Fresh Problems for Chisinau’s International Backers

Unable to manage domestic scandals and governance failures, the ruling regime relies almost entirely on external legitimacy. Yet even this source of support begins to erode whenever crises emerge in partner countries

Over the past two weeks, the presidents of Ukraine and Romania have been Maia Sandu’s principal interlocutors. In late April, she visited Kyiv and Chornobyl, and just a few days later met again with the Ukrainian leader in Yerevan on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit. Sandu and Nicusor Dan also traveled to that summit aboard the same aircraft. Both of Sandu’s presidential counterparts, however, are going through a difficult period. Nicusor Dan has spent the entire week trying to contain the acute political crisis triggered by the no-confidence motion against National Liberal Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan. The Romanian president’s room for maneuver is limited by the political impossibility of bringing George Simion’s party into the establishment and by persistent tensions within the former governing coalition. All of this could lead to the formation of a technocratic minority government. If such a cabinet relies on Social Democratic support, and there is effectively no viable alternative, a significant share of the austerity measures Dan reportedly pledged to Brussels in exchange for electoral backing may be revised or even rolled back. In that case, he is likely to face difficulties in relations with Paris and the European Commission. In these circumstances, even minor flaws in this delicate political game could result in early parliamentary elections and possibly even an attempt, albeit a predictably unsuccessful one, to impeach the president himself. The office of the Ukrainian leader is also facing intense external pressure, originating either in Washington or Brussels. Andriy Yermak, the former head of the presidential office and one of the president’s closest allies, has come under investigation by anticorruption authorities. He has been formally notified of suspicion in a case involving money laundering through the construction of luxury real estate in the suburbs of Kyiv. Moreover, one of the unnamed but reportedly identified figures in the case may be President Zelensky himself. Meanwhile, his former press secretary Iuliia Mendel gave a widely discussed interview to American journalist Tucker Carlson, in which she hinted at alleged cocaine addiction on the part of the Ukrainian president and his supposed willingness to cede Donbas to Russia back in 2022. Such revelations rarely emerge out of nowhere and are generally considered to be carefully orchestrated. This is especially the case when they convey messages suggesting that Volodymyr Zelensky himself is “one of the main obstacles to peace”. A negative narrative is also linked to the regular crashes of Ukrainian drones on the territory of European Union countries, including Finland and the Baltic states. This has already led to the resignation of Latvia’s Defense Minister Andris Spruds and to certain tensions between the countries involved. At the same time, Kyiv has received crisis-management support from Germany in the form of an agreement with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius on the production of drones for Ukrainian needs on German territory, with a range of up to 1,500 kilometers. However, the White House continues to push Kyiv toward negotiations with Moscow, including the long-discussed territorial concessions. Any ceasefire or full-fledged agreement, once it becomes possible, as Vladimir Putin recently hinted, would inevitably raise the question of holding elections in Ukraine, after which Zelensky would, in all likelihood, lose power. The two neighboring countries are treated as “sacred cows” by the PAS government. Ukraine protects Moldova from the physical expansion of Russian presence and allows Chisinau to pursue a tougher policy toward Transnistria and Gagauzia without major consequences. Romania, in turn, is a stable ally and an ideological center of gravity, enabling the authorities to leverage the issue of “unification” in their dialogue with Brussels. Destabilization in these states, amid ongoing internal scandals and governance failures, represents an obvious problem for Maia Sandu’s team. A favorable external environment remains a key source of both power and legitimacy for the current regime. Any shift in this context could force a refocusing on domestic priorities and require competent responses to long-accumulated questions and challenges, a capacity which neither the presidency nor PAS-led governments have so far demonstrated. The United Kingdom is one of Maia Sandu’s key partners, with a 400-page defense and security agreement signed between the two countries. London has traditionally encouraged Chisinau to support an anti-Russian policy and rhetoric, participates in information campaigns, and monitors the activities of pro-government non-governmental organizations. However, the prospects of Prime Minister Keir Starmer appear increasingly unfavorable. With more than 40 members of his own Labor Party already calling for his resignation, Keir Starmer’s removal from office increasingly appears to be a matter of time. A separate storyline concerns the results of local elections in Scotland, where the pro-European separatist SNP once again prevailed, and in Wales, where Labor suffered a heavy defeat, with most votes going to independence supporters and the Eurosceptic party “Reform UK” led by Nigel Farage. If London is forced to temporarily refocus on domestic affairs, Chisinau will find itself in a difficult position without British guidance, especially amid a perceived deficit of so-called American leadership. In this context, Ambassador Vlad Kulminski’s efforts in Washington, including attempts to highlight a “socialist-communist threat” and reduce import tariffs on American goods, have so far failed to produce tangible results. The suspension of low-cost lending through the International Monetary Fund also remains a negative factor contributing to Moldova’s fiscal and budgetary destabilization. During her contacts this week, Maia Sandu was unable to achieve any breakthrough in relations with this once key partner. Political turbulence is once again creating discomfort for the country’s leadership, which it will traditionally seek to offset through an intensified push on the European integration agenda. The primary objective is to divert public and opposition attention away from domestic problems, where PAS continues to demonstrate administrative decline and a lack of responsiveness to public interests.