to import yet another unresolved conflict, especially one involving the military presence of a country that is not a NATO member. Hence all this unexpected political activity surrounding the OGRF, which resembles a frantic anti-crisis campaign. However, the declaration of several military officers as persona non grata that is almost laughable in its absurdity, can hardly be called a substantive step, and it is certainly not what one would expect from the pro-Western ruling regime in Moldova. Under the current circumstances, pretense is perhaps the worst possible response to a long-standing strategic problem. Now, however, our authorities will have to acknowledge an unpleasant reality: Kremlin is not going anywhere on its own; the issue of the OGRF is not only not being removed from the agenda but, on the contrary, is returning to it with even greater force. And as far as we can tell, none of our leaders really knows what to do about it.