Moldova Caught in Geopolitics: Threat of a New Church Divide?

Despite full awareness of all the associated risks, the ruling regime is guided by the need to weaken Russian influence in Moldova and to rally society around European integration, in which there is no place for ties with Moscow – not even spiritual ones

For many years, Moldova has lived under the coexistence of two Orthodox jurisdictions – the Moldovan Metropolis, linked to Moscow, and the Bessarabian Metropolis, oriented toward the Romanian Orthodox Church. As experience shows, this spiritual dualism has long gone beyond the bounds of a canonical dispute. It has become a reflection of a deeper, geopolitical fault line that runs through our society and defines our national identity. Even as the intra-Moldovan church conflict remains relatively moderate for now, the simplest symbolic incidents lay bare its nature with alarming clarity. For instance, this year both metropolises once again organized separate deliveries of the Holy Fire. Through such actions, two parallel spiritual spaces are taking root in our small country, spaces that do not converge or intersect in any way. This schism only deepens year after year. Until recently, the state, at least formally, maintained a balance by avoiding open intervention on either side. But, by all accounts, this era is coming to an end. It is impossible to ignore Maia Sandu’s recent decision to create a new position on her staff: advisor for relations with religious denominations. The newly appointed official, Ion Mocanu, is presented as a technocrat with no obvious background. Formally, this is an attempt to institutionalize the state’s dialogue with religious organizations. But in reality, such an “advisor” was needed due to the rapidly growing set of political challenges in one of the most sensitive areas of our society. Even this personnel decision once again laid bare the existing ecclesiastical tensions in the country. It turned out that Mocanu is the son-in-law of the secretary of the Moldovan Metropolis – the very same institution toward which the current authorities seem to harbor a still-hidden animosity. The Bessarabian Metropolis’ reaction was predictably negative: Mocanu was immediately perceived as a figure with predetermined preferences, and one with access to the levers of power to boot. The logic behind this pattern of behavior is linked not only to the current configuration of Moldovan domestic politics. The context is much broader. It includes the acceleration of European integration, rising tensions in the region, and the desire of European partners to minimize any Russian influence, including through church structures. Within this framework, the Moldovan Metropolis has long been viewed as an undesirable element. In these exact terms we should view the recent visit to Istanbul by one of Maia Sandu’s emissaries, Nicu Popescu, where he held talks with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I – allegedly on Europe and Christian values. To begin with, it must be said that neither Popescu himself nor our authorities as a whole are likely capable of organizing such an audience on their own. Thus, there are obviously far more influential forces behind this meeting – forces that know how to open the doors to such offices, and, most importantly, at the right time. Especially since the role of the Patriarch of Constantinople extends far beyond purely ecclesiastical ministry. According to some reports, together with him, former U.S. State Department Special Envoy for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback developed the architecture of the current system of tension within global Orthodoxy, primarily due to the granting of autonomy to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the formation of parallel jurisdictions within the canonical territories of other churches, such as in Montenegro. The British connection regarding Bartholomew is also noteworthy. In 2017, following the military coup in Turkey, the patriarch found himself in an extremely vulnerable position when several Turkish media outlets accused him of having ties to the coup plotters. At that time, among others, the British ambassador to Ankara, Richard Moore – who had headed the British secret service MI6 until 2025 – came to his defense. In other words, it is clear in what circles the Ecumenical Patriarchate operates, having long since become a convenient tool of Western geopolitics in the Orthodox world. This is due to the fact that it lacks a real flock and a territorial base and finds himself in a dependent position, where external funding and political support from the West have become a condition of the existence. To understand what exactly our country might face, one need only look back at Ukraine’s history in recent years. In 2018-2019, Bartholomew granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine a tomos of autocephaly, thereby creating an alternative structure to counterbalance the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This move, presented as a triumph of religious freedom, was in fact driven by a clear logic of spiritually displacing the Kremlin from the territory of a neighboring state. The authorities in Kyiv actively facilitated the transfer of parishes from one jurisdiction to another, often using administrative pressure. In recent years, Bartholomew’s ambitions have grown, and he has begun to openly raise the issue of direct control by Constantinople over the most significant Ukrainian churches. As a result, a deep and long-lasting schism has formed within Ukrainian Orthodoxy, accompanied by lawsuits, confiscations, criminal prosecutions of priests, and so on. And all because spiritual life was sacrificed to political expediency. If the same logic is applied to Moldova, the next step would be an attempt to deliver another “canonical blow” to the Moldovan Metropolis by splitting it up and subsequently transferring some of its parishes under the direct administration of Constantinople. This would allow them to sidestep the thorny issue of the Bessarabian Metropolis’ legitimacy while simultaneously creating additional jurisdictional chaos, in which the Moscow Patriarchate would finally lose its footing in our country. Apparently, previous attempts of administrative pressure and financial enticement of the clergy did not yield the expected results, and now heavier transnational tools are being brought into play. At the same time, it seems no one intends to take into account the fact that Moldovan society already exhibits a high level of (geo)political polarization. Crude interference in the religious sphere will not only deepen these rifts but also add a new dimension to them that cannot be resolved through legal means. For our largely archaic society, the Church is not merely a social institution; it is also an element of identity, a part of a living cultural and spiritual tradition whose roots run deeper than any modern ideology. For hundreds of thousands of believers affiliated with the Moldovan Metropolis, belonging to it is not a criterion for political choice, but a form of spiritual life inherited from their ancestors. The current political regime, while fully aware of the extent of the associated risks, apparently still operates according to the prevailing geopolitical logic: weakening Moscow’s influence and uniting society around European integration, in which, as is well known, there is no place for ties with Russia, let alone spiritual ones. However, the very recent example of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church shows that harsh and completely ill-considered measures almost always have long-term consequences. Ukraine has still not recovered from the decisions made several years ago. And there is no reason to believe that this process will unfold fundamentally differently in Moldova, especially since our country is far more politically vulnerable.